May 31, 2017
Stop Explaining Community Associations Law the Wrong Way
The proponents and critics of HOAs and Condominiums both tend to over-simplify the law and governing documents in a way that ignores many rights of owners (and boards). Some are explaining community associations law the wrong way. This area of the law is confusing, even to law school graduates and real estate professionals. Among the governing documents are declarations, bylaws, rules & regulations, architectural guidelines, articles of incorporation and amendments. Virginia law includes the Condominium Act, Property Owners Association Act, Nonstock Corporation Act, for the state Common Interest Community Board. This is not to mention federal laws such as the Fair Housing Act. On top of this you have the state and federal constitutions and published court opinions. If a legal dispute emerges between a board and an owner, the parties will struggle to determine which, if any of these statutes and documents apply to the situation. If more than one speaks to the problem, how do you reconcile ambiguities or discrepancies. Given the rat’s nest of law and governing documents, it is a challenge for anyone to quickly sort out these things without the assistance of legal counsel.
So how do you begin to explain community associations law? Most people are visual learners. They sort out complex matters faster with cartoons, charts and other graphics. Some lawyers practicing community associations law have tried to do this for association laws and governing documents. For example, an attorney in Washington State created this graphic. I’ve seen similar graphics for other states prepared by others. Charts like this don’t explain the hierarchy of authorities in a way that reduces confusion. I don’t want my readers to think that I’m picking on the author of this chart. Perhaps this is useful for Washington State. I will explain why this approach is unhelpful with respect to Virginia law.
The General Assembly enacts legislation and private parties join covenants and other contracts. The legislature declares what statutes say. The same can be said for private parties and contracts. Under our constitutional system, the judiciary’s mandate is to declare what legislation and contracts mean in the controversies brought in litigation. Sometimes this is easy because the “plain meaning” of a statute or contract is apparent on the face of the document. Often adversaries bring with them conflicting interpretations of documents or laws when they come into the courtroom. The contract or statute may not be clear on what remedies are available for breach of a statute or contract.
Often, the courts enforce claims, defenses and remedies that aren’t memorialized in any constitution, statute, regulation, contract, etc. Someone can read all community association legislative enactments and the association’s governing documents and not identify fundamental legal rights or duties that the owner (or board) may hold. This is because Virginia, like almost all other states, has “common law” legal doctrine enshrined in older case decisions that applies, except where abolished or superseded by statute:
American judges further interpreted the common law in case decisions applying it from 1776 to the present day. The common law includes a highly-developed set of doctrines regarding property rights, covenants, defenses and court remedies. The Supreme Court recently published an opinion in Tvardek v. Powhatan Village HOA discussing how the common law disfavors restrictive covenants. Here is a link to my previous post discussing the Tvardek case. That case is still important even though the General Assembly enacted legislation in 2017 in response. Enactments of the General Assembly that strengthen the enforcement of covenants are narrowly interpreted by Virginia courts because they limit owners’ common law property rights. This means that the statutes are not interpreted to give HOAs broad powers. The authority must be sufficiently articulated. This is why the proponents of community associations are so active in state capitals.
What are these common law rights, defenses and remedies and why do they matter? There are too many to summarize in this blog post. I will provide one example. A declaration of covenants is a type of real estate contract. The Property Owners Association Act makes it easier for covenants to be legally enforced against owners (and associations) that allegedly breach them. But common law defenses to breach of contract are still available to oppose the legal action. For example, if a board is found to have clearly or consistently failed to enforce the architectural guidelines, then an owner may be able to assert common law defenses such as waiver, estoppel, abandonment of the restriction or acquiescence in the alleged violation. Common law defenses like waiver and estoppel don’t need to be in the governing documents or statutes to be asserted by the owner. Where applicable, the owner just needs to understand the definition of the common law defenses and whether they have been abrogated by statute or the covenants themselves. This is just one example of common law defenses. The Washington state community associations law graphic fails to show common law rights, defenses and remedies that are valuable to boards and owners alike.
The common law is a secret treasure trove to property owners defending themselves against board or neighbor overreach. Property owners have legal rights that aren’t described in the statutes or governing documents. These rights don’t require wing-and-prayer appeals to various state officials or convoluted constitutional arguments. They are already there in legal treatises available in law libraries. In the fast-pace of litigation where parties don’t have months or years to sort out the diverse array of legal authorities and governing documents, owners need qualified legal counsel to help them identify and protect their rights.
Referenced Authorities:
Tvardek v. Powhatan Village HOA, 784 S.E.2d 280 (Va. 2016)
Photo Credit:
StevenM_61 Neighborhood in Snowstorm, North Richland Hills, 2008 via photopin (license)
May 16, 2017
Breach of Agreement to Purchase Insurance
Many construction contracts contain provisions requiring one or more parties to purchase insurance to cover certain activities or property related to the project. These provisions put an affirmative duty on a party to go out and obtain insurance to protect themselves, the other party in the contract or for against third party claims. Given the potential for expensive property damage claims or even personal injury, it makes sense for the parties to consider insurance provisions. This can be a great way of protecting against the risks of loss and litigation. If there is damage or loss and it is covered by a policy, this “Plan B” works. But what if in the event of loss the party that agreed in the contract to purchase insurance failed to do so? Is there a “Plan C?” Can they sue for breach of agreement to purchase insurance? In Virginia, the courts often deem the party who failed to fulfill their obligations to purchase insurance responsible for the loss. This seems obvious, but in cases where the opponent also breached the contract, it may not be clear how to sort out the liabilities. Whether an owner, contractor or subcontractor is what lawyers and judges call a “constructive insurer” by failure to buy insurance turns on the specific language in the agreement.
The leading Supreme Court of Virginia case on this is the 1983 decision, Walker v. Vanderpool. Roland and Elizabeth Walker owned a home in Virginia, southwest of Richmond. In 1977, they retained Vanderpool Heating & Air Conditioning Service for purchase and installation of an oil-burning furnace for $2,305. The contract said, “All work to be completed in a workmanlike manner according to standard practices.” The terms also required the Walkers to acquire and maintain fire insurance on the house. After completion, the furnace caught fire and the house burned. The Walkers had not purchased fire insurance. The Walkers alleged that their home burned because Vanderpool negligently connected the new oil furnace to a “non-existent chimney” and then turned it on. The Walkers sued Vanderpool for $45,000.00 in damages.
Vanderpool argued that if a person enters into an agreement to obtain insurance and neglects to fulfil this obligation, that person becomes the insurer and is potentially liable as such to the other party to the contract. The Walkers responded that the insurance provisions do not properly work to protect Vanderpool from liability for their own negligence.
The Supreme Court of Virginia took a “freedom of contract” approach on this case, observing that the Walkers were free to reject the Vanderpool contract unless the insurance provision was removed or modified. The Court agreed with Vanderpool that by their failure to procure the insurance, the Walkers became self-insured on this risk, and could not come after Vanderpool.
It’s easy to see how these parties looked at the contract and saw in it what they wanted. Vanderpool liked the insurance provisions, and the Walkers liked the scope and standard of workmanship provisions. In general, courts will try to harmonize different provisions in a contract so that no sections are effectively removed or rewritten in the judge’s decision.
Owners and contractors often do not focus on the insurance provisions in a contract until after something unfortunate happens. It pays to understand any contract before signing it.
Sometimes a party who fails to purchase required insurance for a project has no means to pay on a claim. A contractor may have no assets except a few pieces of equipment. An owner may have spent all of their extra cash on the project. It is important to obtain certificates of insurance to confirm that there is coverage in place.
These insurance provisions are found in a variety of other real estate related agreements, such as lease agreements, condominium or HOA covenants or mortgage documents. Newer HOA and condominium covenants seek to shift risks off the board and onto individual owners in sections dealing with liability, indemnification and insurance. Sometimes state statutes will impose insurance requirements. For example, in the District of Columbia, the Condominium Act requires owners and the association to purchase insurance. To understand insurance obligations for an owner in a HOA or condominium, it is necessary to also check what statutes, if any may apply should a dispute arise. Owners and contractors usually need the assistance of a qualified attorney to answer questions raised by mumbo jumbo in real estate and construction documents. Individual persons can often protect themselves by purchasing insurance. Being fully insured can save property owners from potential costs, including repairs and related attorney’s fees.
Case Citation:
Walker v. Vanderpool, 225 Va. 266 (1983)
Photo Credit:
May 5, 2017
Community Association Dispute Resolution Procedures in Virginia
When owners have disputes with their condominium or HOA boards, sometimes it is unclear where or how they must go about seeking redress or defending their rights. Owners must understand how association dispute resolution procedures work so that they do not prejudice their own claims or defenses by failure to go to the proper forum or meet deadlines. What options are available will depend upon the facts of the case and the governing documents. Sometimes it can feel like a labyrinth without an aerial view of sorts. The following is a summary overview and is not intended to explain everything:
Litigation:
In the absence of other dispute resolution procedures, owners have the option of filing or defending a lawsuit. The Property Owners Association Act and Condominium Act both provide that owners or associations may bring suit in order to enforce the declaration of covenants. They also provide that the prevailing party shall receive an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court of Virginia recently made an owner-favorable decision on the issue of attorneys fees. See my post, Condo Owner Prevails on her Request for Attorney Fees.
Some suits where the amount in controversy is $25,000.00 or less can be brought in the General District Court (GDC) for the city or county where the property is located. The advantage of the GDC is that cases go to trial faster and are in most situations less expensive to litigate. Suits over $25,000.00 or where equitable remedies are sought by the owner must be brought in the Circuit Court. The procedures there are more complex. This blog post explains how they usually start, The Beginning of a Virginia Circuit Court Case. Community association cases usually don’t end up in the U.S. District Court. If one of the parties is in bankruptcy, the case may end up in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. While litigation is more time-consuming and laborious than some other dispute resolutions options, the outcomes tend to be more favorable because of the independence of the judiciary.
Internal Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution:
The most common “venue” for resolution of disputes between owners and boards is internally within the association’s governance structure. Declarations of covenants, bylaws, architectural standards, rules & regulations and articles of incorporation may provide for claims to be brought by owners or the association before the board of directors or the architectural review committee.
The most notorious form of this is where the association issues a notice to an owner that she has violated a covenant, rule or regulation and must appear in a hearing before the board or committee. See, Don’t go it alone on a Notice of Violation. The courts allow this under the statutes, but there must also be provisions in the covenants that allow for the association to assess nonjudicial fines. These procedures are controversial because they allow the association to act as prosecutor, judge, jury and collection agent in their own case.
Sometimes owners have disputes with one another over party walls or boundary fences. Many covenants have provisions that require them to submit disputes over party walls or boundary fences to the board of directors as arbitrator. I don’t like these provisions because board members typically don’t have experience or training as arbitrators. Arbitration is not the same as rules violation hearings. Board members may have a vested interest or bias in the outcome of the party wall arbitration.
