October 30, 2026

Virginia Court of Appeals Upholds Homeowner’s Judgment After Defective HOA Siding Repairs

The Condominium and HOA industry is a big business, particularly when it comes to maintenance and repair of improvements to property. HOA renovation projects are not just on common areas such as roads, clubhouses, tennis courts and pools. Many community associations are required to repair components that function as part of someone’s home, such as a roof, siding, ventilation, utilities and so on. When community associations make decisions, they commonly rely upon their advisors, such as managers, attorneys or other professionals. Even when volunteer leaders make significant efforts, the price paid and quality of workmanship varies. For this reason, homeowners ought to monitor such activities, especially when the cost passes through as a special assessment, or the repairs are necessary to protect their home interior.

Earlier this year, the Court of Appeals of Virginia decided a case where such things did not go as desired. In Stonehenge HOA v. Tanesha Hudson, the Circuit Court of Albemarle County entered a $4,500 judgment and $44,761.50 for attorney fees in favor of Ms. Hudson. After filing the appeal, the HOA paid the $4,500. This case caught my interest because of the damage caused by defective repairs, the application of the voluntary payment doctrine, and the arguments regarding reasonableness of attorney’s fees.

Defective Exterior Repairs by Company with Relationship with Manager

The following facts are taken from the judicial opinion and supplemented by some additional research that I have done. Ms. Hudson owns a townhouse. The governing instruments require the HOA to maintain the roof, gutter and siding on the townhouses. The HOA worked with Associa. Associa is a community management holding company estimated to have over one billion annual revenue and over 10,000 employees. The HOA hired Community Group, Inc., doing business as Associa Community Group and Associa on Call to install new siding on the townhouses, including Ms. Hudson’s. Many property management companies that work with HOAs and condominiums are owned by Associa. Associa owns complementary businesses such as Community Group and Associa on Call. I do not know how Stonehenge HOA decided to do business with Associa on Call. What could happen is the manager who works for the Associa subsidiary learns that the association needs a contractor. They “refer” Associa on Call to the association. Yet they are subsidiaries of the same company and to my knowledge share common employees. I do not know whether Associa on Call has any employees who perform construction work or if they always “subcontract” the actual work to a separate company at a lower price. This judicial opinion does not say whether Associa on Call had a contractors license or if they subcontracted the work out to a third party. Associa’s management subsidiary is ordinarily familiar with what work is needed, what funds are available, and what the board members want. This practice does not necessarily lead to an unfair result. Note that Virginia law does not have statutes that regulate bidding in the community association context. Government contracting law does not apply to HOAs, but the directors are nonetheless fiduciaries. This issue was not discussed in the Hudson case opinion. Another issue that may arise with the practice of awarding exterior repair contracts to an affiliate of the manager has to do with workmanship warranties that would run from the subcontractor through the affiliate to the association. If the association terminates the management contract, that may complicate warranty claims. That issue was not discussed in the Hudson v. Stonehenge HOA case either.

In the lawsuit, Ms. Hudson alleged that the deficient siding replacement diminished her home’s value, caused black mold, water damage, and allowed rats and bees to enter the house. She sought $280,000 in damages. Ms. Hudson’s expert testified that the contractor removed and improperly re-installed the drip edge flashing, failed to make certain repairs to the roof, improperly installed kickout flashing and failed to install counterflashing. These effects allowed moisture, bees and rats to enter the townhouse. The Circuit Court agreed with her and awarded $4,500 for repairs and $44,761.50 in attorney fees against those defendants. While the appeal went on, the association paid her $4,500 for the judgment portion.

Voluntary Payment Doctrine

The Court of Appeals refused to consider the Association’s challenge to the judgment because it paid the $4,500. The Voluntary Payment Doctrine provides that absent fraud or misconduct, a claimant cannot later demand that a court return to him funds that he voluntarily paid to another. This is because the making of the payment constitutes a voluntary cessation of the dispute. An exception to this rule arises when the transfer of the money occurs due to a garnishment. But that is not voluntary. A garnishment does not require any agreement on the party of the person who puts their money in the bank account. In the appeal, the association admitted making the payment in order to avoid the accumulation of interest. The court found that the making of this payment in full waived the right to have the appellate court consider a reversal that would require return of the money.

Voluntary payment is an important doctrine for anyone in a dispute with their HOA or condominium to understand. Many homeowners assume that if they consider the payment to be made under protest then they can go back and challenge it later. But this is ordinarily not the case. However, by making a payment this does not constitute an admission or concession as to everything in dispute. On December 4, 2020, I posted an article, The Voluntary Payment Doctrine and HOA Liens, which discusses the voluntary payment doctrine in the HOA context.

Under Virginia judicial precedent, if there are several debts in dispute between two parties, the debtor can expressly or implicitly direct that a payment go to one debt and not the other. In Upper Occoquan Sewage Authority v. Blake Construction, the Supreme Court quoted an older case saying:

A payment by a debtor who owes several debts to a creditor, is to be applied to one or the other of the debts; first, as the debtor may direct at or before the time of making such payment; and such direction may be given expressly or by implication. Secondly, if the debtor give no such direction then the creditor may make the application, according to his pleasure; and he may make it, either at the time of such payment, or afterwards, before the commencement of any controversy on the subject.

This allows a homeowner, under certain circumstances, to pay their “regular” assessments while resisting payment on disputed claims.

Prevailing Party Attorney’s Fees in Community Association Cases

These defendants were particularly displeased with the award of attorneys fees. Here, they were sued for $280,000. The plaintiff won $4,500.00. The attorney fee award was $44,761.50. The defendants argued that Ms. Hudson did not substantially prevail, because that was only a 1.7% success ratio. However, under judicial precedent, one may qualify as the “prevailing” party even if they do not prevail on all of their claims. The comparison of damages recovered to damages sought does not change which party prevailed.  The defendants also argued that awarding a $44,761.50 on a $4,500 judgment is excessive. The factors that the courts are to consider for attorney’s fees awards are the time and effort expended, the nature of the services rendered, the complexity of the services, the value of services provided, the results obtained, whether the fees are consistent with those for similar services, and whether the services where necessary and appropriate. The court observed that while the ratio of damages sought to damages awarded is a factor to be considered, the other factors ought to be weighed as well. I previously blogged about attorney fee awards in HOA. My July 20, 2022 article was Awards of Attorney’s Fees in Community Association Litigation.

What Should a Virginia Homeowner Do After Defective HOA Repairs?

If association-directed work may have damaged your home, or common elements upon which it relies, consider taking the following steps:

  1. Take photographs and record videos. Record when you first noticed the problem and the frequency or any reoccurrence.
  2. Keep notices, emails, letters, inspection reports, invoices, meeting minutes, and communications with the HOA, property manager, and contractor.
  3. Review the governing document provisions that assign responsibility for the affected building component to the association or the homeowner.
  4. Notify the HOA and property manager in writing. Describe the condition, identify any immediate risks, and request an inspection and written response.
  5. Emergency work may be required to stop active water intrusion or protect the property. When possible, document existing conditions before repairs begin and preserve removed materials that may help establish the cause of the damage.
  6. Construction-defect disputes often depend on technical issues involving flashing, roofing, moisture pathways, installation methods, and building components. An inspection may help identify both the source of the problem and the work required to correct it. HOA leaders and professional advisors take such reports seriously. Sometimes it helps to show the obvious.
  7. Before paying a disputed charge or judgment, consider whether payment could affect the ability to challenge it.
  8. Consult with legal counsel should a contractor, HOA lawyer, director or manager ask the homeowner to sign a release, proposal or work order when the financial responsibility is uncertain or contested.

Legal Authority:

Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., 275 Va. 41 (2008).

Stonehenge Homeowner’s Assn v. Hudson, 2026 Va. App. Lexis 442 (Aug. 18, 2026)(Unpub).

The photo used is a free image and does not depict anything discussed in the article.

October 22, 2026

First Material Breach, Cost vs. Value Damages, and Unsigned Change Orders

For many people, a custom home build, large addition or whole house remodel is the most expensive and complicated transaction they will personally handle in their lifetime. Choosing a contractor and a design takes considerable time and carries high stakes. Most projects see at least one breach or accusation. Most homeowners, even those who can afford a major construction project, are not familiar enough with construction law to know for certain what course of action is necessary in the event of a breach. This post covers three issues from a 2026 Court of Appeals of Virginia decision: the first material breach rule, the cost vs. value measure of damages, and email change orders.

What Is the First Material Breach Rule in Virginia Construction Cases?

Under Virginia law, the party who commits the first “material” breach cannot enforce the contract. But a “minor” breach, one that does not “go to the root of the contract,” does not excuse the other party’s performance. Virginia appellate courts are generally averse to applying the rule strictly in construction cases unless there is bad faith. This is especially true when both sides have offsetting claims for payment and defect correction.

On June 23, 2026, the Court of Appeals of Virginia decided Inviting Structures, Inc. v. Royal in an unpublished opinion. The dispute arose from a $232,180 contract to install an outdoor spa tub, a stone outdoor living space, and landscaping. Each side claimed the other breached the contract first.

Royal claimed the contractor started off on the wrong foot by installing plants in locations that did not match the design. When told of the problem, the contractor stopped work and met with the homeowner. At trial, the court awarded $12,471.60 in damages for landscaping defects. The Court of Appeals held that the misplaced plantings were a breach, but not one that triggered the first material breach rule.

The contractor claimed Royal breached first by seeking damages for a project Royal had not paid for in full. The draw schedule required a $40,000 payment upon delivery of the spa tub. Royal did not make that payment and later claimed in the lawsuit that the tub was defective. The Court of Appeals held that this did not bar Royal’s recovery. Royal had paid $192,170 of the $232,180 contract price, and the court found that withholding the $40,000 payment was not material and not in bad faith.

As this case shows, the “first material breach rule” is something of a misnomer. A breach may be “material” enough to entitle the other party to payment, an offset, or a damages award. Sums of $12,000 to $40,000 are not trivial, even on an expensive project. Courts are still reluctant to apply the rule in such cases because excusing the other party from all further performance is an extraordinary, drastic result. It can derail a project that would otherwise resolve itself through corrective work, substantial completion, and reasonable payment for work received. The takeaway — be circumspect about canceling or terminating a construction contract and immediately suing without first consulting counsel. Many contracts spell out what gives rise to a right of termination for cause and what the effect of a termination without cause would be.