Some newer governing documents have internal dispute resolution procedures that seem all-encompassing. For example, an owner may be required to exhaust detailed procedures under the governing documents before acquiring the legal right to bring suit. Rules may require deadlines and procedures for seeking board of directors “appellate” review of decisions adverse to the owner. This may require an owner or their lawyer to compare multiple governing documents and to analyze them under Virginia statutes and case-law to determine whether action is necessary in order to protect one’s property rights. If the owner fails to first exhaust the” internal remedies” before going to court or fails to follow some dispute resolution procedure, they may be prejudiced in their ability to get a judge (or arbitrator) to consider it on its merits.
In general, the world of these internal nonjudicial procedures favors the boards. Not only do they sit as decision makers, they also may have authority to record liens, foreclose or even act as trustee in condominium termination proceedings. That said, owners should not ignore these procedures. If the board fails to follow its own internal rules, then that may position the owner for a favorable outcome in litigation or arbitration. The board has no authority outside of what the covenants and statutes create. See, Do your association’s parking rules pass the small test?
Arbitration:
Virginia law allows community associations to put binding arbitration clauses in their covenants. This means that in the event of a dispute, an owner may find out that they cannot simply bring the case before the judiciary. Arbitration clauses typically designate a company such as the American Arbitration Association as the “venue” that acts in the place of a court. Sometimes, arbitration can be more expensive to the participants than litigation. Significant up-front fees may be required. The covenants may require the case to be arbitrated through an agency that has cozy relationships with real estate industry people and doesn’t have a consumer protection orientation. The arbitration process doesn’t favor the “little guy.” See, Overcoming Delay Tactics in Arbitration.
Office of the Ombudsman of the Common Interest Community Board:
If there weren’t already enough potential venues, the General Assembly created another one. If an owner has a grievance against a board or licensed property manager, they may submit an adverse decision to the state Common Interest Community Board for review. This has been touted by some as a way of having a government regulator review the legality of a board or property manager action without having to court or arbitration. As my previous blog post explains, the Ombudsman does not render decisions adverse to boards where the parties are arguing opposing interpretations of statutes or governing documents. See, Condo Owner Prevails on her Request for Attorney Fees. Since both sides need to take opposing interpretations for a dispute to arise in the first place, this is not a useful process for an owner to pursue when they are concerned about the outcome.
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In my practice, I prefer to help clients to understand and protect their rights without unnecessary legal action. Ideally, boards and owners can negotiate a mutually acceptable outcome without going to court or arbitration. Unfortunately, this is not always possible in many owners’ circumstances. When a HOA or condominium board seems to be taking improper action or failing to fulfill its obligations under the governing documents, owners need to know where they can turn to obtain useful and cost-effective relief. As this survey shows, in Virginia there is a potentially confusing array of procedures and venues. An owner can potentially become focused on one or two and run the risk of having a deadline expire on bringing the claim properly. When owners need some help making sense out of the governing documents, laws and correspondence from the association, they need an attorney who practices community associations law but isn’t allied with the boards or association industry. That’s why I started my little firm where we don’t accept cases where we represent boards.
photo credit: –v Laberint d’Horta via photopin (license)
April 28, 2017
Condo Owner Prevails on Her Request for Attorney Fees
One problem that owners in HOAs and condominiums face is access to justice. Boards enjoy various out-of-court remedies, such as fines, liens and foreclosures. To obtain remedies for the board’s breach of the governing documents, owners must bring a lawsuit. This requires legal counsel familiar with how governing documents, statutes and judicial precedent fit together. When cases go to trial, owners face uncertainty in the amount of attorney’s fees that may be awarded to the prevailing party. What determines whether a condo owner prevails on her request for attorneys fees? Many judges seem reluctant to award a full amount of attorney’s fees. Is seeking the assistance of a state agency a viable alternative to the courts?
I’m happy when I can report news to my readers when owners win and courts set precedents that will help them in the future. On April 13, 2017, condo owner Martha Lambert won a significant victory in the Supreme Court of Virginia against Sea Oats Condominium Association. Her board forced her to hire an attorney go to trial to obtain reimbursement for a $500.00 repair. The governing documents contractually obligated this Virginia Beach association to repair an exterior door jamb to her condo unit. The board failed to make the repair despite her persistent requests. They insisted that the damage was to a limited common element that was her responsibility. Initially, she sought petitioned the Virginia Common Interest Community Ombudsman’s Office to redress the board’s adverse decision. The Ombudsman issued a couple decisions letters indicating that she was unable to help Ms. Lambert. The owner made the repair herself and sued the association in the General District Court of Virginia Beach. When Sea Oats prevailed in G.D.C., Lambert appealed to the Circuit Court. There Sea Oats continued to defend the case, filing a motion and discovery requests. Lambert prevailed in the subsequent trial. The judge awarded a $500 judgment in her favor and against the condominium association. Ms. Lambert’s attorney submitted an affidavit indicating she incurred $8,232.00 in attorney’s fees. Under the Virginia Condominium Act, a prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. The parties submitted briefs and argued a post-trial motion on the issue of attorney’s fees.
The lawyers for the condominium board opposed the attorney’s fees award. They argued that the owner’s request for attorney’s fees was 16 times the amount of the judgment. Without waiting to read Ms. Lambert’s response, the Judge James C. Lewis awarded her only $375.00 in attorney’s fees. Ms. Lambert’s attorney nonetheless filed a brief, and provided notice that she incurred an additional $2,650 in fees for the post-trial motions activity.
Was court litigation Ms. Lambert’s only means of redress against the condo board’s adverse decision regarding the broken door? Is there some state agency or official who can aid resolution of these disputes? Ms. Lambert tried to take this dispute to the Office of the Common Interest Community Ombudsman. Ombudsman Heather S. Gillespie issued a decision letter on April 17, 2013. Ms. Gillespie observed that her office lacked the legal authority to decide the dispute because the answer lay in the interpretation of the condominium instruments (bylaws, covenants, etc.) as to whose obligation it was to repair the limited common element. In a separate letter dated May 13, 2013, Ms. Gillespie declined to decide against Sea Oats on Ms. Lambert’s claim to inspect the association books and records pursuant to the Condominium Act. Ms. Gillespie observed that the Act was not clear and that sorting out statutory ambiguity was the province of the courts. As you can see from this case study, the Ombudsman’s Office lacks the authority to decide cases where parties present conflicting interpretation of legal documents. Of course, if the parties agreed as to what they meant, there would not be a dispute. Consumers and property owners are better off in court anyway because of the independence of the judiciary from lobbying and the political winds of change.
Ms. Lambert’s only effective means of redress was through the courts so that’s where she went. There are two ways of looking at Ms. Lambert’s case. There is a view that if someone files a civil lawsuit, they must have done something wrong to incur the damage that they suffered or they are otherwise petty or vindictive. In my years of practice both bringing and defending civil suits, I have come to see that there is often an unfair prejudice against plaintiffs.
The other perspective is that Sea Oats drove unnecessary litigation by failing to perform their maintenance obligations and then aggressively defending the suit to exhaust Ms. Lambert’s resources. If the defendant can simply outspend and exhaust their opponent, they don’t need to be in the right. If obstructionist tactics are rewarded in how attorney’s fee awards are determined, then the specific obligations of the HOA or condominium covenants can be made of no effect.
Judge Lewis explained why he only awarded $375 in attorney’s fees. He found that Ms. Lambert’s lawyer did a “magnificent job,” but “I thought $6,000 in attorney’s fees on a case involving a dispute of $500 was not fair to the Defendant [Sea Oats].” Ms. Lambert appealed her case to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Was it proper for Judge Lewis to find that a prevailing party could be denied almost all the attorney’s fees she incurred because the amount was not “proportional” to the judgment? Lawyers know from experience that, especially in many state courts, judges are reluctant to award a prevailing party $6,000-$9,000 in attorney’s fees on a $500.00 judgment. The practical effect is that owners and their lawyers are reluctant to bring lawsuits where the amount of attorney’s fees is expected to exceed the value of what could be expected in the judgment. Sometimes these circumstances embolden boards to strategically breach the covenants.
On appeal, Ms. Lambert analogized the attorney’s fees provision in the Condominium Act to similar provisions in the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The Supreme Court previously held that the purpose of the VCPA’s attorney’s fees provisions is to encourage private citizens to enforce the statute through civil litigation. Otherwise, the VCPA’s policies could be made of no effect if the consumer must bear the costs of vindicating the statutory rights. If you listen to the audio recording on the Court’s website, you can hear Lambert’s appellate attorney Kevin Martingayle doing an excellent job arguing the case to the justices.
On appeal, a judge’s determination of an award of attorney’s fees is evaluated on an “abuse of discretion” standard. However, the scope of the judge’s discretion is not absolute. The statutes and contract provisions create a boundary of exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court viewed the trial judge’s “proportionality” requirement as an incorrect legal conclusion misinforming his decision.
The Condominium Act states that the prevailing party in an action to enforce compliance with the condominium covenants and bylaws shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. There is an analogous section in the Property Owners Association Act that applies to most HOA’s in Virginia. These statutes are exceptions to the general rule that each party to a lawsuit must pay their own attorney’s fees. Unless you are in Alaska, courts won’t consider attorneys fee requests unless there is a statute or contract provision that allows for attorney’s fees. The Condominium Act makes an award of reasonable attorney’s fees mandatory when one side prevails, instead of merely an option for the judge.
What factors determine the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees? According to the Supreme Court of Virginia, those factors include:
- The time and effort expended by the attorney.
- The nature of the services rendered.
- The complexity of the services.
- The value of the services to the client.
- The results obtained.
- Whether the fees incurred were consistent with those generally charged for similar services
- Whether the services were necessary and appropriate.
Judges are also permitted to consider other factors. In Lambert v. Sea Oats, the Supreme Court found that the amount of damages awarded was a permissible consideration under the “results obtained” factor. However, “merely applying a ratio between the damages actually awarded and damages originally sought will not satisfy the reasonableness inquiry.” This is common sense. In some cases, the non-prevailing party will engage in vigorous litigation tactics that will leave their opponent with the choice of taking necessary action to obtain a result in the case or abandon the claim. Conversely, plaintiffs can also be found to “over-litigate” cases, resulting in defendants incurring attorney fees that may be unnecessary in the case was properly brought. A formulaic ratio may be simply inadequate to do justice. The Supreme Court observed that a trial court may consider any disparity between the amount sought in the lawsuit versus the verdict. If a plaintiff sues for $500,000.00 but only receives $50,000.00 at trial, then this may factor in the attorney’s fee award. The Supreme Court found that Judge Lewis should have compared the $500 sought to the $500 awarded instead of the ratio of the fee request to the award:
[T]he “results obtained” factor does not permit courts to do what the circuit court did here—i.e., to use the amount of damages sought as a limit beyond which no attorney’s fees will be awarded. To do so tells parties that they may not recover the reasonable attorney’s fees they incur simply by sending an attorney through the courthouse door if they prosecute, or defend against, claims in which such fees exceed the amount in controversy. Circuit court litigation comes at a price, sometimes a heavy price. There is an initial pleading, or an answer to one, to research, write, and file. Discovery may be propounded and must be answered. There will be witnesses to prepare for trial. There may be pre-trial motions to research, write, and argue. And then there is the trial itself, if the case makes it that far. If either party invokes its right to a jury, trial could encompass everything from voir dire to jury instructions.
Each of these tasks requires an attorney’s time and, provided the time is reasonable in light of his or her experience and the nature of the case, he or she may expect compensation for that time at a reasonable rate. Undoubtedly, the number of tasks and the time required for them will vary depending on whether the ad damnum is $500 or $5 million, regardless of whether the attorney represents the plaintiff or the defendant. They will likewise vary based on the vigor with which the opposing party responds. But it is the court’s duty to assess the necessity of those tasks, the time spent on them, and the rate charged “under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Mullins, 241 Va. at 449, 403 S.E.2d at 335. This does not require the court to pore over pages and pages of billing records to evaluate the reasonableness of each line-item. But the court may neither shirk its duty to assess what amount of attorney’s fees is reasonable in the specific case before it, nor award an amount so low that it fails to reimburse the prevailing party for the costs necessary to effectively litigate the claim that—after all—it prevailed on.
Plaintiffs who come to court believe they have legitimate claims that are being illegitimately denied by the defendant. Defendants who come to court believe their defenses are legitimate. Neither’s position need be frivolous; they may simply disagree. But when each of them comes to court seeking a neutral adjudication of their disagreement, each is there because the opposing side forced him or her to be. When the case is covered by a fee-shifting provision and the court weighs the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to award, it cannot dismiss out of hand the costs of litigation inflicted on the prevailing party by the losing party’s insistence on its losing argument, based solely on the dollar value of the claim. To do so deprives the parties of the benefit of their bargain if the fee-shifting provision is contractual and contravenes the intent of the General Assembly if the provision is statutory.
We stress that this holding does not mean that courts may not consider the value of the claim, along with other factors, to assess the complexity of the case (and therefore the legal services necessary to represent the client’s interests), or whether those services were necessary and appropriate in light of the claims prosecuted or defended against. It means only that courts may not do what this court did and say that “$6,000 in attorney’s fees on a case involving a dispute of $500” is unreasonable per se, without regard to the necessary costs of effectively litigating a claim.
The Supreme Court’s decision requires the case to go back to the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach to reconsider the award of attorney’s fees in light of the opinion.
Lambert v. Sea Oats is a big victory for owners in condominiums and HOAs. First, it sends a message that the particular circumstances of a case cannot be ignored and replaced by some percentage of the judgment. Second, this discourages HOA and condo boards from stonewalling owners’ rightful claims for what they are entitled under the governing documents. Third, it puts the obligation on the parties to make sound, rational litigation decisions. Fourth, it will help owners in cases that will never actually go to court. Why? Because the association lawyers will counsel their clients regarding this case and it will deter the kind of conduct that gave rise to cases like Ms. Lambert’s.
What I dislike about the trial judge’s approach in awarding only $375 is that it places parties like Ms. Lambert in an impossible position. Without reversals like this appellate decision, in the next case an owner would have to either (a) fix the common area herself and not seek reimbursement, thus making the covenants to no benefit to her, (b) limit the attorney’s activity to one or two hours of work, which could result in the owner losing the case for failure on a procedural technicality, or (c) effectively pay eight or nine thousand dollars to get the door fixed when the board is required to do it for $500.00.
Not all community association lawsuits are about money damages. Sometimes the plaintiff seeks an order that their opponent stop doing something, to take affirmative action required under a contract, or to declare the results of a board election invalid. In a footnote, the Supreme Court states that in those cases there may not be a dollar amount in controversy: “These cases tend to be binary, and the ‘result obtained’ is clear based on whether the relief sought was granted or denied.”
Does this new decision mean that homeowners will always get a disproportional award of attorney’s fees in small dollar cases where they prevail? No. But it does help to level the playing field of litigation. I hope that this case encourages more owners to pursue legal action when they suffer damage and infringement of rights in association matters. This case should also discourage owners and boards alike from bringing cases that should not be brought in the first place.
Update July 20, 2022:
I have a new blog post about Attorney fee awards in HOA and condominium law cases. “Awards of Attorney’s Fees in Community Association Litigation.” This blog post addresses the issue of attorneys fees in these cases more generally, with greater focus on the procedural aspects of such claims.
For Further Reading or Listening:
Lambert v. Sea Oats Condo. Ass’n, 293 Va. 245 (2017)
Lambert v. Sea Oats Condominium, Inc. (Jan. 2017 Va. Supr. Ct. Oral Argument)
Lambert v. Sea Oats Condominium, Inc. (Apr. 17, 2013 Va. CIC Ombudsman Determination)
Lambert v. Sea Oats Condominium, Inc. (May 13, 2013 Va. CIC Ombudsman Determination)
Lambert v. Sea Oats Condominium, Inc. (Jun. 5, 2013 Va. CIC Ombudsman Determination)
Featured Image:
The photograph for this blog post doesn’t depict anything discussed in the article. It’s a row-house in Alexandria, Virginia.
February 28, 2017
Little Love Lost in Sedimental Affair
A lawsuit for damage to property must be timely filed to prevail in court. In Virginia, the statute of limitations for property damage is five years from accrual of the claim. When an owner suffers damage caused by a neighboring owner, when does this five year time-period start running towards its expiration date? Does the clock start ticking at the time the trespass or nuisance began or some other moment? On February 16, 2017, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued a new decision finding that when the effect of the offending structure is continuous, the claim accrues when damage began. The distinction between “temporary” and “continuous” is potentially confusing and the stakes are high in real property damage cases. Understanding how Virginia courts apply these rules is essential whenever owners and their attorneys discover what is happening.
Forest Lakes Community Ass’n v. United Land Corp. of America involved property that I have driven by numerous times. I grew up in Orange and Culpeper Counties in Virginia. My family would drive down Route 29 to shop or attend sporting events in Charlottesville. The Charlottesville area prides itself as the home of President Thomas Jefferson and the University of Virginia. Along Route 29 is Hollymead, an artificial lake built from a sediment basin. A sediment basin removes silt or other particles from muddied waterways. Two HOAs, Forest Lake Community Association, Inc. and Hollymead Citizens Association, Inc. jointly own Lake Hollymead.
The defendants included United Land Corp. and other owners and builders of the Hollymead Town Center (“HTC”) upstream from the Plaintiff HOAs’ lake. In 2003-2004, defendant developers constructed three new settlement basins along Powell Creek, the tributary to Lake Hollymead. Owners in the HOAs complained about excessive influx of sediment from the HTC construction into Lake Hollymead. If I bought a home with lake views, I wouldn’t like looking at muddied waters either. The HOAs complained that the defendants caused excessive sedimentation by improperly removing vegetation within the Powell Creek watershed.
If this was a serious problem, how did it get through the county’s permitting process? According to the case opinion, the development complied with state and local regulations regarding retainage of sediment within the three new basins. The county rejected suggestions from downstream owners that upgraded sediment filtration systems be required of HTC. The case doesn’t discuss whether the county’s standards did, or should set a benchmark for the reasonableness of the defendants’ control of sediment. Owners may have a right to sue even when the city or county refuses to intervene in a property damage dispute.
Discussions continued within these HOAs for years. In 2011 they finally filed suit, alleging nuisance and trespass. The HOAs asked for the court to award them money damages and an injunction requiring the defendants to stop the excessive drain of sediment. The HOAs enjoyed standing because they jointly owned Lake Hollymead as a common area. Incursion of sediment into Lake Hollymead began during HTC’s construction. The HOAs argued that intermittent storms caused subsequent separate and distinct sediment incursions, each triggering new causes of action that restarted the five year statute of limitation. This was contradicted by the HOAs’ expert who acknowledged that at least a little sediment incurred continuously. The HOAs also argued that the defendants’ sediment currently sits in Lake Hollymead and will continue to trespass until someone digs it out.
When a case comes to a lawyer for the first time, her initial assessment considers statutes of limitation. Legal claims have a corresponding statute of limitation setting a deadline by which the claim must be brought. Even if the claim is one day late it can be dismissed as time-barred. The HTC defendants sought to have the HOAs’ claims dismissed because they waited over five years after the sediment problem began in the 2003-2004 timeframe. After a day of testimony, Judge Paul M. Peatross found that the statute of limitations barred the claims because they accrued in 2003 and sediment incurred continuously thereafter.
The HOAs sought review by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Their appeal focused on Judge Peatross’ ruling that the claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitation because the continuous damage accrued at construction.
Justice D. Arthur Kelsey explained in the opinion that under Virginia law, a claim for an injury to property accrues when the first measurable damage occurs. Subsequent, compounding or aggravating damage attributable to the original problem does not restart a new limitations period. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs might need to seek a claim for an award for past, present and future damages. This accrual principle applies where the permanent structure causing the injury could be expected to continue indefinitely. I find this confusing, because drainage systems and sediment basins have lifespans. After a number of years, they fail or require repairs. Anything that comes into contact with water is under tremendous pressure. Perhaps what the court means is that the structure causing the injury is “permanent” if it would continue to cause the damage if maintained to continue to function as it did originally. This concept of “permanent structure” implies that its owner will maintain the nuisancing or trespassing feature as it presently exists.
Alternatively, in the facts of a case, a later cause of action might accrue that looks and acts like the earlier one but is a “stand alone” claim that starts a new five year limitations period. This can happen where the structure causes separate, temporary property damage. For example, some dams can be opened or closed. This exception can apply even when the physical structure causing the damage is a permanent fixture.
Justice Kelsey acknowledged the challenges applying these principles to particular cases:
Though easy to restate, these concepts defy any attempts at formulatic applications. Because the underlying issue – determining the boundaries of a cause of action – depends to heaving on the factual context of each case, our jurisprudence has tailored these principles to analogous fact patterns and rights of action.
To resolve these issues, the Supreme Court relied upon the factual finding of the Circuit Court that the three HTC sediment basins discharged into Lake Hollymead on a continuous basis and that the five year statute was not revived by a later, discrete discharge episode.
Ordinarily, on these motions to dismiss a lawsuit, the courts tend to give plaintiffs a benefit of the doubt. Often judges will look to see if the facts are contested so as to warrant a trial. Here, Judge Peatross took a day’s worth of testimony in a pretrial hearing. The HOAs may have appealed on the hope that the Circuit Court short-circuited the case too early and the Supreme Court would rule that they deserved another chance to have their case heard on its merits. This case may embolden more defendants to put on expert testimony in support of a plea of a statute of limitations in the hopes that their cases could be brought to a quick end.
The easiest way to avoid these kinds of statute of limitation problems is to file suit early enough so that either way the court looks at it, it would be deemed timely. Plaintiffs and their lawyers should file early to avoid the necessity of having to litigate such issues in day long evidentiary hearings and on appeal.
Case Citation:
January 24, 2017
What’s left of Virginia’s HOA Open Meeting Policy?