How Are Construction Defect Damages Measured? Cost Rule vs. Value Rule:

The Inviting Structures, Inc. case also addresses how courts measure damages for defective construction work. Under Virginia law, there are two alternative measures of awarding damages for defective work, the “cost rule” and the “value rule.” The cost rule awards the cost one would incur to correct the defects proven. The cost rule is the measure that the courts ordinarily apply and is thus more familiar to judges, attorneys and experts. The cost measure is used unless it would be “grossly disproportionate” to the results, would involve “unreasonable economic waste,” or the cost of remedying the defect is unreasonable compared with the benefit that would be achieved. The value rule considers the difference between the value of the construction if it was properly completed versus the value of the defective work that the purchaser received.

In the Inviting Structures, Inc. case, the Royals complained that the contractor installed a spa tub in their backyard that showed visible corrosion on its exterior. They wanted the court to award them the cost to purchase and install a new spa tub. The Court of Appeals concurred with the Circuit Court’s determination that to do so would give the Royals a windfall, essentially two tubs for the price of one. The trial judge found that the corrosion to the tub was minor, cosmetic, and localized to certain areas.

In other cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia suggests that if the property owner puts on evidence of the breach and the cost to repair, then the burden shifts to the contractor to rebut the accuracy of the cost claim with evidence of the current value, depreciation or betterment. This is consistent with the principle that the defendant bears the burden of proving mitigation of damages. In the Inviting Structures, Inc. case, the record showed that it was the Royals’ own expert who characterized the damage to the tub as “localized” to certain areas.

Are Unsigned or Email Change Orders Enforceable?

Virginia courts will enforce provisions in contracts that require any change orders to be made in writing and signed. The law ordinarily enforces contracts as written. This rule is subject to the defense that such provisions may be expressly or implicitly waived in particular instances. But waiver would have to be proven. In the Inviting Structures, Inc. case, the contractor sought payment for additional work that the homeowner informally agreed to purchase as add-on work. The contractor argued that this established liability under a “course of dealing” manner of doing business. The Court of Appeals agreed with the contractor, but on a different ground — the contract’s change order clause itself allowed change orders by email. The parties had agreed to the changes by email exchanges. Those emails were enforceable without a physical signature or formal e-signature.

Legal Authority:

Inviting Structures, Inc. v. Royal, 2026 Va. App. Lexis 344 (Ct. App. Va. June 23, 2026) (unpublished).

Lee v. Bell, 237 Va. 626 (1989).

Nichols Constr. Corp. v. Va. Mach. Tool Co., LLC, 276 Va. 81 (2008).

Note that the photo used with this blog post does not depict any of the property at issue in the case discussed in this article. It shows a different spa tub.

October 17, 2026

Does Selective Enforcement Make HOA Restrictions Unenforceable?

When the HOA contends a resident violated a rule, the accused may wonder if the rule is unenforceable because of other changes in the use or alteration of structures in the subdivision allowed to continue since the creation of the rule. This is called “selective enforcement.” Does selective enforcement make HOA restrictions unenforceable? That is a reasonable question. But under Virginia law, inconsistent enforcement does not automatically make a restrictive covenant unenforceable. The answer usually depends on the covenant’s language, its purpose, the association’s prior conduct, and the effect of other violations on the community as a whole.

It is human nature to compare oneself with others when accused. They see varying uses and alterations that developed over time and draw their own conclusions based on a sense of fairness. This tendency to compare reflects the fact that the developer made the lots and homes look similar or at least cohesive in some way. One may not be able to avoid comparison during each drive in and out of the neighborhood. This has to do with the peer pressure within and among social classes. Comparison is tricky. Good examples can draw people upward. On the downside, comparison can breed envy or snobbishness, poisoning relationships. If the principle of treating others as one would want to be treated breaks down, mental alarm bells go off. The “golden rule” runs like a thread through community association law. Yet, restrictive covenants are not really expressions of the golden rule. They require everyone to do more specific things.

Whenever a lot owner receives a notice of violation, they immediately think about other houses in the neighborhood that are doing the same thing that they have. When they confront their leaders or management about this, the latter simply point back to the rule. The recorded instruments form the “contract” between the owners. The covenants provide a specific set of parameters for what one ought to expect parameters that are supposed to be clearer and more fair than individual opinions or informal understandings. When the rule appears contrary to the practices and patterns seen in the subdivision, many lot owners wonder if the changes on the ground have nullified the developer’s, “dead hand.” Many people research this issue on Artificial Intelligence programs and receive misleading answers. AI tends to validate negative emotions by rendering an answer favorable to the phrasing of the question.

In Virginia, like most states, the burden of proof to nullify a recorded restriction on the grounds of changed conditions is more onerous than what AI leads many people to believe. According to judicial precedent, the party asserting that the recorded restriction is unenforceable or because changed conditions has the burden of proving that the purpose of the restriction can no longer be achieved. Conditions must have changed so substantially that the essential purpose of the covenant is defeated. The legal precedents require the party attacking the restriction to prove that there was “radical change.” The HOA’s or neighbor’s ability to enforce the restriction is not forfeited by mere failure to object to similar violations in the same neighborhood. How does one distinguish between the “radical change” that nullifies a rule and “ordinary” lapses in enforcement that do not deprive the plaintiff of  a remedy? Consider a few case decisions:

  1. If the homeowner installs a fence that violates a prohibition against side yard walls, the mere fact that some other lot owners have been getting away with having side yard fences does not nullify the rule. Village Gate HOA. v. Hales, 219 Va. 321 (1978).
  2. If the rules only allow split rail fences, but the developer approved some other fence styles, this is insufficient to nullify the rule requiring split rail fences. Melmore II, L.C. v. Boyer, 45 Va. Cir. 178 (Loudoun Cir. Ct. 1998).
  3. A defendant constructed a garage without architectural approval. When he did apply, the committee denied it. Defendants identified other outstanding violations in the community. The court declined to find abandonment of the rule requiring architectural approval for alterations. Sugarland Run HOA v. Couzins, 28 Va. Cir. 334 (Loudoun Co. 1992)
  4. Norfolk Circuit Court found that if a platted street was not constructed, a lot owners were not required to observe a setback rule based on the street location. Miller v. Grinnan, 86 Va. Cir. 446 (Norfolk 2013).
  5. Where a covenant protected the historic character of an adjacent property, and that historic home was later relocated to a different location and the agricultural neighborhood became a commercialized. This constituted a “radical change” that nullified enforcement of the covenant. Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Center Assoc.. v. Smith, 264 Va. 350 (2002).
  6. There were two lots in a subdivision. One lot bore a restriction that it must be sold with the other. But the other lot was not burdened with a reciprocal restriction. The court found the purpose of the restriction defeated. Wells v. Beville (March 31, 2022 unpublished Supreme Court of Virginia decision).
  7. A restriction forbade commercial uses. There were some commercial uses surrounding the lot. The subdivision did retain its residential character. The court found that the existence of those commercial uses nearby did not defeat the purpose. River Heights Assocs. v. Batten, 267 Va. 262 (2004)

As you can see, “radical change” is rarely found where the defendant merely pointed out various other lots around them also breaking the rule. Seem to violate the principle of mutuality that the HOA, as the enforcer, should not expressly or implicitly not condone the violation of the rule for one and not another, especially since all of the directors are also burdened by the same rule. However, the courts tend to look at restrictions as something more than a legal mandate asserted by a peer group. What the restriction seeks to achieve ought not to be defeated by a few violations. In other words, two wrongs do not make a right. The protection afforded by the recorded covenant is not lost merely because the HOA fails to properly enforce it. A HOA may lose its ability to enforce a covenant by express waiver. The HOA may change or nullify the rule by amending the declaration or handbook. But in the end the HOA’s role in covenant enforcement is understood in terms of contract law.

Unfortunately, the concept of “selective enforcement” can be ambiguous. Although the “radical change” standard is enforcement-friendly and not often useful to owners who receive notices of violation, this does not mean that everyone has to do as their HOA orders them at all times. There are other grounds upon which enforcement activity may be resisted, as discussed in other articles on this website. For example, the rule may be inapplicable. In other cases, the rule may be valid but cannot be enforced due to abandonment, waiver or estoppel. That inquiry focuses instead on the HOA’s particular actions or communications.

Maryland also applies the “radical change” rule. Dumbarton Improvement Assn v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co., 434 Md. 37 (2013).

In 2026, the D.C. Court of Appeals applied the “radical change” doctrine. In that case, the landowner wanted to use an alleyway property as a large nightclub featuring exotic dancing. However, a restriction against nightclub use burdened the property. The landowner believed that it could operate the property as a nightclub without unreasonably burdening the neighbors. D.C. ruled against them, rejecting a suggestion to adopt the “reasonableness” rule used in New Jersey.  DTLD, LLC v. Power Station Ltd. P’ship, 350 A.3d 1285 (D.C. 2026).

New Jersey courts apply a reasonableness test: “‘reasonableness’ is necessarily a fact sensitive issue involving an inquiry into present business conditions and other factors specific to the covenant at issue.” In addition to issues of ambiguity or non-ambiguity of the restrictive covenant language and the property purchaser’s actual or constructive notice of the restriction, the factors they consider are: (1) the intention of the parties when the covenant was executed and whether the parties had a viable purpose which did not at the time interfere with existing commercial laws or public policy; (2) whether the covenant had an impact on the consideration paid, “a measure of the value to the parties of the covenant at the time”; (3) whether the covenant is reasonable concerning area, time, or duration (with a caveat that covenants that extend for perpetuity may often be unreasonable); (4) whether the covenant imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade (such as “where there is limited space available to conduct certain business activities”); (5) whether the covenant interferes with the public interest or the public welfare; and (6) whether, even if the covenant was reasonable at the time it was executed, “changed circumstances” now make the covenant unreasonable. Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz & Sons, 121 N.J. 196 (1990). This is not currently the law in Virginia, Maryland or D.C.