Promoters of community associations tout them as “mini-democracies,” reflecting the American tradition of public participation in governmental activity on a local level. One hallmark of “representative government” is that constituents may openly observe and review what their elected officials are doing with the money and property controlled for common benefit. Norman Rockwell enshrined this in his famous illustration of a working-class gentleman standing up to speak during a “town hall” meeting. If a citizen could not review proposed enactments and observe the deliberations of their rulemaking bodies, a fundamental element of democracy and the rule of law would disappear.
Lack of transparency and accountability between the management group and the owners is a widespread problem. With every news report about a condo building collapsing, managers embezzling thousands of dollars or the board awarding lucrative contracts to affiliated vendors, questions arise about how effective oversight could cure these ills. Today, the Washington Post ran an article about a Maryland HOA case where the judge found that the board improperly enforced a resolution requiring all owners to replace their mailboxes with a new $500.00 design. Fair elections, open meeting policies and freedom of information are the supposed safeguards for a resident’s peace of mind. Given Americans’ love affairs with democracy, truth, home ownership and their own pocketbooks, one would expect legislative efforts to strengthen HOA boards’ transparency to their members. Unfortunately, legislation passed by the 2016 Virginia General Assembly and a new bill introduced in the 2017 session trend in the opposite direction. This blog post examines the HOA open meeting principle, legislative and board governance trends limiting transparency, and whether the proposal currently before the General Assembly will promote openness.
According to the “open meeting” requirement, HOA boards and committees may not conduct deliberations and decisions outside of a publicized meeting. One exception to the “open meeting” requirement is the power of the board to meet in “executive session” to discuss certain sensitive matters such as the status of anticipated or pending litigation. The board must exit executive session and make an open resolution about any matter covered behind closed doors. When the election of board members and the open meeting policy work, board members are accountable to owners. When it works, the only way the owner can lose his voice is by avoiding the meetings. Quite often, these rules are simply ignored by directors and managers who either don’t know or care about them. The failure to observe these formalities leaves many attorneys who represent boards concerned that this might have adverse effects on the outcome of owners’ lawsuits challenging the decisions.
Many HOA bylaws and statutes appeared decades ago when people communicated by paper and the telephone and met in-person. In 2017, there are many ways that people can meet through communication technology. In person meetings by groups have mostly been replaced by “staying in touch by group e-mail.” HOA board members are not paid. Most would like to minimize in person meetings to save time. Attorneys and managers like to accommodate their boards’ requests while maintaining regulatory compliance. Owners who attend meetings who are not directors tend to not say much, ask time consuming questions or directly challenge the decisions and practices of the board and management. Management’s motive to limit the “open meeting” duty is obvious. The risks of this to the community are well known. The board is supposed to oversee the property management company and other employees, contractors and agents that take care of things on a day-to-day basis. Without effective board oversight, a HOA can easily devolve into one where the president and/or the property management company is running things without accountability.
On January 11, 2017, Delegates David Bolova & Joseph Lindsey introduced House Bill 1553 into the Virginia General Assembly that addresses this very issue. HB 1553 would amend a section of the Property Owners Association Act, Va. Code § 55-510.1 regarding meetings of the board of directors. HB 1553 proposes how 2016 legislation allowing for nonstock corporation board action by written consent without a public meeting would apply in the HOA context. The General Assembly amended Va. Code § 13.1-865 in 2016 to greater facilitate “action without meeting of board of directors” of a nonstock corporation. Almost all Virginia HOAs are nonstock corporations. Previously, a nonstock corporation board could only act without a meeting where the governing documents didn’t specifically require it and all of the directors signed a written consent to the resolution without the meeting. The 2016 amendments relaxed the onerous unanimous consent requirement. Now, if the articles of incorporation so allow, a board can act by written consent in lieu of a meeting if accepted by a majority of the directors (or by a quorum if larger). The directors may indicate their consent by paper or electronic means. A few sentences in the governing documents can greatly limit the duty to conduct business in open meetings.
The 2016 amendments contain an interesting privilege for directors who do not want the board to act outside of the public meeting. If any director doesn’t like the proposal, she can either abstain from it or submit a written objection within 10 days that forces the board to take up the matter in a future open meeting. This statute allows directors to initiate new proposals outside of the open meetings. If the proponent has enough director consents, the only way that a non-director owner could comment on it would be if one director submits a timely objection. One or more directors who disapprove of the majority’s policies would have to decide if they want to force an open meeting on the subject or simply allow the likely outcome to run its course without a meeting. Where the articles of incorporation allow, this legislative amendment creates a potent exception to the open meeting requirement.
A written consent without a meeting cannot be made casually by a majority hashing things out informally by email. The directors’ entitlement of 10 days’ notice is a practical impediment if the board meets once a month. While powerful, these new procedures are not a free-for-all to the board majority enjoying a favorable set of governing documents.
HB1553 proposes how these 2016 amendments to the Nonstock Corporation Act would apply within the context of the statutory requirements for board meetings. Va. Code § 55-510.1 requires that all board and committee meetings be open to all owners. The statute forbids directors from using “work sessions” or other informal gatherings to circumvent the open meeting requirements. Boards must take and keep written minutes of the director’s meetings. HB1553 would require any written consents without a meeting pursuant to the amendments to the nonstock corporation act to be added to the agenda packet for the next HOA board meeting. Members would be permitted to make comments on these consents, which by that time may already be valid and in force. The board has the authority to rescind any consent made without a meeting. Of course, it is a lot harder for an owner to argue against a resolution once it is already adopted and valid.
I have several questions about how this proposed 2017 legislation would work with the 2016 amendments and the realities of HOA governance:
- How Do Board Open Meeting Requirements Reconcile with Power to Act by Written Consents without a Meeting? The proposed amendment does not eliminate the open meeting requirement, it just clarifies a significant exception for certain written consents executed outside of meetings. Are directors permitted to deliberate and debate the proposed consents outside of meetings, despite the open meeting requirement? Or are they only allowed to accept, decline or object to the proposed consent, with no questions asked or information given? Is the “consent without a meeting” option a narrow exception to the “open meeting” requirement, prohibiting any back-and-forth other than the notice, text, acceptance or objection? Would this drive boards to make ill-informed or erratic decisions without regular meetings? Some dissident directors might feel compelled to exercise their “objection” privilege to force all such proposals into an “open meeting.” This could easily strain tenuous director relationships.
- Could Written Consents without a Meeting Deprive Owners of their Rights to Educate Themselves and Engage their Concerns? None of these statutes require any proposed written consents to be circulated to the owners before consideration by the directors. The legislation doesn’t require the proposal to go before the owners or an open meeting before circulation for approval. The proposal might greatly affect certain owners’ interests. An owner whose rights or interests are infringed by the written consent would later find herself fighting to undo resolutions that have already been adopted. There are many decisions that a board can make that are difficult to reverse once a contract is awarded. This legislative relaxation of requirements for consent without a meeting is ripe for abuse by boards and managers who don’t like people asking questions about what they are doing.
- Are Owners Entitled to Review Electronic Mail Between Directors Related to Written Consents without a Meeting? I’m concerned that that where these practices are adopted, the exception will practically swallow the open meeting requirement whole. If directors exchange emails or text messages with each other regarding a proposed written consent without a meeting, are owners entitled to review those messages as minutes, books and records of the association? As a practical matter, the HOA’s attorney may struggle to explain to the board what types of email communication are permitted and which ones aren’t under these laws.
- What is Left of HOAs as a “Mini-Democracy?” What is left of the “town hall” model in HOAs where the governing documents and state statutes allow board majorities to act outside of the “open meeting” ideal? This trend runs a strong risk of leaving owners with a level of transparency and accountability lower than what they enjoy with their city or county government. With regulatory agencies, the public has minimal “notice and comment” protections in administrative rulemaking. This new consent without an open meeting exception would offer even less protections to owners affected by adverse board decisions.
House Bill 1553 does not go far enough to keep all of the “tentpoles” up on the open meeting policy. I hope that the general assembly improves this bill so that the accountability of managers to boards and boards to members does not stray even further from the “Town Hall” civil ideal.
For Further Reading:
2017 House Bill 1553 to amend Va. Code 55-510.1, Meetings of the Board of Directors
2016 enacted Chapter 382, amending Va. Code 13.1-865, Action without Meeting of Board of Directors
January 13, 2017
Check Your Privilege, HOA
The attorney-client privilege is frequently misunderstood in the community associations context. When many owners request information, sometimes their board, board’s attorney or property manager asserts the attorney-client privilege. This may seem to obstruct their attempts to assess their property rights or how community funds are being spent. I recently had a conversation with a friend about an issue she raised at a HOA meeting. She asked the directors whether certain assessments were valid under the governing documents. The board consulted with their attorney, who answered them by e-mail. My friend suspected that the attorney advised the board that a judge would deem these assessments invalid. When asked, the board and their attorney refused to disclose the email, claiming attorney-client privilege (“ACP”). Since the board answers to the owners and the attorney works for the HOA, are the owners entitled to the attorney’s answering email? Does it make sense for any non-director owners to pursue copies of the attorney’s email?
In Virginia we have a court decision that addresses this issue that I will discuss. But first, let’s cover the basics. Anyone who deals with lawyers must understand how the ACP generally works. If an owner understands the ACP, she can more effectively pursue the information to which she is entitled and side-step unnecessary quarrels over confidentiality. This blog post will focus on the attorney-client privilege as applied by the courts in Virginia. The basic principles are similar in states across the country. Does this doctrine really allow boards to conceal important plans and communications in a shroud of secrecy? Not really, but it is often, baselessly asserted in many disputes, including HOA and condominium matters.
The purpose of the ACP is to encourage clients to communicate with attorneys freely, without fear of disclosure. This way attorneys can give useful legal advice based on the facts and circumstances known to the client. The Supreme Court of Virginia defines the ACP as follows:
Confidential communications between attorney and client made because of that relationship and concerning the subject matter of the attorney’s employment are privileged from disclosure, even for the purpose of administering justice . . . Nevertheless, the privilege is an exception to the general duty to disclose and is an obstacle to the investigation of the truth, and should be strictly construed.
The burden is on the party asserting the attorney-client privilege to show that it is valid and not waived. The privilege can easily be waived by disclosure of the communications to third parties. Waiver may be intentional or negligent, where the disclosing party failed to take reasonable measure to ensure and maintain the document’s confidentiality. Judges will consider waiver of privilege questions on a case by case basis. In general, the courts are reluctant to weaken the privilege by finding waiver in doubtful circumstances.
Contrary to popular belief, the privilege does not apply to every document or communication transmitted between an attorney and client. For example, if the client sends the lawyer corporate or business documents related to the facts of the case, those items would not be protected by the privilege by the mere act of transfer. It is quite possible that only the cover letter would be privileged. Generally, the privilege covers the seeking and delivery of legal advice.
Related to the attorney-client privilege is the “work-product doctrine.” The work product doctrine protects from disclosure the interview notes, office memoranda, internal correspondence, outlines, mental impressions and strategy ideas of the client’s lawyers prepared with an eye towards litigation.