Given that much of the advice that one may receive from artificial intelligence is misleading, homeowners ought to consult with an attorney before “digging in” opposition to a notice of violation, complaint or lawsuit regarding challenged alterations or use of their property.

Photo by TLK GentooExpressions:

May 18, 2026

Virginia Supreme Court Reaffirms a Reasonableness Standard for Placing Things in Easements

Ingress and egress are fundamental characteristics defining the usefulness of property. Sometimes, access runs across another owner’s lot. Many lots lack sufficient (or any) frontage on the right of way to get a vehicle through without an easement. Driveway easements inevitably result in disagreements, or at least tension, in the neighborly relations between the “landlocked” home and the property across which the easement lies. This gives rise to lawsuits concerning fences, walls, stones, trees, grading, shrubs or other objects placed within the easement. On October 21, 2021, I have posted an article about this to this blog, “Problem with Pipestems.”

In April 2026, the Supreme Court of Virginia published a new judicial opinion that provides clarification about this. In this case, Caryn and David Yost relied upon a 50 foot wide easement across the lot owned by Thibault Enterprises LLC to access their home in Dinwiddie County, Virginia. Thibault placed fencing, vines and hay bales within the easement. The gravel road is narrower than the 50 feet width of the easement. The Yosts could use the gravel road to drive to and from their home, despite the presence of the items located elsewhere in the easement. None of the items encroached upon the gravel road.

Is Thibault barred from placing anything in the easement that practically narrowed its width in certain areas, or are such things permissible so long as the purpose of the easement remained protected? The easement stated, “. . . the right of ingress and egress over an outlet road, fifty (50) feet in width, running from the southwestern corner of the [Yosts’ property] to State Route #601.” The gravel road is approximately 12 feet wide.

The Supreme Court opinion summarizes several points of law from judicial precedent. Because a party in Thibault’s position remains entitled to make reasonable use of the land burdened by the easement, not all encroachments are forbidden. When an easement is limited to a particular purpose, the burdened parcel may use the land in ways that are not inconsistent with the neighbor’s easement right. This style of analysis requires courts to consider factors beyond the wording of the deed and whether the object narrows the width for traffic purposes. Courts consider whether trees or shrubs would obstruct emergency vehicles from using the driveway or hamper snow removal. If the construction of a fence would prevent two vehicles from passing each other along the driveway in the easement, this could be an impermissible burden on a driveway easement.

In addition to case law, Virginia has a statute, Code § 55.1-305:

Unless otherwise provided for in the terms of an easement, the owner of a dominant estate shall not use an easement in a way that is not reasonably consistent with the uses contemplated by the grant of the easement, and the owner of the servient estate shall not engage in an activity or cause to be present any objects either upon the burdened land or immediately adjacent to such land that unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. For the purposes of this section, “object” does not include any fence, electric fence, cattle guard, gate, or division fence adjacent to such easement as those terms are defined in §§ 55.1-2800 through 55.1-2826. Any violation of this section may be deemed a private nuisance, provided, however, that the remedy for a violation of this section shall not in any manner impair the right to any other relief that may be applicable at law or in equity.

Note that Va. Code § 55.1-305 is an important statute in any easement dispute because it articulates a statutory basis for a nuisance action. In Yost v. Thibault, the Supreme Court articulated a general rule that might allow more options for the parcel burdened by the neighbor’s driveway:

Consistent with our cases and Code § 55.1-305, we hold that the owner of a servient estate is not automatically required to remove all objects intruding into an easement of a defined width. Instead, courts reviewing claims of an impermissible encroachment upon an easement, whether of defined width or otherwise, should (1) examine the language of the deed to determine the purpose of the easement and the intent of the parties; and (2) evaluate whether the actions of the owner of the servient estate unreasonably interfere with the easement.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ ruling, judging in favor of Yost, finding that for an ingress and egress easements, the objects placed in portions of the easement not used for the gravel driveway were reasonable. The court added a footnote that the reasonableness of the item’s location may change in the future.

We recognize that a change in circumstances may require a different answer. For example, if traffic increases along the gravel road, making the width of the existing road inadequate for ingress and egress, or if erosion renders driving over the road impracticable, it may become necessary to use the full width of the easement for ingress and egress.

The Yost v. Thibault Enterprises LLC case does not explain how to resolve difficulties where an express easement contains ambiguous language. In the 2023 case, Forbes v. Cantwell, the easement stated, “[t]here is reserved for the benefit of the owners of Lot 6 and their heirs and successors in title, a 40[-]foot easement . . . for the purpose of providing. . . fencing and landscape buffer for the benefit of Lot 6.” The Court of Appeals found the words, “fencing and landscape buffer” to be ambiguous. In a situation where the deed does not adequately explain the purpose of the easement, the Court may take evidence regarding the intentions of the parties from the circumstances surrounding the transaction. This raises thorny questions in many cases because the parties may disagree as to whether the language is ambiguous, or what evidence is relevant to resolve the issue of intention.

The Yost v. Thibault Enterprises LLC case does not address what to do when the burdened owner installs a fence and gate across the width of the easement, where the gate is narrower than the full width of the easement. For example, what if Thibault installed a gate that was only 12 feet wide? In Yost, the court allowed fencing within the easement area, but there was not a gate providing the sole opening through the easement. Prior to Yost, some courts concluded that if the easement was 50 feet wide, any gate must be no less than 50 feet wide, absent some express term to the contrary.

Developers try to prevent easement disputes from arising by telling lot owners to obtain HOA approval. Recorded covenants often require committee approval of a design application before any fence, wall, pillar or gate may be erected or altered, including easements. HOA’s ordinarily forbid owners from constructing things that interfere with sight lines for motorists.

In addition to HOA’s, local governments regulate fences and walls in zoning ordinances. This is why one ordinarily sees short fences in front yards and taller fences in backyards. The HOA and county rules operate independently of each other, such that the homeowner must comply with both, even if they contain different standards.

In most cases, HOA and county rules are more lenient regarding trees, shrubs and grading than structures. A vegetative buffer is often the best option.

A homeowner ought to consult with an attorney before constructing anything in an easement or reacting to a neighbor’s effort to obstruct the easement.

Legal Citations:

Thibault Enterprises, LLC v. Yost, 927 S.E.2d 806 (Va. Supr. Ct. Apr. 9, 2026).

Forbes v. Cantwell, 78 Va. App. 454 (2023).

Va. Code § 55.1-305

October 21, 2021 article to on blog, “Problem with Pipestems.”

April 29, 2026

How to Write So Your HOA Leaders Will Listen

Do you live in a community? A “community” is a group of people who listen to each other when it is important. Anyone can call themselves a community. To really be one, that title must be “earned.” That starts with communication. If leaders expect to be heard, but ignore or deflect the relevant questions or input of others, then it may function as some other type of organization. This is true of HOAs, condominiums, or cooperative housing.

A seller usually presents the home as part of something greater. The buyer may be attracted to this during the visit or in the disclosure packet. Many home buyers believe that they are buying into an arrangement of mutual support. Humans naturally gravitate away from alienation. In a bad situation, later they may suspect that others expect them to pay their assessments, obey the rules and regulations, and support the leaders without burdening them with complaints. What appeared to be a privilege turns out to be mostly an obligation. I do not have a problem with calling these things “community associations” because people ought to aspire to solve problems through sharing and listening together. You may not need a lawyer if you know how to write so your HOA leaders will listen. Sometimes being heard requires a different approach to communication.

To get needs met, the homeowner may need to engage with their association officers, directors, committee members, or managers, or volunteer for a role themselves. This realization may not come until after a significant problem or threat arises that is not easily resolved. Let us consider a hypothetical: The HOA may have altered the landscaping, hardscaping or plants on a common area adjacent to the owner’s home, and now her yard or outdoor space is unusably soggy. The drainage problem may lead to water intrusion inside the home. Upon inquiry, the homeowner learns that the maintenance of the common area was reoccurring HOA agenda item for 2 years. Other homeowners wanted to change the impact of the common area on their own lot. Some wanted to clear out brush for aesthetic reasons. The board and managers do not show great interest in her concerns because they feel that a decision was already reached previously.

If a homeowner is inundated with stormwater and her inquiries are ignored or deflected, then she rightly will feel flooded with concerns about how to solve this problem that impairs the use she envisioned when she bought it. A homeowner is right to believe that the HOA ought not to alter the common area in such a way as to channel stormwater through her backyard. When informally raising this issue, leaders, managers or neighbors may say some off-putting things, such as suggestions that she caused the problem herself. These experiences can be quite alienating.

Where a serious problem is not being adequately addressed, or even acknowledged, some additional efforts must be made for the homeowner to get needs met. Usually this consists of a more formal letter or email directed at the board with a call to action. As an attorney who represents many condominium unit owners and HOA lot owners. I have seen (and written) both successful and unsuccessful demand letters. This blog post is to point out a few do’s and don’ts..

Use an Organized Narrative:

The email must be adequately organized, with an introduction (why am I receiving this), a coherent story that explains why the issue arose, unanswered questions, if any, and a clear “ask.” The most common problem with homeowners’ emails to their HOA leaders is that it is not understandable to someone who was not intimately familiar with the situation. The homeowner may have been talking with someone else to that point. But the reader of the latest email may be ignorant of the situation. This is particularly the case with the association’s attorney or members of the board who are not involved day-to-day.

Many homeowners hope that the HOA’s attorney will look at the situation and advise the board to address the concerns, so as to manage liability and risk. The attorney must understand the story. An escalating letter or email to the HOA ought to be built around a brief storyline. Short paragraphs with useful headings make it easier to read on a cell phone or tablet. Something longer than two pages is likely to be abandoned midway.

Include a Call to Action:

The “ask” or demand must be succinct. Ideally it is apparent at the top of the email and restated towards the end. The issue may be complicated. It is possible that the homeowner may not know why the problem exists or exactly must be done in order to solve it. Even if the demand is a request for an inspection or books and records, it must be readily apparent to a busy, and possibly skeptical reader. “Please restore the swale on the common area to channel water towards the storm drain” is much better than, “My backyard is flooded and your contractor is at fault, so help me.” Both of these things may be true, but the former is much easier to accept.

Be Careful About Personal Attacks:

If a problem is ruining the homeowner’s life, she is being ignored or blamed, and a culprit is identified, it can be easy to view this as something personal. Sometimes, there is an individual malefactor, and it is not possible to discuss the matter without mentioning this person in the facts. In almost all cases, HOA employees, managers or volunteers will stop listening (or go on the offensive) if they receive a letter or email that attacks their honesty, good faith or motivations.

Typically, the director or committee member is in a position of greater influence than the homeowner complaining. The homeowner may have every reason to feel upset. The opportunity in sending a demand by email or letter is the possibility to persuade. If successful, this may avoid the necessity of getting lawyers or courts involved or focus campaigns at the next election. Often a personal attack does not result in mind-changing self-reflection on the party of the attacked person. An attack will be ignored or elicit a personal counterattack.

Emotional Intelligence > Artificial Intelligence:

Do not unduly rely upon artificial intelligence in crafting a letter or email to the HOA or condominium leaders. Programs like ChatGPT are useful, but it does not know what questions are important or what reasons are strongest.

The Board May Include People Who Think In Different Ways:

You may not know whether the board members have the same politics as you, how old they are, or which country, languages, or region they grew up with. They may not agree with each other. Condominium communities are typically more diverse than HOAs. You may write a better letter if you first attend a board meeting or introduced yourself to volunteers.

Trust is Golden, but There is Other Currency:

By the time the homeowner finds himself writing a demand letter to the board of directors, the trust between the parties may already be severely damaged. Everyone wants the important relationships in their life to enjoy a healthy level of mutual trust. If one side expects the other to accept all of their demands as a condition for future trust, the dispute may not be resolved easily. In those situations, sometimes it is more practical to reduce the solution to mutually agreed terms.

Everyone who owns property has rights. Every person ought to be treated with dignity. But social, persuasive people who can control their impulses and connect with strangers have more success. Active listening and effective communication are the organic fibers that are spun into the woven fabric. You may not be able to make your whole HOA into the community you want. But you do have the power to fashion a community around your own family.

When a Lawyer is Needed:

Sometimes, the demand letter to the HOA is not successful, or the homeowner may be reluctant to write it himself. In moments of intense frustration it may not be clear how to write so your HOA leaders will listen. Often, the homeowner needs his own attorney to help him protect himself, his family and investment. This is particularly helpful if the next steps may include potentially acrimonious discussions or the answer to the problem is not readily apparent because it requires additional information or specialized knowledge.

P.S.: Yes, I am familiar with the book, “How to Talk So Kids Will Listen” by Adele Faber and I thought about it when I chose this topic!

February 4, 2026

Appeals Court Finds Indefinite HOA Assessment Provision Unenforceable

For most homeowners’ associations, the declaration is clear enough about assessments that the lot owners have little doubt whether they can be enforced. The developer has every incentive to make this clear. Community associations run on assessments as fuel. Sometimes inattentive developers hire inexperienced attorneys to write the declaration, and the language is too unclear to accomplish the desired goals. Not all covenants are sufficient to make a HOA a “property owners association” for purposes of the Virginia Property Owners Association Act. Where the declaration was not carefully drafted, the association may not be able to collect the assessments as they expected. This leaves the lot owners in a potentially adventitious position in the sense that the HOA may be less able to lord over them. The uncertainly may lead to unresolvable strive or neglected common areas.

On February 3, 2026, the Court of Appeals of Virginia published an opinion that found a declaration of covenants too indefinite to allow the association to impose assessments. Shekar and Barbara Jannah owned three lots in Terrace View subdivision in Forest, Virginia. Forest is in Bedford County, near Lynchburg. The developer recorded a declaration of protective covenants that gave an option to create Terrace View Property Owners Association. The declaration gave the developer the option to convey common areas to TVPOA. This said that TVPOA, “shall have the right to establish and collect assessments, and by accepting ownership in the subdivision each Lot Owner(s) shall be deemed to have agreed to pay the same when and as due.” The developer subsequently incorporated TVPOA. TVPOA did not do much until 14 years after the developer recorded the declaration.

Later, TVPOA imposed an Assessment Fee on the Jannah lots. The Jannah’s refused to pay the fee. They filed a declaratory judgment and injunction suit against TVPOA. The lawsuit asked the court to make several determinations:

  1. TVPOA was not a “property owners association” for purposes of the Virginia Property Owners Association Act.
  2. TVPOA had no authority to collect the disputed fee or any fee against them.
  3. TVPOA had no authority to enforce any of the restrictive covenants.

TVPOA filed a response, asserting in defense that the Jannah’s had previously agreed to pay assessments, that he had served on the Board at a time when assessments were enforced, and they had sold a lot subject to the declaration they now contest.

For any association to qualify for the powers and remedies afforded by the VPOAA, it must have a recorded declaration that authorizes it to collect a fixed or variable assessment, and the declaration must affirmatively require the association to spend the assessments on maintaining the common areas of the development. These things must be expressly stated in the declaration. According to judicial precedent, it is insufficient for the requirement to spend the assessment on the common areas to merely be implied or inferred. For more discussion of this topic, check out my October 24, 2029 blog post, “Do I Even Have a HOA?” TVPOA pointed to language in the declaration that said that the purpose of the declaration was, “to maintain, ‘the best use and most appropriate development and improvement of said property[,] and to preserve, so far as practicable, the natural beauty of said property.’” TVPOA also said that it had adopted bylaws that require the common area to be maintained. TVPOA had contractually obligated itself to pay for electric lights at the entrance.

TVPOA pointed to a 2024 amendment to Va. Code § 55.1-1805, which added, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent an association from levying or using assessments, charges, or fees to pay the association’s contractual or other legal obligations in the exercise of the association’s duties and responsibilities.” TVPOA argued that this amendment relaxed the VPOAA definition of a property owners association such that it now includes TVPOA. the legal standard of what must be in the declaration to make it qualify for remedies under the VPOAA. TVPOA argued that even if it is not a VPOAA association, it still can enforce the declaration by assessments.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court’s determination that TVPOA was not a VPOAA association. TVPOA’s board could not make it a “property owners association” simply by adopting bylaws that required it to maintain the common areas. The Court disagreed that the 2024 amendments to Va. Code § 55.1-1805 relaxed the requirement for a declaration. The General Assembly adopted that 2024 amendment after the Court of Appeals published the Burkholder v. Palisades Park Owners Association case in 2023. In Burkholder, the Court of Appeals held that the pre 2024 amendment version of Va. Code § 55.1-1805 precluded a POA from imposing assessments for the cost of lot compliance inspections, because that was not expressly authorized by the Palisades Park declaration. The declaration authorized assessments for other purposes, but not the cost of lot compliance inspections. In this 2026 TVPOA case, the Court of Appeals found that the 2024 amendment did not change the statutory definition of a “property owners association.” In Burkholder, the parties agreed that Palisades Park was a property owners association. They disagreed whether under the declaration the cost of the lot compliance inspections could be assessed against the inspected lots. The new Va. Code § 55.1-1805 does not change the definition of a property owners association, it just makes it easier for associations to assess lot owners for the obligations that it has. The determination that TVPOA is not a “property owners association” is significant. The VPOAA does contain protections for the homeowners. Overall, the benefits to the HOA of qualifying under the VPOAA outweigh the rights it affords the owners. For example, the VPOAA allows for special assessments beyond what is provided in the declaration. TVPOA cannot take advantage of this. Homeowners who are concerned about a rogue board hoarding resources and bullying its members would prefer if the VPOAA does not apply.

Even when an association does not qualify as a “property owners association” or some other common interest community recognized under Virginia statutes, it nonetheless may be a nonstock corporation or unincorporated association that can do some business. The recorded covenants may be binding as a “contract” even if it is not a VPOAA declaration. The Court of Appeals disagreed with TVPOA’s argument that their declaration was sufficient to allow it to impose and collect assessments. The Court of Appeals held that the provision at issue was to indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable. In doing so, the Court adopted the legal standard taken by North Carolina courts. Under this test used in other states (and now in Virginia), the court examines the covenant to see if it determines (1) the amount of the assessment and (2) the purpose for which it is levied. An open-ended requirement to pay the association any amount demanded for whatever purpose the board wanted is insufficiently definite to be enforced. The court may look beyond the covenant to determine the assessment amount (thus allowing variable assessments), but there must be something in the covenant that provides a “textual anchor” for the determination of the amount. This does not seem to be a “bright line” rule.

In the 2008 N.C. Court of Appeals case Willow Bend HOA v. Robinson, the covenant allowed the HOA to levy assessments to promote the “welfare” of residents. The board imposed assessments to pay the bills from the association’s attorney incurred in defense of litigation brought by a member. The court found this legitimate because an HOA is required to use an attorney in litigation. The amount of the assessment could be ascertained by reading the bills issued by the firm to the HOA.

By contrast, the TVPOA assessment provision gives no guidance as to the purpose or amount of the assessments that would be imposed. The covenant does not require TVPOA to spend any money on common area maintenance or any other purpose. For this reason, the “contract” was insufficient to enable to the court to give it an exact meaning.

The Court of Appeals considered TVPOA’s arguments that the Jannah’s’ suit was barred because they previously had paid assessments to TVPOA or alternatively, because Mr. Jannah was on the board when TVPOA had imposed assessments. The Court found such circumstances, if proven would be irrelevant to the legal issues decided on the summary judgment motion. TVPOA failed to appeal the issue of those defenses with respect to the injunctive relief. This suggests that a different standard applies regarding the defenses of waiver, estoppel and unclean hands in declaratory judgment versus injunctions.

I would not be surprised if TVPOA seeks an en banc review or appeals this decision to the Supreme Court if it has the resources to do so. Or the community associations industry may lobby the legislature to amend the VPOAA to reduce the doubt cast by this case over assessment collection. Assessment collection is HOA life blood. Any legal precedent that provides a grounds of defense against collection suits or liens interferes with the industry’s ability to do fundraising and fund-spending.