When the client is an incorporated association and not an individual, questions arise as to which people function as the “client” as far as the privilege is concerned. Corporations can only act by means of their human representatives. This will often extend beyond the officers and directors of the corporation. Courts have found the privilege not waived when employees were privy to the communications. While the privilege is sacrosanct, it is narrow in scope and easily waived.
In Batt, et al. v. Manchester Oaks HOA, a group of owners challenged their board’s policy whereby parking spaces were assigned in a community where some townhouses had garages and others didn’t. Parking is a precious commodity. The plaintiff owners sought correspondence between the HOA’s leaders and their attorney. The owners asked the Circuit Court of Fairfax to order Manchester Oaks to produce the documents. They argued that the directors were fiduciaries of the owners and the suit asserted that the board acted inimically to the owner’s interests. In some other states, this is a judicially recognized exception to the ACP in some contexts. Judge Terrence Ney, who was highly respected within the local bar, declined to adopt the “Fiduciary-Beneficiary Exception” because that would “chill” communications between parties and their attorneys for fear the exchanges could be used against them in the future. I think he got this right. Properly understood, this does not infringe upon owners’ rights. Here’s why:
- Owners Need Boards to Act Competently. Owners need their boards to freely share their concerns with their attorney without fear that someone could later obtain the emails and use them against them. Community associations law is complex. For HOAs to work properly, boards need legal counsel to help them accomplish worthy goals while complying with the law and the governing documents. Owners need the HOA’s lawyer to tell the board what they can’t do, so that they can avoid doing bad things.
- The Director’s Fiduciary Duties Are Primarily Defined by the Governing Documents. If a fiduciary-beneficiary exception applies to a communication, that would be shown in the covenants, bylaws or perhaps a statute.
- The Board’s Lawyer is Not the Community’s Judge. When new owners visit HOA meetings and see directors defer to the association’s counsel on legal matters, this may lead to a misconception that the written opinions of the HOA’s lawyer are the “law of the land,” subject only to review by a judge. The opinions of the board’s attorney are simply her advice. Sometimes attorneys are wrong. Trial judges and appeals courts exist to make final determinations on contested legal disputes.
- “What Did the Board’s Attorney Advise” is Not the Best Question. This is really the most important point here. Requesting the HOA to disclose its attorney-client communications is not the best question to ask. Instead, the owner should ask the board to explain its authority to adopt or enforce a resolution. A HOA or condominium’s legal authority is public. It is written in a declaration, covenant, bylaw, statute, etc. The written legal authority and the official policy cannot be privileged. If the owner and board were to end up in litigation, sooner or later this would have to be spelled out in court. Chasing after what the attorney confidentially advised the board is not the direct path to solving the owner’s problem. If the board or its managers object on grounds of privilege when an owner asks them to point to the section in the governing documents that undergirds the policy, then the owner needs a lawyer of her own.
Ultimately the owners challenging the directors’ parking policy in the Manchester Oaks HOA case prevailed in Court, invalidating the board’s parking resolution. They didn’t need the attorney’s advice letter to achieve this. In other cases, owners don’t need to invade the board’s privilege, when it is properly invoked. However, it is very common for corporate parties to try to abuse the attorney client privilege in litigation. When someone invokes the attorney-client privilege in a HOA dispute, that is a good time to retain qualified legal counsel. If a party doesn’t back down when called out on an improper invocation of privilege, the dispute can be put before a judge. This “Check Your Privilege, HOA” blog post is the first in a series about how the attorney-client privilege is used and misused in the community association context. In future installments, I plan on discussing a couple hot topics. Does the Property Manager qualify as the client for purpose of the ACP or is it waived if the manager participates in the discussions with the attorney? Are the HOA’s lawyers’ billing statements protected from disclosure to the owners by the ACP or are they fair game?
For Further Reading:
Batt v. Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass’n, 80 Va. Cir. 502 (Fairfax Co. 2010)(Ney, J.)(case reversed on appeal on other issues).
Walton v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists, P.C., 280 Va. 113 (2010).
Michael S. Karpoff, “The Ethics of Honoring the Attorney-Client Privilege” (CAL CCAL Seminar Jan. 31, 2009)
Photo Credit:
November 15, 2016
Attorneys Fees Awards Against HOAs
In this blog and in my law practice, I focus on practical solutions to clear & present legal dangers to property rights of owners of properties in HOAs, condominiums or cooperatives. Many raise questions about getting attorneys fees awards against HOAs. This is an interesting topic in community associations law, where the outcomes of many disputes have a direct or precedential impact on other owners in the community. In my last blog post, I discussed a couple of 1990’s Virginia court opinions where owners’ counsel used an old English common law doctrine to solve modern HOA litigation problems. The doctrine of “virtual representation” allows individual owners to bring to complaints of general concern without naming every owner in the community as a plaintiff or defendant. Where the actual, named parties to the lawsuit fairly represent the interests of other members who are too numerous to add to the court case, the judge can nonetheless render a decision that binds all impacted parties. For example, a “representative” owner may bring a court case challenging an election or the validity of board resolution and the final order binds all members impacted by the election or board action. The doctrine of “virtual representation” solves a couple obstacles to owners gaining effective access to the legal system.
Today’s post discusses the problem of “free-riders” who may reap a benefit from other owners virtually representing them and footing the bills. In litigation, HOA boards draw upon the benefit of insurance policies, loans or assessment income to finance their legal expenses. The board may protract the dispute in a desire for a precedential effect or to simply wear down the owner. There is a case presently before the Supreme Court of Virginia where an owner accuses her association of the latter. Martha Lambert had a claim for $500.00 for reimbursement for certain repairs she made herself that were the responsibility of Sea Oats Condominium Association, Inc. The board’s lawyers defended the claim with time consuming motions and discovery normally used in cases where the amount in controversy is much larger than $500.00. Ms. Lambert “won” in the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach on what the judge described as a “close call.” The judge told the owner’s lawyer he did a “magnificent job” and reasonably pursued the case. However, the court only awarded $375 in attorney’s fees out of the full $9,568.50 amount Ms. Lambert incurred in the case. The only reason Ms. Lambert didn’t get the full amount was because the trial judge wanted to make an attorney’s fees award smaller than the $500 principal judgment. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal to determine whether the statute allowing for “reasonable” attorney’s fees required the Circuit Court to reduce the award to an amount in a nexus to the principal judgment awarded. Lambert accuses Sea Oats of engaging in “stubborn & obstructionist tactics.” Kevin Martingayle, Counsel for Ms. Lambert describes the trial judge as punishing the homeowner for vindicating her rights and discouraging others from doing the same when necessary. At stake is whether one party can get away with not performing their covenanted obligations because a lawsuit would add insult to injury. Lawyers practicing in the community associations arena around the state will watch to see what the Supreme Court does with this case.
The outcome of Lambert vs. Sea Oats only appears to directly impact the association and Ms. Lambert. In other HOA lawsuits, the rights of other owners are directly impacted by the outcome. What if, hypothetically speaking, a condo association caused injury to an entire floor of condominium units. One owner decides to sue. A plaintiff may find herself shouldering the burdens of similarly situated owners (“free riders”) not joining the suit or otherwise helping to pay for the legal expenses incurred by the plaintiff. Under many HOA governing documents and state statutes, the prevailing party at trial is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees against their opponent. What about the portion of a prevailing owner’s legal expenses which is attributable to representing the interests of similarly situated fellow members who are not official parties to the lawsuit? Would this provide a separate basis for an award of attorney’s fees reflecting the realities of “virtual representation?”
Since the 19th century, Virginia’s common law tradition of judicial precedents protects representative plaintiffs from the burden of the “free rider” problem. In “virtual representation” cases, the prevailing party may recover in their attorney fee award for legal expenses incurred in achieving the common benefit:
It is a general practice to require, when one creditor, suing for himself and others, who may come in and contribute to the expenses of suit, institutes proceedings for their common benefit, that those who derive a benefit shall bear their proportion of the expense and not throw the whole burden on one. This is equitable and just. But it only applies to those creditors who derive a benefit from the services of counsel in a cause in which they are not specially represented by counsel. If a creditor has his own counsel in a cause, he cannot be required to contribute to the compensation of another. Stovall v. Hardy, 1 Va. Dec. 342 (1879), quoted in, DuPont v. Shackelford, 235 Va. 588 (1988).
Virginia courts apply this “common fund” doctrine in awarding attorney fee awards in creditor suits, securities lawsuits, civil rights cases, trust & estate litigation and other representative litigation. In 1999, the Circuit Court of Winchester applied it in the context of a dispute among members of a defunct nonstock corporation over the proceeds of liquidated assets. Most community associations in Virginia are incorporated under the Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act.
The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized that the common fund doctrine serves to eliminate “free rides” that would unfairly burden litigants in cases that directly impact a class of represented parties not retaining counsel in the lawsuit:
The essence of the common fund doctrine is that it would be unfair to permit one party to retain counsel, to file suit, to secure a benefit that all will share, yet to leave the full cost of the effort upon the one party who initiated the suit while others who will share the proceeds make no contribution. If others are to sit idly by and reap the benefits of one litigant’s labors, the idle parties should share in the cost of those labors. In short, the common fund doctrine is aimed at preventing “free rides.” See J. P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorneys’ Fees From Funds, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1597, 1647 (1974), quoted in, DuPont v. Shackelford, 235 Va. 588 (1988).
The common fund doctrine extends beyond cases where there is an actual “fund” of money to included cases where there may be some sort of injunctive, declaratory or equitable remedy that does not have a specific dollar amount associated with it.
I am not aware of any published judicial opinions where a judge has considered the “common fund” doctrine in representative plaintiff litigation specifically involving HOAs or condominiums. However, the Property Owners Association Act and the Virginia Condominium Act provide for “prevailing party” attorney’s fees. Is there any reason why the common fund doctrine should not be applied to avoid free riding of representative plaintiff litigation against community associations? I see no obstacle to use of this doctrine for such in a proper case.
Update July 20, 2022:
I have a new 2022 blog post about Attorney fee awards in HOA and condominium law cases. “Awards of Attorney’s Fees in Community Association Litigation.” This blog post addresses the issue of attorneys fees in these cases more generally, with greater focus on the procedural aspects of such claims.
In 2017 I posted an article more particularly about the Lambert v. Sea Oats Condo. Ass’n, Inc. case, “Condo Owner Prevails on Her Request for Attorney’s Fees.”
Case Citations:
Du Pont v. Shackelford, 235 Va. 588 (1988).
Turner v. Yeatras, 49 Va. Cir. 395 (Winchester 1999).
Photo Credit:
Jason OX4 Il Radicchio at the Border via photopin (license)(for illustrative purposes – does not depict anything from any case discussed)
November 3, 2016
Lawsuits Against HOAs Potentially Benefit Other Owners
In many HOA disputes, only one (or a small handful of) owners desire to challenge board actions that negatively impact a larger class of owners in the community. If the court finds that the board action was invalid, then the court decision would materially impact everyone, not just the plaintiff owners and the HOA. Today’s post is about how plaintiffs lawsuits against HOAs potentially benefit other owners. Usually, a plaintiff must name everyone materially impacted by a potential outcome as parties to the lawsuit. Must a homeowner join all owners as plaintiffs or defendants in a lawsuit against a HOA seeking judicial review of a board decision? What flexibility does the law allow for one or more owners to bring a representative claim against the association to benefit themselves and other similarly situated owners? How should attorney fees be handled in cases with “free riders”? The answers to these questions show tools for owners to enjoy greater access to justice in community association disputes.