A few points in summary:

  1. The 2024 amendment to Va. Code § 55.1-1805 does not redefine property owners’ associations in a way that would allow them to enforce assessments and then manage the money in a way not contemplated by the declaration. That amendment addresses Burkholder-type issues. The wording of the amendment tells us how to read the other provisions.
  2. If an association does not qualify as a “property owners association” under the VPOAA, then it cannot take advantage of the statutes that make it easier to levy or collect assessments. For many associations, they will never be able to raise enough money to be able to hire a large team, tackle major upkeep obligations, or use litigation to intimidate their members.
  3. Just because one’s community association is not a statutory “property owners association” does not mean that the covenants are unenforceable entirely, or that the association is not a valid entity of some kind.
  4. Barring a reversal of this case on a reconsideration or appeal, the test used in other states will apply in Virginia, whereby the assessment provision must provide a way to determine (1) the amount of the assessment and (2) the purpose of the assessment. This is important to lot owners in Virginia because many declarations contain overly general like that in TVPOA’s declaration. Otherwise, the board could force the lot owners to pay for something that never should be made a part of the association’s business, such as acquiring new property, constructing common area structures not contemplated by the declaration, or other pet projects of the board.
  5. Many HOA’s that do not qualify as VPOAA associations may not be able to force homeowners to pay any assessments. This is because of the overlap between the two legal standards.
  6. The prior conduct of the lot owner with respect to the matters at issue may not be relevant. Here, TVPOA asserted that Jannah had participated somehow in the adoption of prior assessments and had paid at least one of those in the past. The Circuit Court found this non-determinative, and the Court of Appeals agreed. This may or may not apply in a particular case. The applicability of affirmative defenses in an equity case is fact specific. Homeowners should not go around and put into writing that they agree with a board action and then try to fight it later, because this may bar their case under its facts.
  7. One may speculate that the Jannah’s paid more in attorney’s fees to litigate this case and defend the appeal than what they were asked to pay for the assessment. I doubt that they were able to recover any of those attorneys’ fees. The VPOAA attorney fee statute would not apply. Even if there is an attorney fee provision in the declaration, TVPOA has no means to raise the money to pay the fee award. In these sorts of cases, the cost of the litigation often becomes a major concern. The homeowner ought to consider whether they have the resources to match whatever the association can spend out of their funds or their insurance may provide.

Selected Legal Authority:

Terrace View Property Owner’s Assn, Inc. v. Jannah, 86 Va. App. 686 (2026)

Va. Code § 55.1-1805

Burkholder v. Palisades Park Owners Association, 76 Va. App. 577 (2023).

November 3, 2025

Injunctive Relief in Community Association Cases

When disputes between homeowners and their HOA or condominium boards escalate into the courts, often one or more parties seek an injunction. An injunction is a court order requiring a defendant to do or not do something. Injunctive relief in community association cases contrasts with normal civil remedies like money damages.

Since starting this blog over 10 years ago, I have posted various articles about injunctive relief in community association cases. In my May 24, 2019 and July 12, 2022 posts, I focused on the basics of injunctive relief in Virginia as this pertains to community association matters. Today I would like to discuss two recent judicial opinions that illustrate the criteria applicable to pursuing or resisting injunction suits.

Ordinarily, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law to get an injunction. This requires something more shown than mere breach of a statute, contract provision or common law duty. In other words, there must be a good reason to grant this remedy instead of money damages.

In HOA cases, determining the legal standard is not simple. The Property Owners Association Act and Condominium Act require the board and the homeowners to comply with the statutes and the governing instruments. By statute, failure to comply is grounds for civil action to sue for damages or injunctive relief, or any other remedy available at law or equity. This raises a question as to whether plaintiffs must prove injunction claims according to the aforesaid (stringent) requirements, or does this mean that the plaintiff can just prove breach and meet whatever defenses the opposition presents.

2024 Norfolk Case, Patterson v. Gardner:

In 2024, the Circuit Court of Norfolk, Virginia considered this issue in a fence case. Laurie Patterson sued Robert and Carol Gardner in an effort to block them from constructing a fence that she contended violated the condominium bylaws and would constitute a nuisance. Passions ran high, as two dogs, one ex-boyfriend, scenic views and water access were at stake. The parties litigated Ms. Pattersons objections to the portion of the fence planned for the Gardner lot. This was important to the Gardners who wanted to enclose their yard for their dog to run without a leash.

The parties’ condominium’s bylaws provided: “No unit owner may erect additional improvements or change the exterior appearance of his unit without the consent of the other unit owner.” Gardner pointed to the section of the Condominium Act that provided injunctive relief as appropriate for beach of governing instruments as the basis for her remedy.

Patterson argued that she was entitled to an injunction under Va. Code § 55.1-1915(A) once she established that the Gardner’s’ property is subject to the condominium instruments and that they have failed to comply. The Judge rejected this argument, holding that proof of irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law are prerequisites to the granting of an injunction under a court’s traditional equity jurisdiction. Neither is required when a statute or ordinance expressly empowers a court to grant an injunction against its violation. In that case all that is required is proof that the statute or regulation has been violated.

The Court did not treat this to be the case, because Patterson did not sue for violation of a statute; she sued for a violation of the condominium instruments. The statute merely provided standing for a pre-existing remedy. Thus reasoning, the Court said that as the remedies given are all encompassing and long pre-dated the statute, the General Assembly may have enacted Va. Code § 55.1-1915(A) merely to confer standing on certain people to exercise statutory rights. The Court observed that even if the statute did relax what Patterson had to prove in her case in chief, it did not prevent the Gardner’s from bringing the defense of unclean hands, or from arguing that exercise of judicial discretion.

Ultimately, the Circuit Court ruled against Ms. Patterson, finding that the defense of unclean hands barred her suit, because she frequently allowed her own dog to roam on the Gardner property.

2023 Virginia Federal Court Case, Thomas Jefferson Crossings HOA v. Etemadipour:

Similar issues arose in a federal case brought by Thomas Jefferson Crossings HOA in Forest, Virginia against the Etemadipour family for constructing homes on lots in a manner alleged to be contrary to the architectural standards. The HOA objected to both the absence of architectural approval, and to technical aspects of what was actually built. The HOA sought a court order requiring the homeowners to demolish the home and start the process over.

The U.S. District Court observed:

  1. Code § 55.1-1828(A) allows for damages or injunctive relief when a lot owner fails to comply with a property owner’s association’s declaration.
  2. An injunction is an extraordinary remedy and rests on sound judicial discretion to be exercised upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of a particular case.
  3. In general, a court may not grant injunctive relief unless a party has shown that party would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, and that the party has no adequate remedy at law.
  4. However, in cases involving a violation of a real covenant, an injunction is granted almost as a matter of course unless a defendant can meet an exception.
  5. Virginia courts have recognized an exception for when an injunction would create a hardship or injustice that is out of proportion to the relief sought. The hardship defense would be available regardless of what basic criteria apply to the plaintiff’s claim.

In this case, the homeowner constructed the house with a crawlspace. The HOA said that it would have only approved it with slab construction, not crawlspace. The court found that even if the standards did require a slab, the external visual difference between slab and crawl space to be insubstantial. Slight deviation from plans did not warrant demolition. The Court agreed with the homeowners that the request that they tear down their homes presented an undue hardship, and that this warranted exercise of discretion in denying the requested demolition injunction.

Both of these courts appear to be taking a position that, regardless to whether irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law are required, normal defenses in equity such as unclean hands, undue hardship, and judicial discretion are available to a defendant in a community association injunction case. This is good news for homeowners because the judges ought to be flexible in the grounds upon which they can deny an injunction.

Note that sometimes, “the shoe is on the other foot,” and the homeowner seeks an injunction against a neighbor or the board. In many cases, an injunction is the judicial remedy that the homeowner seeks. It is not good for the homeowner if the courts are stringent across the board in their use of injunctive relief.

Hopefully, the appellate courts in Virginia will provide additional guidance regarding whether irreparable harm and inadequate remedy at law are required in community association cases generally, or if other principles relax the standards. In my personal, private opinion, the wording of the governing instruments regarding the availability of the injunction relief in community association cases (or any other remedy) ought to carry significant weight. For example, if the recorded instruments expressly say that an injunction is a remedy for breach of the terms of the recorded instrument, then the Court ought to grant an injunction, without regard as to the availability of other judicial remedies or irreparability, unless there is an equity that warrants discretionary denial or some defense in equity is proven. Such an approach is consistent with the statute and the judicial precedents. The drafter of the recorded instruments choses the wording of the language, and homeowners are provided with a copy of it in their disclosure packets. It is unclear from the case law whether the rule that restrictive covenants are enforced by injunction regardless as to irreparable harm or adequacy of damages would apply to terms of governing instruments that are more like corporate bylaws or “business” concerns. For these reasons, the applicable standard may vary.

Legal Authority:

Va. Code § 55.1-1828 (VPOAA)

Va. Code § 55.1-1915 (Condo Act)

Patterson v. Gardner, 114 Va. Cir. 288 (Norfolk 2024)

Thomas Jefferson Crossings HOA v. Etemadipour, 2023 U.S. Dist. Lexis 184043 (W. D. Va. Oct. 12, 2023)

 

September 10, 2025

Does Failure to Follow the Bylaws Render a Board Decision Void?

When homeowners purchase properties in HOAs or condominiums, often they do so with the belief that they, as members, have a voice in community business. Association boards make business decisions that impact the way of life, investment, and financial burden on the members. Poor decision-making may result in financial distress or diminished usefulness of the home. In such instances, affected homeowners find themselves searching for means to protect their own interests.

The law enshrines “individual” property rights. It also defers, to some degree, to committees established to govern ”collective” business. Many wonder how it is possible for boards and committees to make poor decisions without being corrected by some agency of government. Within the association, the governing instruments set forth what the board is supposed to do (limiting the scope of potential business that may be conducted) and how they are supposed to go about their deliberative process (corporate governance).