Mass claims by owners may be brought against community associations in several ways. A group of interested owners can split the cost for one law firm to sue on their behalf. Alternatively, owners may bring separate suits and have the claims consolidated in court. Filing a class action may be a feasible option in many states. Is there any other way that claims can be brought to benefit both the named plaintiffs and other similarly situated owners? Can this somehow make lawsuits against HOAs more affordable?
There are good examples of such representative actions in Virginia. Ellen & Stephen LeBlanc owned a house in Reston, a huge development in Fairfax County, Virginia. Reston is a locally prominent example of where the community association model largely replaces the town or city local government. Most Restonians live under a Master Association and a smaller HOA or condo association. Such owners must pay dues and follow the covenants for both the master and sub association.
The LeBlancs owned non-waterfront property near Reston’s Lake Thoreau. In 1994, the Master Association decided that henceforth, only waterfront owners would be permitted to moor their watercraft directly behind their properties. This would substantially inconvenience the LeBlancs’ boating activities. The LeBlancs’ lawyer Brian Hirsch filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County challenging the validity of the master HOA’s decision on both constitutional and state law grounds. The association retained Stephen L. Altman to lead their legal defense.
Roger Novak, Judy Novak, Rex Brown and Dalia Brown all owned waterfront properties on this lake. These families did not want the LeBlancs or other non-waterfront Reston owners mooring their boats behind their houses. I can’t blame them for wanting a tranquil aquatic backyard all to themselves. The Novaks and Browns hired lawyer Raymond Diaz to bring a motion to intervene. The Browns and Novaks became parties to the suit. These intervenors asked the judge to force the LeBlancs to name all the owners in Reston as parties or dismiss the case for lack of necessary parties.
In general, a lawsuit must be dismissed if the plaintiffs fail to name all parties that are necessary for the case to be properly litigated. A suit on a contract or land record usually must include all parties named in the contract or instrument. The Novaks and Browns wanted to block people like the LeBlancs from enjoying mooring privileges on the lake. They wanted the LeBlancs to name all the parties subject to the covenants recorded in the registry of deeds for the Reston Association. If the LeBlancs had to litigate against the hundreds of owners, then the case could quickly become uneconomical, even if most were friendly. The Court denied the intervening parties’ motion, upholding an exception from well-established legal precedents in non-HOA Supreme Court of Virginia opinions:
Necessary parties include all persons, natural or artificial, however numerous, materially interested either legally or beneficially in the subject matter or event of the suit and who must be made parties to it and without whose presence in court no proper decree can be rendered in the cause. This rule is inflexible, yielding only when the allegations of the bill disclose a state of case so extraordinary and exceptional in character that it is practically impossible to make all parties in interest parties to the bill, and, further that others are made parties who have the same interest as have those not brought in and are equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of the controversy as would the absent persons.
The Circuit Court found this exception to apply:
In the case at bar, it is impracticable to join the estimated 400 to 500 homeowners surrounding Reston’s five lakes in this action. Likewise, the interests of these persons are the same as those of the parties to this action, and said parties are certain to bring forward all of the merits of the case as would the absent persons.
Hundreds of other owners are materially impacted by the case’s outcome. But this exception allows the case to proceed without adding them as necessary. Other individual owners are not barred from suing or become party to the LeBlancs’ case. The other owners weren’t necessary for the practical consideration of the sheer number of the affected class. The court found the LeBlancs sufficient to represent the case against the exclusive moorings rule, and the Novaks, Browns and the HOA competent to defend the board’s action favorable to the waterfront owners. The LeBlanc’s case was permitted to proceed without adding hundreds of affected owners. This “virtual representation” procedure is significant because the court’s ruling on the validity of the board’s resolution would affect all owners, not just the parties.
At trial, the Court upheld the Board’s decision to regulate boating activity on Lake Thoreau as a valid exercise of powers granted in the covenants. The LeBlanc’s case was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Virginia declined to reverse the decision. However, the principle that one or more owners can virtually represent the interests of a large class of homeowners in a contest over the validity of HOA rulemaking has not been overturned.
In 1996, the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria applied the same principles in a homeowner challenge to a condominium election of directors. The Colecroft Station Condo Unit Owners Association Board asked the court to dismiss the judicial review of the election because not all owners were listed as plaintiffs. The judge rebuffed demands that all owners be added as parties, citing the same exception as used in LeBlancs’ case.
This exception that all materially affected parties need not be named as a plaintiff or defendant in the lawsuit is important to homeowners’ rights for several reasons. It gives an individual or small group of owners the ability to proceed with a lawsuit even when their neighbors might be friendly but uninterested in litigating. It gives owners another option when their rights are threatened and are not effectively redressed by board of directors’ elections or initiatives to amend the governing documents. Certain types of claims may be brought where class actions are not permitted or unfeasible. One brave owner could get a court to overturn an invalid board decision infringing upon the rights of many. This “virtual representation” doctrine advances the cause of homeowner access to justice in HOA and condo cases.
One challenge in these “virtual representation” cases is the notion of “free-riders.” The HOA’s attorney’s fees are paid for by the board’s accounts receivable: assessments, fees, loans and/or fines. Representative plaintiffs leading the challenge might find themselves “carrying water” for similarly situated owners who would stand to potentially benefit from the outcome of the case but aren’t paying lawyers. Is it fair for the challenging owners to pay for the legal work undertaken to achieve a benefit to both the plaintiff and the larger class? Are they entitled to an award of attorney’s fees reflecting the benefit conferred on behalf of other interested parties not named as plaintiffs? I will address this question in a future blog post focusing on the doctrine of “common fund” or “common benefit” in attorney fee awards and how this might apply in community association cases.
Case Citations:
LeBlanc v. Reston Homeowners’ Ass’n, 38 Va. Cir. 83 (Fairfax Co. 1995)
Cobble v. Colecroft Station Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n, 40 Va. Cir. 105 (Alexandria Cty. 1996)
Photo Credits:
pnyren35 20160131_Reston Trail Walk-187.jpg via photopin (license)
andrewfgriffith Flight Over the Town Center via photopin (license)
Bill Schreiner Dec15707 via photopin (license)
October 13, 2016
High Court Upholds Public Policies Against Restrictive Covenants
The issue of restrictive covenants often comes up in news or social media stories where a HOA or condominium demands that an owner take down an addition, a shed, a statue or some other architectural feature on the grounds that it offends the rules. The board claims that the rule is found in (or derived from) a document recorded in the land records encumbering all of the properties in the community. The board’s assertion of the restriction may come as a surprise to the owner. In a recent blog post, Does an HOA Disclosure Packet Effectively Protect a Home Buyer?, I wrote about how the existing legal framework fails to adequately disclose to the purchaser what it means to live in a HOA. That post started some great conversations with attorneys, realtors and activists about how consumers could be better protected during the sale process. Today’s post focuses on what the legal requirements are for a contractual relationship to arise between the community association and a resale purchaser who did not sign off on the restrictive covenants originally.
Restrictive covenants that bind future owners are a legal device that predate HOAs and condominiums by hundreds of years. Community associations derive their power to collect $$$ from and enforce rules against their owners through restrictive covenants. However, many owners are not aware that enforcement of restrictive covenants are disfavored by Virginia courts on public policy grounds.
Restrictive covenants are contract terms which, if enforceable, follow the property or the person around even after the contract between the original parties is over. They aren’t limited to real estate. For example, a pest control company may ask an employee to sign an agreement not to compete against the employer even after leaving the company. Courts are skeptical of contracts that restrict the ability of a worker to make a living in the future. For public policy reasons, workers should be able to reasonably put their skills to use in the marketplace regardless of what a written agreement might say. The courts enforce only very narrowly tailored covenants-not-to-complete in the employment context. Judicial precedent and the uncertainties of litigation make many businesses reluctant to sue former employees now working as rivals.
Courts disfavor restrictive covenants on real estate for similar policy reasons. Covenants that bind future owners narrow the usefulness of the property. Labor and property should be freely marketable without short-sighted, unreasonable restrictions. Such a policy protects property values and market liquidity.
The Supreme Court of Virginia still shares this viewpoint. On February 12, 2016, the Court decided Tvardek v. Powhatan Village HOA. That case was about the validity of an amendment to the HOA declaration, including its restrictive covenants. In ruling in favor of the homeowners, the Court reaffirmed the strict construction of covenants that run with the land, even in contemporary HOAs. Justice D. Arthur Kelsey’s opinion explains:
“The common law of England was brought to Virginia by our ancestors” in large part “to settle the rights of property.” Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554, 557 (1886). At that time, English common law had developed a highly skeptical view of restrictions running with the land that limited the free use of property. “Historically, the strict-construction doctrine was part of the arsenal of restrictive doctrines courts developed to guard against the dangers imposed by servitudes.” Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.1 cmt. a (2000).
Virginia real estate law generally views restrictive covenants as a threat to liberty. University of Virginia law professor Raleigh Minor prophetically wrote in his 1908 treatise, “perpetual restrictions upon the use of land might be imposed at the caprice of individuals, and the land thus come to future generations hampered and trammeled.” If only Professor Minor could see how property rights have eroded in many communities today.
The viewpoint of many people in today’s real estate industry and local governments is the opposite of what courts have traditionally held. Buyers are told that covenants protect their investments from barbarian neighbors who might do something to make the surrounding properties look undesirable. But as Professor Minor pointed out 100 years ago, these rules give an opportunity for capricious enforcement. Is the message of our contemporary industry an insight misunderstood by previous generations, an appeal to the preferences of certain buyers who dislike non-HOA neighborhoods or merely a sales pitch?
English common law recognized very few restrictive covenants running with the land. Those receiving judicial approval appeared to be limited to easements appurtenant “created to protect the flow of air, light, and artificial streams of water.” United States v. Blackman, 270 Va. 68, 77, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446 (2005); see also Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 557 (1886). Over a century ago, we noted that “attempts have been made to establish other easements, which the [historic common] law does not recognize, and to annex them to land; but the law will not permit a land-owner to create easements of every novel character and attach them to the soil.” Tardy, 81 Va. at 557. Since then, in keeping with our common-law traditions, Virginia courts have consistently applied the principle of strict construction to restrictive covenants.
The court applied this principle in the Tvardek case where the association sought to enforce an amendment to the declaration against certain owners who didn’t vote for it. As the court reaffirmed in this 2016 decision, restrictive covenants are not always enforceable. The Tvardeks opposed being deprived of their right to rent out their property. The covenant has to fall within a recognized category. The principle of “strict construction” works against the restrictor and to the benefit and protection of the owner.