Given that procedures in the statutes and bylaws serve to protect members, what difference does it make if the board fails to follow proper procedures in deliberating and deciding an important business decision? Does failure to follow the bylaws render a board decision void? Well, it depends.

This issue was recently litigated in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. Blakeview Home Owners Association in Oakton, Virginia had a retaining wall that needed to be replaced at a six-figure cost. The community discussed this topic from time to time. The HOA president sent an email to other directors calling for a letter ought to be sent to the members informing them of the situation and what needed to be done. Such a letter was not sent. On August 10, 2023, the members received a board meeting agenda stating that the “Retaining Wall Committee” would report on a “Retaining Wall Update.” This agenda served as a notice for the August 16, 2023 meeting. This notice did not say that the board would consider approving a Fine Earth Landscaping, Inc. contract for the replacement of the wall. The price tag was approximately $340,000.00.

The developer incorporated Blakeview pursuant to the Virginia non-stock corporation act. While the Property Owners Association Act does impose meeting notice requirements on associations, no statute imposes a heightened notice requirement in order to approve a contract with a price tag at a certain threshold. But Blakeview’s bylaws impose such a requirement:

It shall be the duty of the Board of Directors to  . . . not authorize any item, or group of related items, whether by way of payment, agreement, or similar, in excess of $40,000 without 45 days notice to the members of the intention to do so and with at least 14 days’ notice of the date, time, and place of the meeting at which such item or group of related items will be considered.

When the Blakeview board conducted their August 16, 2023 meeting, almost no members attended the discussion about the Fine Earth contract. At that meeting, the board approved the contract. Later, lot owner Jacob Davison became aware of this. In his view, the contract was overpriced and unduly benefitted the lots protected by the retaining wall.

Before continuing with the reasoning of the judicial opinion, I would like to acknowledge a general concern about lack of notice in HOAs.  Many community association members struggle to discern what the board is doing. Homeowners sometimes do not discover that a contract was made until months after the fact. When an HOA leader announces that a contract is eminent, it may be impracticable for a homeowner to push for competitive bidding or further review. HOAs are supposed to conduct most business in open meetings. The agendas for the board meetings should be circulated in advance. Executive (closed) session is supposed to be used only in certain circumstances, such as consultation with legal counsel.

HOA boards become frustrated with the sorts of inquiries and statements made by their members during (and between) meetings. Sometimes they try to avoid criticism by deliberating over e-mail and in executive session, and to use open sessions and newsletters to announce what is going to happen. Attendees are usually allowed to speak for 2-3 minutes. Because the consideration of pending contracts can be handled in executive session, it is common for boards to keep such negotiations confidential until they want to announce them. Reserve studies are provided upon request. The full cost and urgency of a project may not be adequately shown in the reserve study. Unsurprisingly, homeowners sometimes abandon attempts to participate in the meetings of the association. Furtive deliberations often backfire. Homeowners are displeased when everything seems to be fine until one day they are unpleasant surprises. I have no reason to believe any of these practices were present in Blakeview, beyond what is indicated in the opinion letter. I mention these things to illustrate how the failure to provide the notice required in the bylaws for major action items reflects a larger problem.

Mr. Davison filed suit in the circuit court, seeking money damages on the grounds that the board’s decision to approve the contract was void because they did not follow the bylaws. Mr. Davison’s principal argument was that because the HOA failed to observe the notice requirement in the bylaws for business in excess of $40,000, the Fine Earth contract was ultra vires or invalid as a matter of law. Does failure to follow the bylaws render a board decision void? In its analysis, the circuit court found it significant that Mr. Davison’s lawsuit alleged that the disputed contract was “void ab initio.” The lawsuit did not contend that it was “voidable.” A void corporate act is entirely invalid. By contrast, a “voidable” action is valid if not challenged, but if the legal challenge is made and is successful, then the action is nullified by the court’s decision.

According to Virginia judicial precedent, an action taken by a corporate body, such as the board of directors, is not “void” if the corporation has the power to take the act and the only irregularity is the method by which the act was approved. In such a situation, the irregularly adopted act may be “voidable” in court. Even if it is voidable, it is often possible for the board to later “ratify” the procedurally defective action.

By contrast, if the corporate body lacked the authority to conduct a particular vote or was forbidden from doing so by a state or governing instrument, such an action is “void ab initio” because it is “ultra vires.”

The “void” versus “voidable” distinction sounds overly technical but it is not. The statutes and governing instruments define the scope of the sorts of business, policies and transactions that a community association may undertake. It does not matter how perfectly the board follows the procedural requirements; a HOA cannot undertake ultra vires actions. On the other hand, replacement of the roof on a structure on a common area easily falls within the normal business of a community association. If the board votes on one day against replacing the roof on the poolhouse, it can later revisit that question on a later date. If there is something procedurally defective, the board can later notice the meeting, achieve a quorum, and someone can move for the vote to purchase the replacement roof, even if the board had made a procedural mistake previously. It would not make sense if the failure to follow procedure once would foreclose any ability to properly conduct such a vote in the future. This corrective activity is called “ratification.” While the “ratification” option is powerful, the board nonetheless must exercise good faith business judgment.

In a footnote, the circuit court addresses the Manchester Oaks HOA v. Batt case. Mr. Davison argued this case as authority in support of his argument that the contract was void. In that case, the trial court found that the meeting at which the members adopted a declaration amendment was improper because the members received inadequate notice. The HOA did not challenge this ruling on appeal. The Supreme Court of Virginia observed that if this is correct, the disputed amendment would be rendered invalid because a meeting of a corporation held upon inadequate notice is improper and the corporate acts undertaken at the meeting are invalid as a matter of law. Because of the way this issue came before the Supreme Court, the trial judge in Davison v. Blakeview did not view this as binding precedent. I would add an observation that the meeting at issue in Manchester Oaks was a meeting of the members at which they had a right to vote. This is different from the notice afforded for board meetings, where only directors can vote.

The circuit court only considered Mr. Davison’s argument that the Fine Earth contract was “void,” because he never raised the “voidable” theory. The trial judge found that voting on the Fine Earth contract could not be “void,” even if the bylaw was not observed, because maintaining the common areas was well within the HOA’s business.

The judge observed that had Davison alleged voidability, the HOA could have availed itself of the “ratification” option, retroactively blessing the approval of the contract.

The court observed that there was nothing shown that if proper notice had been given, the result of the board vote would have been different. While Davison said that the contract was too expensive and benefitted some lot owners over others, the court did not find a lack of good faith business judgment in approving it.

The court concluded that there was no basis upon which to grant relief to Mr. Davison, and entered judgment for the defendant HOA.

The Davison v. Blakeview decision does not mean that individual homeowners are without any legal remedy in HOA litigation in general or corporate governance disputes in particular. Some may argue that this case shows that HOAs may conduct themselves in whatever fashion the board majority sees fit. This is not correct.

When homeowners become frustrated with their HOA or condominium boards, there is a temptation to view every procedural defect as an “opening” to object to a meeting from being called to order or to challenge a particular decision after the meeting. There are many instances where a homeowner ought to focus on the legal technicalities, particularly where a HOA decision or inaction impacts her unit or lot in a direct and special way. For questions that have to do with budgets, contracts, and management of common property used by all in a similar way, it is often better for the homeowner to focus on building support for her particular concern among the members and directors of the association.

Authority:

Jacob Davison v. Blakeview Home Owners Ass’n, et al., CL-2024-7040 (Fairfax Co. Aug. 18, 2025).

Manchester Oaks HOA, Inc. v. Batt, 284 Va. 409 (2012).

Va. Code § 55.1-1816 (VPOAA – Meetings of the board of directors)

June 18, 2025

Do District of Columbia Courts Apply the Business Judgment Rule?

The Business Judgment Rule (BJR) is a legal doctrine that owners must understand when dealing with their homeowners’ associations, condominiums and housing cooperatives. The BJR is a legal presumption that corporate directors’ business decisions were on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the actions taken were in the best interest of the organization. The BJR imposes a burden upon the challenger to rebut the presumption. There are several exceptions to the BJR. Before discussing that, I would like to explain why the BJR is so heavily ingrained in the law of any organization. Generally, it is not the job of courts to “armchair quarterback” the management and internal life of private business organizations by reversing decisions that the judge or the plaintiff view to be imprudent. The same could be said for families, houses of worship, and school boards. Classical liberalism allows people to freely associate with each other as they see fit and order their own affairs, and to give up a certain measure of their own freedom or flexibility to pursue a common endeavor. The BJR is not a delegation of authority, it is a legal presumption that can be overcome by proof. Overbroad application of the BJR can undermine the property rights, free association and liberty to contract principles that the BJR is supposed to protect. To be clear, the BJR does not mean that corporate boards can do whatever they want.

The BJR is important in the community association context. It acts as a check on the idea that a single homeowner ought to be able to challenge any doubtful board decision on a theory of violation of the governing instruments or breach of fiduciary duty. The whole idea of a private association is that neither an individual director nor lot owner ought to be able to hijack the business of the collective by ignoring rules of order. I have written about the BJR in the past. On March 16, 2022, I posted, “Are Courts Critical or Deferential towards HOA Decisions?” This compared the BJR to other standards that may apply under Virginia law such as principles of strict construction or reasonableness. On April 15, 2022, I posted the article, “Condominium Director Conflict of Interests and the Business Judgment Rule.” This piece focused on a Maryland appellate decision Cherrington Condo. v. Kenney that dealt with the interested director exception to the BJR. The landowner prevailed on a challenge to a landscaping contract that favored certain townhouse owners. Maryland courts hold that the BJR applies in that state, subject to certain exceptions. Any exception to the BJR is a fact specific inquiry, especially the meaning of the governing instruments. Note that the rights to inspect books and records and attend business meetings are essential to discern whether a BJR exception may apply.