A restrictive covenant running with the land that is imposed on a landowner solely by virtue of an agreement entered into by other landowners who are outside the chain of privity would have been unheard of under English common law. See generally 7 William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 287 (1925) (“Whether or not the burden of other covenants would run with the land, and whether or not the assignee of the land could be sued by writ of covenant, seem to have been matters upon which there is little or no mediaeval authority.”). Privity has long been considered an essential feature of any enforceable restrictive covenant. Bally v. Wells (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 913, 915; 3 Wils. 26, 29 (“There must always be a privity between the plaintiff and defendant to make the defendant liable to an action of covenant.”). Many of our cases have recognized this common law requirement. See, e.g., Beeren & Barry Invs., LLC v. AHC, Inc., 277 Va. 32, 37-38, 671 S.E.2d 147, 150 (2009); Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC Props., 255 Va. 75, 81, 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1998); Sloan v. Johnson, 254 Va. 271, 276, 491 S.E.2d 725, 728 (1997). We thus approach the statutory issue in this case with this historic tradition as our jurisprudential guide.
Someone is “in privity” with another if they have legal standing to sue them because he (or his predecessor-in-interest) was party to the contract that creates the rights at issue. The court affirmed the common law privity requirement, rejecting any suggestion that it should be discarded as outdated. For this reason, the legal requirements that the association disclose certain documents and the seller honor a right of cancellation of the purchase contract have the effect of establishing privity between the HOA and the subsequent purchaser. Do these statutes fairly balance the respective rights of resale purchasers and community associations?
The Tvarkeks did not contest that they were not bound to the HOA covenants that existed when they bought their home. Instead, they sought to have an amendment to the covenants declared invalid because the statutory procedures were not properly followed. If you are curious about the technical reasons why the court found this particular amendment invalid, there are other bloggers, such as Jeremy Moss, following community associations law developments in Virginia have written about Tvardek from this angle. An HOA may have hundreds of members. The membership changes every year. Most owners have never personally made any transactions with the developer or the owners who voted to amend the declaration of covenants. How can privity exist if the declaration can be amended without a signature from every owner? That’s where the legislature comes into play:
The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act, Code §§ 55-508 to 55-516.2, expanded the concept of privity considerably beyond common-law limits. In general terms, the Act permits the creation of a restrictive covenant running with the land and enforceable against subsequent owners of the parcels covered by the declaration, whether or not they consent, so long as the association follows the statutorily prescribed procedures governing the association’s declaration and amendments to it.
The enactment of the HOA statutes do not wipe out the rule of strict construction of covenants that run with the land. Instead, the General Assembly expands certain exceptions to the privity requirement for the enforceability of restrictive covenants. The basic rule of skepticism holds. The Property Owners Association Act must be understood within the context of the common law.
One might think that the modern age of statutes would have marginalized the role of English common law, but this is not so. “Abrogation of the common law requires that the General Assembly plainly manifest an intent to do so.” Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30, 35, 540 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2001). We do not casually presume this intent. “Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms.” Giordano v. McBar Indus., 284 Va. 259, 267 n.8, 729 S.E.2d 130, 134 n.8 (2012) (citation omitted). A statute touching on matters of common law must “be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law.” Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215 Va. 274, 276, 208 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1974).
Case law is very important to make sense of any HOA. Otherwise the statutes just seem to be an enablement of legal powers for the boards that are not found in the governing documents.
The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act authorizes the creation and enforcement of restrictive covenants against nonconsenting landowners in a manner unknown to the common law. The General Assembly, however, policed the imposition of these covenants with a host of strict procedural requirements — not the least of which is the plainly worded command that no recorded amendment shall be “effective” unless it is accompanied by a certification verifying that the requisite majority signed the amendment or a ratification of it. See Code § 55-515.1(F). In effect, the General Assembly created something entirely new to the law (the right to form private associations having power over land use) while adding precautions to honor the common law’s ancient antipathy toward restrictions on the free use of private property.
The POAA is not some sort of freeway that allows boards to completely bypass the old traffic lights of the common law. As attorney John F. Faber, Jr. observes in his July 2016 Hampton Roads Realtor magazine article about Tvardek, “‘close enough’ does not count when interpreting statutes that allow broad application of restrictive covenants prohibiting the free use by owners of their properties.” In Tvardek, the court articulates three important, related legal protections for owners:
- A restrictive covenant has to be expressly stated in a public land recording (or fairly implied by very narrow exceptions).
- Restrictive covenants must fall within narrow exceptions to the general rule prohibiting them in order to be enforceable.
- If the board relies upon the POAA to enforce the covenant but can’t show that it meets the strict requirements of the statute, it is out of luck.
Does this mean that an owner should disregard notices from the HOA or condo that there is a rules violation or monthly assessments due? Certainly not. Owners should presume that courts will enforce clear and validly adopted restrictive covenants. But what the board, property manager or other representatives of the association is tell the owner may not accurately reflect what the owner’s legal obligations actually are. The owner may not even have a complete set of the governing documents in her possession. In any dispute with an HOA or condominium, owners should see a qualified attorney to help them protect their rights.
For Further Reading:
Tvardek v. Powhatan Village Homeowners Ass’n, 291 Va. 269, 784 S.E.2d 280 (2016)
Photo Credit:
Geoff Livingston The Georgetowner via photopin (license)
September 14, 2016
Does an HOA Disclosure Packet Effectively Protect a Home Buyer?
There is an interesting September 14, 2016 article in the Washington Post by Ilyce Glink and Samuel Tamkin entitled, “Why you should look carefully at an HOA’s plans for that community before buying a home there.” The article responds to Virginia home buyers who have great questions that aren’t answered in an HOA disclosure packet. The purchasers know that the roads the HOA owns need major repairs. It is overall a great article. The HOA disclosure packet doesn’t say how this will be paid for. They are concerned that their dues might increase from $1,000 to $3,500. This is a make or break question. Virginia law entitles the buyer to disclosure of HOA governing documents, corporate records and financial reports before going to closing on purchase of property. These disclosures are supposed to educate buyers about their rights and responsibilities to the HOA for as long as they own the property. In reality, buyers have many things on their minds during this exciting and stressful time. Their busy lives are consumed with urgent matters. They attend the home inspection and negotiation of any repairs. They come up with the down payment and approval from their mortgage lender. An excited family member may be dismissive of any questions or red flags about the property. The purchase will require the buyers to move and have their lives disrupted. Many home buyers feel worn down by demands of the process. They want to avoid cancelling and starting all over. All the buyers know about the HOA may be from seeing neighboring houses, maybe some common areas like a pool or playground. What’s in the HOA disclosure packet or condominium resale certificate give the association great influence over the financial affairs and home life of the buyers. Virginia law requires that HOA disclosure packet to include the following statements and documents:
Statements:
1. Name and registered agent of the association.
2. Approved expenditures that will require a special assessment.
3. Ordinary assessments or mandatory dues or charges.
4. Whether there are any other parties to which the lot owner may be liable for fees or charges.
5. Reserve study report or summary.
6. Current budget and financial balance sheet.
7. Any pending lawsuit or unpaid judgment that could have a material impact.
8. Insurance coverage provided and not provided by the association.
9. Whether any improvement to the property being sold is in violation of the governing documents.
10. Flag display restrictions.
11. Solar panel use restrictions.
Documents:
1. Declaration & any amendments.
2. Articles of incorporation, bylaws & any amendments
3. Rules, regulations or architectural guidelines
4. Approved minutes of the board and owner meetings for previous six months
5. Notices of any pending architectural violations
6. Disclosure Packet Notice Form prepared by the Virginia Common Interest Community Board
7. Annual Report form filed with the state with officers and directors and other information
8. Federal Housing Administration lending approval statement
While many people aren’t familiar with these kinds of documents, they reflect the family’s future financial obligations to the HOA and restrictions on the use of the property. The 2008 subprime mortgage crisis was caused in part by mortgage lenders giving borrowers loan documents that they didn’t understand. The HOA covenants are also a source of confusion. Many buyers would never buy a home without using a home inspector, but they try to tackle the HOA disclosure packet themselves. Unfortunately, it is easier for an unaided consumer to eyeball things in the home that need repairs than make sense out of the HOA documents. The federal government requires mortgage lenders to provide borrowers with simplified statements of the loan terms to make them transparent. For HOAs, consumer protections are weaker. Virginia law gives the buyer only three days to cancel the purchase contract after receipt of the HOA disclosure packet. That might give a professional working in the real estate industry enough time to digest them. However, many ordinary consumers struggle to make this three-day review period a meaningful part of their decision-making. A buyer could negotiate with the seller for this three-day period to be lengthened in the language of the sales contract. Few ask for this because the disclosures in the sales contract do not suggest to the buyer that additional time might be necessary.
As more HOA horror stories appear in news articles and social media posts, consumers are more likely to read the HOA disclosure packet and ask questions like in today’s Washington Post article. Even if the buyer is familiar with community associations law, the governing documents may be vague, ambiguous or unclear about issues critical to the buyer’s use and enjoyment of the home. This is what the home buyers in the article discovered. Glink and Tamkin recommend that the buyers knock on the door of the HOA president and ask her point-blank about how the road repairs will be paid for. An officer who understands their leadership responsibilities well might provide a sufficient answer upon a direct request. However, in most situations this probably won’t achieve a satisfactory result. Educated officers and directors know that the HOA or condo board is only required to provide the information and documents referenced in the statutes. If the buyer is unsatisfied, they have to either exercise the contingency within the deadline or negotiate for an extension of the cancellation period and a follow-up request to the board. The HOA could employ dilatory tactics, inducing the buyer to inadvertently waive the right of cancellation while pursuing an answer to the question. The road expense issue is probably already a hot-button issue for this board with lots of HOA politics in play.
There is a disturbing issue about the facts described in this newspaper column that isn’t addressed by the article. The HOA is managed by its board and not by a property management company. The monthly dues for the property are $1,000. This means that the officers and directors are handling a huge budget themselves, making day-to-day property management decisions. Maybe the board consists of retired real estate professionals who do this as a hobby to benefit the community at no added benefit to themselves. Given the commitment required to manage such a large budget, this is probably not the case. This would be my number one question.
If the purchasers have questions about what the documents mean, they might ask their real estate agent. Realtors provide a lot of value to their clients because they negotiate sales transactions all the time. The agent may not be the best person to ask because she won’t receive a commission on the sale if the buyer gets cold feet and backs out. The disclosure packets contain legal documents that are designed to enforce restrictions in court should disputes arise. If an attorney or real estate agent might struggle to make sense out of the disclosure packet, a buyer who is not familiar with HOAs may only read a few pages before setting them aside and focusing their attention elsewhere. If consumers understood the HOA disclosure packet and made an intentional decision to go to closing or back out based on what they read, consumer trends and demands might force home builders to make HOAs more owner-friendly.