I would like to now turn to District of Columbia, which has fewer community associations. D.C. has older row houses which are usually not governed by an association. The most common types of D.C. common interest communities are cooperatives and condominiums. D.C. has its own condominium act which was based in part upon Virginia’s. D.C. does not have an equivalent to the Property Owners Association Act. D.C. has corporate statutes that impose standards of conduct on directors of corporations. However, those statutes do not always apply because many organizations are not set up as D.C. corporations. In corporate governance cases, the applicable statutes are a good place to start. The BJR is primarily a legal presumption that is used by the courts in various states to ascertain the burdens of the parties to move forward in litigation. Do District of Columbia courts apply the Business Judgment Rule? In a 2006 decision, the Court of Appeals considered a derivative action, Behradrezaee v. Dashtara, brought by a shareholder against a D.C. stock corporation, alleging self-dealing and misuse of corporate assets regarding leases by the corporation for two stores, a lease by the corporation for warehouse space, and preferential hiring practices. In Behradrezaee v. Dashtara, the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the Superior Court because the complaint adequately pleaded a derivative action based on improper refusal to pursue a claim, by reason of the directors’ interestedness. This opinion recognized the BJR in the sense that there would be little reason to find an exception if the rule did not otherwise apply.

Two years prior, the Court of Appeals decided a residential cooperative case, Willens v. 2720 Wisconsin Avenue Cooperative Association. This is an interesting common interest community case because the opinion discusses the paradox that every association board is susceptible to a conflict arising from the interests that the directors have in their own properties governed by their own votes. This raises a thorny question as to whether the reality of pervasive director interestedness warrants stricter or more relaxed application of the duty to govern impartially in the interest of the community as a whole.

In 1974, a developer established the 2720 Wisconsin Avenue CooperativeAssociation, Inc. (the Cooperative) under the D.C. Cooperative Housing Act. As a Cooperative, the members do not own their individual units. They own shares in the corporation which owns the property as a whole. The member’s ownership interest consists of corporate equity in the Cooperative. The right to occupy or sublease a particular unit derives from being a member in good standing with the Cooperative. At creation, this particular developer transferred the building to the Cooperative in exchange for a wrap-around mortgage. The Cooperative subsequently apportioned the debt on the mortgage to the individual shareholders. Plaintiffs Liliane Willens and Steven Niederman exercised their rights to prepay their obligation under the apportionment. This saved them money on interest that would otherwise be incurred if paid out periodically. Subsequently, the Cooperative negotiated with the developer to release the mortgage in consideration of various setoffs and judgments entered against the developer, a sum that it agreed to pay, and assumption of an underlying promissory note. Thereafter, the board voted to release the other members of their obligation to pay their allotted portion of the debt. However, the board gave no rebate to Willens, Niederman or the other two prepaying members. The board voted to impose a new special assessment against the “forgiven” members to replenish the reserves, but this was less than the amount that had been forgiven. Willens and Niederman brought a lawsuit against the Cooperative. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the Cooperative, finding that the decision to cancel the debt for the other members protected by the BJR.

The Court of Appeals found that the equity interests of the members, including the plaintiffs and the directors, were in the assets of the Cooperative, including the members individual promissory notes. In this sense, a housing cooperative is a fundamentally different sort of community association from a HOA or condominium. The cancellation of the mortgage debt apportioned in the promissory notes was equivalent to the distribution of corporate assets to the shareholders. The other members, including the directors, received a distribution of corporate assets. The plaintiffs received nothing. The Court of Appeals found this to constitute a prima facie case for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Also, the Court found that the claim for breach of fiduciary duty ought to have been permitted to move forward. The directors of a Cooperative owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its members, including a duty of loyalty. An unequal treatment of shareholders may be found to violate the fiduciary duty of loyalty. The Court found that to show breach of duty of loyalty, the plaintiffs were not required to present evidence of motivation for personal gain or actions in bad faith. Even where directors act in good faith, they may unintentionally violate the duty of loyalty. Because the Court found breach of duty of loyalty, the BJR will not apply. The Court explained:

“It is,” in short, “black-letter, settled law that when a corporate director or officer has an interest in a decision, the business judgment rule does not apply.” Croton River Club v. Half Moon Bay Homeowners Ass’n, 52 F.3d 41, 44 (2nd Cir. 1995); see also Williams, 891 F. Supp. at 1183-84.

We appreciate that the directors of a residential cooperative (or condominium) association will typically be unit owners who “will rarely be wholly disinterested” in any decision the board may make. Croton River Club, supra. This may be reason enough to stick with the “reasonableness” standard of review employed in Johnson, or otherwise to be cautious in affording such directors the protections of the business judgment rule; alternatively, it may be a justification for applying the rule with a degree of tolerance for some director interestedness where cooperative and condominium boards of directors are involved.

Wherever the line should be drawn, however, we think the present case falls on the wrong side of it for purposes of deciding whether the business judgment rule applies. Without in any way impugning the good faith and integrity of the director defendants in this case, the fact remains that they had a personal economic interest in the decision they made that was in direct conflict with that of appellants and other Cooperative members in the minority. The interest and the conflict, taken together, are too blatant in our view for the business judgment rule to shield it from scrutiny. It is not only that the directors benefitted personally from their decision to cancel their own (and the majority of members’) sizable promissory note obligations; it is also that they benefitted personally and disproportionately, if indirectly and only modestly, from their concurrent decision to withhold corresponding payments from the minority of members, including appellants, who had prepaid their notes. Simply put, withholding the distribution of corporate assets (money) from the minority indirectly enriched the majority, if only because the money remained in the corporate treasury.

Willens, 844 A.2d at 1138(emphasis added). While the Court of Appeals seems to recognize the BJR under D.C. law, the “interested director” exception, while narrow, is particularly potent when it applies. This exception could theoretically be raised in many cases because every director is impacted personally by the business decisions of the board. This is because every director is subject to the rules adopted and the assessments imposed or forgiven. Generally speaking, community associations are adverse to going to trial if their directors engaged in some sort of self-dealing.

In sum, a property owner in a D.C. community association ought to be prepared to show how her claim fits into a recognized exception to the BJR to move the case forward. The interestedness of the board members who made the adverse decision is something that such a party ought to carefully consider in determining whether a claim may be brought.

Selected Legal Authority:

D.C. Code § 29-306.30. Standards of conduct for directors.

D.C. Code § 29-306.31. Standards of liability for directors.

Behradrezaee v. Dashtara, 910 A.2d 349 (2006).

Willens v. 2720 Wis. Ave. Coop. Ass’n, 844 A.2d 1126 (2004).

June 4, 2025

District of Columbia Demolishes Building After Mailing Notice of Violation

Washington, D.C. has numerous old buildings. The building owners usually want to sell, repair or renovate them. Some owners fail to adequately maintain older buildings. Over the years, the D.C. government has taken an increasingly strict approach to unmaintained buildings. In some instances, the government ignores property that causes problems for adjacent residents. The government’s aggressive approach in such matters has put owners in a bind. The owner may struggle to maintain or remodel the property while simultaneously fight off legal notices.

In 2023, the D.C. Court of Appeals decided a case, 1417 Belmont Glen Community Development LLC vs. D.C., where a property owner brought a constitutional due process lawsuit against the D.C. government for demolishing its building on safety grounds. Belmont challenged the sufficiency of the notice provided to it as the owner. The case is important to the owner or occupant of any D.C. property that has or could have a maintenance or renovation issue. D.C. property owners ought to treat Notices of Violation and Notices of Infraction  with appropriate seriousness.

Belmont owned a property in D.C. with an existing building. Belmont  intended to develop it into a condominium association. In 2008, the building partially collapsed. The D.C. Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA, now Department of Buildings) found it to be in imminent danger of further collapse, presenting a life safety issue. In 2009, DCRA issued a notice of violation and notice to abate (NOV). The NOV directed Belmont to demolish or repair it to make it safe. The NOV quoted statutes requiring structures that are unsafe or dangerous to be taken down or made safe as deemed necessary. The NOV mentioned that the mayor may summarily correct the violations where there is an imminent threat to safety. The NOV stated that the owner ought to be provided with notice by personal service or registered mail and by conspicuous posting. The NOV included deadlines and indicated an opportunity to request a hearing.

DCRA sent out the NOV by regular first-class mail and posted it on the door of the premises. Belmont contended that it never received a copy of the NOV. DCRA did not hear from Belmont. A second major collapse occurred. Approximately three months after the NOV, the D.C. government demolished the structure.

Belmont filed a lawsuit against the D.C. government, alleging violation of its Fifth Amendment due process rights by failure to provide proper notice. Note that the Fifth Amendment applies because D.C. is a federal city and not a state. The Superior Court initially granted Belmont’s motion for summary judgment. Later, upon D.C.’s motion to reconsider, the court did a 180-degree turn, entering judgment in favor of the government. Belmont appealed.

D.C. admitted that it did not follow the statutory registered mail notice requirements that applied. On appeal, Belmont argued that D.C.’s failure to follow the local procedural requirements in connection with the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest amounted to a constitutional due process violation. However, federal and D.C. courts have held that the failure to follow procedural statutes does not by implication amount to a constitutional violation. An error of state (or D.C.) procedural law does not automatically implicate the constitution.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Superior Court’s reconsidered ruling that a combination of (a) regular first-class mail and (b) posting on the property satisfied minimum constitutional due process requirements. The constitution requires “adequate” notice, not proof of “actual” notice.

What is important about this case is not merely the application of these constitutional law principles, but the question as to whether the content, form and timing of the notice provided was sufficient for the abatement action taken. Many Americans assume that robust procedural guardrails exist and must be observed before the local government can tear down the building that the owner is in the process of renovating.

Initially the Superior Court was dissatisfied with the decision of the D.C. government to raise the building when the NOV did not expressly inform Belmont that it would summarily do so if there was not a correction. The NOV was issued before, not after D.C. made a governmental decision to demolish the building. In its reconsidered ruling, the Superior Court observed that the NOV was “ambiguous” as to whether additional notice would be given before razing the building. The Court of Appeals went even further in validating the government’s powers, finding that the NOV unambiguously provided procedural due process of the imminent possibility that the government would tear down the building if Belmont failed to take action.