In theory, a buyer can retain independent attorneys and CPAs to review the HOA disclosure packet and answer questions. This would allow an educated decision whether to cancel within the short deadline. In reality, if the buyer doesn’t already have an attorney and/or CPA lined up at the beginning of the three-day period, it may already be too late. Let’s say the buyer spends a day trying to make sense of the HOA disclosure packet on his own. If the family cannot figure things out themselves, on the second day he might start calling around for an attorney. Unfortunately, almost all community association lawyers represent the associations themselves, big investors or developers. They do not normally represent homeowners. My firm is an exception – in my solo practice I never represent HOA boards. General practice attorneys often represent individual persons. However, to effectively advise the purchaser on short notice, the attorney must be familiar with the appellate court decisions concerning the HOA statutes and governing documents. Much of the law pertaining to community associations matters is found in court opinions, not just acts of the general assembly. Many general practice lawyers are very good but may not be familiar with these things. Assuming that the buyer does find an attorney who is a good fit, there still are time constraints. The buyer has to talk to the lawyer, hire him, and provide the documents. It may take the attorney more than an hour or two to review the documents to prepare to provide an overview and answer questions. All of this must be completed within 3 days (or whatever extended period agreed with the seller) so that the buyer can make a meaningful decision to exercise or waive the HOA contingency. Otherwise the buyer might lose their deposit and some other fees if they want to get out of the contract. The three-day period might work if the buyer hired the attorney beforehand. However, the terms and disclosures in the sales contract do not alert the buyer that such might be desired.
Don’t get me wrong. The HOA disclosure packet provides critical information and documents to consumers and does contain a right of cancellation. Doing away with it entirely would be a huge setback to property owners. Unfortunately, the deadlines and procedural features of the disclosure laws don’t do enough to protect consumers. My professional experience working with owners leads me to believe that many of them go to closing unaware of what they are getting into. This is not really their fault. Sometimes they don’t understand the extent of some restriction or obligation that the property is subject to. Also, owners have rights that they are often unaware of and could improve their situation if they knew about them.
One of the key statements in the packet is the Virginia Common Interest Community Board Disclosure Notice Form. This is a kind of “Miranda” warning to consumers about what it means to live in an HOA or condo. The current version is useful but could be improved. It doesn’t mention fines for rule violations. It states that the buyer is subject to all of the decisions of the Board. Yet an adverse decision of the board might be legally void or voidable if the owner acts promptly. The notice does not reference the statutes or common law principles that may dramatically affect the rights and obligations of owners. The packet notice does not point out to the buyer that they have a right to have their own attorney review the documents and answer their questions. If the buyer received a useful disclosure notice form at the time they signed the contract, then they might more carefully consider whether to hire an attorney, CPA or other professional to help them with the HOA disclosure packet. Also, if the statute allowed for a longer period of time for the contingency than three days, the buyer would not need to negotiate that in advance. These additional protections are necessary because the system that exists has a practical effect of limiting home buyers’ right to counsel.
Based on my own personal experiences with real estate, the stories I have read about other people’s experiences and homeowners I have spoken to, I believe that on a practical level, the HOA disclosure packet is an ineffective system of consumer protection. This is shown by the surprise that owners experience when they are victim of an abusive debt collection practice, an arbitrary architectural review decision or any other infringement of their property rights by an association. Fundamentally, the HOA disclosure packet procedure doesn’t work because consumers don’t understand how its contents help them find answers to any questions they might have.
What does a buyer need to know that isn’t found in the HOA disclosure packet? The courts are the branch of government that oversee HOA boards. The Supreme Court of Virginia has repeatedly held that the declaration is a written contract or agreement between the owners and the HOA. If you go to the Virginia Code looking for guidance on something not explained in the packet you might not find the answer there because of the nature of the legal system. The declaration, along with other real estate contracts are interpreted by court precedents for many issues. For example, if a party breaches a contract, they are entitled to remedies which might include money damages, attorney’s fees or an order for the other side to do something. An owner has an interest in knowing whether the declaration even makes the association qualify as an HOA. The system of remedies for breach of covenants is very important in the HOA context because that’s where the owner finds means of enforcing his rights. A wide variety of rules that pertain to HOAs are found in court opinions that aren’t neatly summarized in the disclosure packet or even in legislation.
Because the governing documents are written in legalese interpreted by court opinions and legislative enactments, the disclosure packet is not effective as a summary of the rights the HOA has over the property. The Washington Post column illustrates this. A buyer does not have the time to take a law class on community associations or enforcement of real estate covenants in the three days in which the disclosure laws give them to review it.
I hope that the General Assembly amends the statutes to provide stronger protections for buyers. If buyers knew what they were getting themselves into beforehand, they would be better educated to be owners or even board members. In the meantime, home buyers should prepare to retain advisors to help them understand the documents. If necessary, the buyer and seller can agree to expand the three-day waiting period. Ultimately, families must work with their own team to stick up for themselves and protect their rights. Owners owe it to themselves to adequately understand all of the rights and burdens that may come with the sacrifices made to purchase the property to begin with. Buyers should retain a qualified attorney to help them understand the documents before they even receive the HOA disclosure packet or condominium resale certificate.
For Further Reading:
Common Interest Community Board – Virginia Property Owners’ Association Disclosure Packet Notice
Va. Code Section 55-509.5 (Contents of association disclosure packet; delivery of packet)
Va. Code Section 55-79.97 (Va. Condominium Act – Resale by Purchaser)
Photo Credit:
160404-neighborhood-sidewalk-morning-clouds.jpg via photopin (license)(does not depict property referenced in blog post)
August 17, 2016
Court Determines that an HOA is Not Legally Valid
HOAs and Condominiums derive from the covenants and state statutes’ powerful tools to use against homeowners. However, if the association does not meet the legal definition of a HOA or condo, then it cannot use the statuary toolbox. Instead of issuing fines, it must file a lawsuit each time it wants to obtain a lien against an owner’s property. The Virginia Condominium Act and Property Owners Association Act contain many protections for owners. However, they also provide associations with powerful debt-collection tools if they fit within the statutory definition. If a court determines that an HOA is not legally valid, this is a big win for owners being bullied by the board. Every once in a while, owners will take a stand and challenge whether their “HOA” exists. Recently, George Evans, Karen Evans, Gilbert Kesser & Yvonne Kesser brought such a case against their “HOA” in Culpeper, Virginia. On July 13, 2016 they won an important motion, setting the stage for big changes in Seven Springs Farm Subdivision (SSF). I am originally from Culpeper County, but I have never been to Seven Springs. We lived in a quiet residential development of modest wooded lots a few blocks from a lake. No one ever complained that their quality of life or property values suffered for lack of an HOA. When I left to go to college in 1995, there were few HOAs. Since then, development transformed Culpeper County from a farming community into a suburb of Northern Virginia. HOAs played a key role in that transformation.
This case arose over a dispute about assessments for road improvements. The covenants required the HOA to take a member vote before apportioning an assessment against the unit owners. On March 29, 2014, the Board made a $12,000 “blanket” assessment against homeowners without taking their votes. When the Kessers and Evans refused to pay, the HOA placed liens against their properties. Many owners of HOA properties believe that their Boards have the power to “tax & spend” for the “general welfare” of the community and that there is little way to challenge this. However, the Seven Springs Farm HOA case shows that everything a Board does must be authorized according to proper interpretation of the governing documents.
My friend, Mark Sharp, brought a suit on behalf of the Evans & Kesser families. They sought a judgment declaring that SSF is not a HOA for purposes of the Virginia Property Owners Association Act (“POAA”). Usually, the developers’ lawyers who set up HOAs take care that the Association qualifies as an HOA under the POAA. However, just because it calls itself an HOA and acts as though it has those powers doesn’t mean that it is an HOA. In Virginia, the declaration of covenants must provide, among other things, that the Board has the power to make assessments and also an affirmative duty to maintain common areas. This makes sense, because a contract is only meaningful if obligations go both ways. Contracts that fail to exchange something by both sides are invalid because of lack of “consideration.” In the HOA context, fundamental unfairness would arise if the board had the power to assess and lien but no obligation to spend the money on the common areas. Without this mutuality of obligation, an association is not entitled to the toolbox of remedies provided in the POAA.
In the Seven Springs case, the declaration gave the “HOA” the power to assess. The board had the power to do common area maintenance but were not specifically obligated to perform it. Under Virginia law, “valid covenants restricting the free use of land, altogether widely used, are not favored and must be strictly construed.” Accordingly, “substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved against the restrictions, and in favor of the free use of property.”
Culpeper Circuit Court Judge Susan Whitlock’s opinion applied this strict construction principle to the question of whether the association qualifies as an “HOA” under the Property Owners Association Act. Anything in a declaration of covenants can be strictly construed. HOA lawyers typically make the governing documents many pages long in order to avoid having a judge find any “substantial doubt or ambiguity.” Judge Whitlock observed that an HOA is subject to such a challenge even if there was an ongoing pattern of owners paying dues and the Board spending the money on the common areas.
When the owners brought this challenge, SSF filed a demurrer, asking the judge to dismiss the case for legal deficiencies and not allow it to proceed to trial. Judge Whitlock overruled this demurrer, finding that “The Defendant’s Declaration fails to expressly require SSF to maintain the common areas, and therefore the Defendant is not a “Property Owners’ Association” under the POAA. Merely stating that those fees shall be used for maintenance of Lots and upkeep of roads fails to bridge the gap of ambiguity to be considered an affirmative duty to maintain.”
While the board, its managers and lawyers may interpret ambiguous governing documents to empower them to do what they want, in the end it is the counts that oversee HOAs, which a judge may very well reject. Judge Whitlock permitted the owners challenge to the road improvement assessment to proceed in Court.
This Seven Springs Farm HOA reminds us of several things: First, an owner must understand what the governing documents mean under state law to know what their rights and responsibilities are. In a dispute, this will require attorney assistance. The president, manager or HOA lawyer approaches the issue from a different perspective and cannot be expected to disclose to the owner all of her rights. The governing documents may or may not be consistent with what someone might think to be a common-sense approach to solving a problem.
Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia views a HOA as a contractual relationship. Ambiguous or uncertain provisions of these “contracts” can be strictly construed in the owners’ favor. A Virginia HOA board is not a “mini-government” empowered to exercise general legal authority within the boundaries of the development.
Third, Judge Whitlock’s decision is a pleasant reminder that not only do HOAs sometimes lose in Court, sometimes they are found to be less than a card-carrying member of the HOA club. Owners considering litigating against their community association should take this opinion as a reminder that a good case is winnable.
Fourth, just because a judge rules that an association is not an HOA under Virginia law doesn’t mean that the declaration of covenants is completely invalid. Such a ruling just means that its board cannot benefit from all of the intensive lobbying that the industry has done to empower HOAs and condominiums. A non-HOA association may still be able to exercise dominion over common areas and take owners to court to resolve disputes.
Property owners considering court action involving their boards of directors should begin the process with careful consideration of the recorded governing documents with the assistance of a qualified attorney. In many cases, they have more rights than what others explained to them.
Case Citation: Evans v. Seven Springs Farm HOA, No. CL15001273 (Culpeper Co. Va. Cir. Ct. Jul. 13, 2016)(Whitlock, J.)
Photo Credit: Culpeper County Courthouse via photopin (license)