Note that the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals, at various times construed the legal characteristics of the NOV in different ways suggests that a homeowner attorney might also find the NOV confusing. What this appellate opinion means for owners is that the courts can be expected to construe any NOV in a manner friendly to the government’s prerogatives. It would be a mistake to assume that there would be subsequent regulatory notice of lawsuit before the building would be demolished. This does not mean that the agencies can do whatever they want. This means that property owners must exercise caution.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the Due Process Clause did not require an additional notice of a decision to raze the building if not corrected or appealed. The Court held that it was sufficient for the government to provide first class mailing and posted notice  that the building was unsafe, that the government asserted the right to take corrective action, and that Belmont had the right to be heard at a hearing if requested.

The Belmont opinion describes the facts in a manner that does leave the reader feeling particularly sorry for the landowner. The opinion strongly suggests that Belmont was negligent in monitoring the property. However, in other cases the facts that can be put into evidence may appear less clear 1. The statutes do not require the building to partially collapse before the government may take drastic action.

Given this appellate decision, it would be a mistake for any D.C. property owner to assume that the government would make a diligent effort to get in contact with her before taking corrective action, bring a lawsuit or a specific notice to demolish, or provide “grace” in a situation where it would be obvious that the property owner was in the process of renovating or improving the structure viewed as requiring maintenance.

Property owners can take precautions to avoid harsh results. The property owner can keep the government appraised of her best mailing address for legal notices. The owner can monitor the property for unsafe conditions or posted notices. The owner can prevent structures from becoming unsafe by conducting timely repairs. When a NOV or Notice of Infraction is posted or mailed, the owner ought not to view it as an advisory memorandum that can be ignored if it is wrong. For reasons of temperament or cultural background, some may be inclined to show their disapproval of an erroneous notice by ignoring it. This is quite risky. Any NOV, NOI or similar legal document ought to be viewed as something like a lawsuit or final court order which should be contested or appealed as legally required. On the flipside, the homeowner ought not to consider these developments to mean that if a NOV or NOI is issued, there is nothing that can be done to protect her rights. In many cases, the property owner ought to consult with an attorney to discuss what action ought to be taken. If nothing else, the Belmont case shows that simply doing nothing and seeing what happens should be avoided. Ordinarily, the property owner needs to submit a response form within a defined deadline to obtain a hearing before the agency or the Office of Administrative Hearings. As the Belmont case shows, the NOV or NOI does not necessarily need to be clear in order to allow the government to take adverse action.

One frequent issue in such matters is that the abatement or hearing request deadline stated in the NOI or NOV is inadequate to find a contractor, apply for a permit, and to abate the issue in the time allotted. The inadequacy of the time allotted forces the homeowner to either “dual track” the abatement with the legal hearing request and appeal or to abandon a legal challenge. But by abandoning such a challenge the homeowner opens herself up to drastic action like what is seen in the Belmont case.

Case Citation:

1417 Belmont Cmty. Dev., LLC v. D.C., 302 A.3d 512 (D.C. 2023).

May 13, 2025

Can the Homeowners Stand Their Ground with the HOA?

To show their prowess, lawyers try to sprinkle magical dust with a cease-and-desist letter, brokering a compromise, or strategically complying with the opponent’s requirements. Alternatively, the client needs the attorney to “show his teeth” and forcefully lead action or bring litigation. In these scenarios, decisive action provides apparent relief from acrimony, uncertainty, or doubt. This website focuses on the variety of dispute resolution techniques that an attorney may be able to assist the homeowner with.

In today’s article, I address a particular approach in HOA, condominium or neighbor disputes that does not require commitment to quick settlement or finding the fastest route to the courthouse. Can the homeowners stand their ground with the HOA? For many property owners, the best course of action may be sticking up for themselves and seeing what happens next. For example, a homeowner may believe that the accessory structure on their property that the HOA complains about today ought to remain because years ago she received an approving email or letter from a HOA representative. In another hypothetical, the declaration may not subject property to HOA regulation of trees and shrubs, because the restrictions do not speak to such things. The homeowner may not believe that a Notice of Violation for an unapproved tree planting is a legitimate violation. Elsewhere, the association may tolerate other expressive signage or decorations but find fault with the display of a particular flag chosen by the homeowner.

The person issuing the letter, email or notice may feel strongly that the “offending” item ought to be removed, and may be an officer, director, committee member or manager of the association. The homeowner may be uncertain whether she should accommodate that person’s wishes (for the sake of peace and certainty), aggressively defend themselves through a counterattack (in consideration of what they are dealing with), or find middle ground.

There are three general ways of looking at these sorts of HOA, condominium and neighborhood controversies. The first approach is that the leaders ought to take strong and direct action in dealing with miscreants. “Violators” inspire other violations. Objections to use of HOA notices of violations, fines, and other heavy-handed approaches are met by arguments that there are people upon whom due process would be wasted, and they must be prevented by legal means from ruining things for everyone. The second idea is that all problems can be solved through “restorative justice,” managing the feelings of others, and collaborative, communitarian ideals. The third is the idea that society’s institutions, including business, government, education and also community associations are corrupted in some important way. Thus, in any dispute one ought to assume that the individual being pressured or sued is probably innocent (unless proven otherwise), because this is what institutionalism does.

With HOA’s and condominiums, the second, “collaborative” view dominates the discourse. The concept of a community association is that it is a local mediating institution that makes decisions deliberatively by votes of committees or the membership. However, a “collaborative” approach does not always result in an agreement. People become frustrated by a sense of wasted time. Many HOA committees like to be “informal, while prepared to move on or impose punitive measures if they see fit. When collaborative approaches fail, boards and committees tend to rely more on executive sessions or email communications. The focus evolves into using the deliberative process in a way to manage various voices and factions within a community.

It is possible to go too far in valuing “concord” over toleration of personal dignity. I was reading something about civil unrest in the United Kingdom by journalist Sam Ashworth-Hayes. He was talking in a May 11, 2025 article about the place of free speech within the UK in the context of controversies about migrant policy. Ashworth-Hayes writes,

If you set out with the goal of minimising (sic) the risk of conflict between groups, then you will tend to police those who are easily policed, rather than those who infringe on the rights of others. . . .

Your rights, in other words, are directly related to the perceived threat your group poses. If you are largely peaceful, you will face the full force of the law as it attempts to avoid clashes between groups. If police officers are worried that a riot will result from confrontation, an offender will likely walk free. And the wider war on free speech results from the same dynamic.

Of course, disputes within HOA’s are not the same as political controversies in other countries where the fear of rioting is a factor. But the human dynamics are not dissimilar. HOA’s and condominiums tend to bring their enforcement powers down on those whom they can make a public example of. Thus, “concord” is achieved by picking sides. Ashworth-Hayes makes an important point: How one is treated in a controversy is often a product of how one presents oneself. Always seeking a “collaborative” solution is noble. But if you are completely within your rights, and someone wants you to change, if you enter into mediation with them, you may have to compromise on something important that you were never obligated to. By appearing to be helpless and weak, others will treat you like you are, rather than respecting your vulnerability.

For many homeowners, the best immediate course of action in their dispute with their HOA may be to stay the course with whatever alteration or usage they have going on, politely decline to comply with a request that is not based on a rule that must be followed, and to leave the door open to negotiation about other matters. For some people, this will not work, because some people cannot tolerate any sort of uncertainty or ambiguity in their dealings with others. Standing one’s ground may me that participation in community meetings or activities may be awkward, because they have a dispute with someone that has never been “resolved.” However, if they simply give in or escalate the conflict, the sense of alienation would not be avoided.

In discussing such an approach, the landowner may ask what sort of threats or action they may face if they simply stand their ground on something. The big threats could mean a notice of violation, a fine, a lien, foreclosure, lawsuit, or suspension of common element usage rights. However, if the homeowner is in the right, the association may be reluctant to take any sort of punitive or legal action just to satisfy a complainer. For example, an association may not have the will or resources to spend tens of thousands of dollars on pursuing a lawsuit. They may believe that filing a lien and pursuing foreclosure would open themselves up to getting sued. These concerns introduce a level of uncertainty. But the homeowner usually knows the people involved well enough to understand whether the risk is high. In other cases, standing one’s ground is not recommended because the homeowner would lose the case and suffer some sort of financial loss.

Can the homeowners stand their ground with the HOA? They may need an attorney. The homeowner’s attorney performs an important role in evaluating a course of action built around firmly but politely declining the unfounded demands of an association or neighbor. An attorney may represent the other side. The client may have never “disobeyed” a legal letter before. The risks or opportunities afforded by staying on the course may be unclear to the homeowner. The attorney may have dealt with many HOA notices or cease and desist letters before and may understand something about what is happening that the owner lacks the experience to pick up on. It may be necessary to investigate to determine how firm of a footing the client or the opponent seems to be. Attorneys sometimes communicate things to the opponent for the purpose of drawing a response that allows the client to be advised of potential further action or non-action.

April 11, 2025

Common Interest Community Law in Virginia Seminar

On May 20, 2025, I am going to present a portion of a continuing legal education (CLE) seminar about Common Interest Community Law in Virginia. The Seminar can be accessed live in Richmond, or there is also a webcast. This is geared towards attorneys. I will participate in a panel discussion about owners rights in community associations. Chad Rinard and I will focus on architectural review and covenant enforcement, providing both board and owner perspectives. This is a highly qualified group of presenters. I recommend that any Virginia attorney interested in this area of the law participate.

Common Interest Community Law in Virginia

Tuesday, May 20 |  9:00 a.m.–4:15 p.m. ET
Live Webcast + Telephone
Live on Site in Richmond/Innsbrook

Live MCLE Credit: 6.0
Title Agent Credit: 6.0 Title (live on site and webcast only)

 

Live on Site $329  |  Web $329  |  Tel $379

Cosponsored with the Common Interest Community Substantive Committee of the Virginia State Bar Real Property Section

Collaborate with experienced attorneys for a detailed and comprehensive overview of the creation and operation of Common Interest Communities, more commonly known as Community Associations.

Enjoy an educational seminar with some of the top speakers on Community Association law.

  • Master new tools to enhance your practice and make you a better lawyer.
  • Discover an array of solutions, both with and without the intervention of a Court, that are available for both the Community Association and the “non” Community Association lawyer.
  • Network with your colleagues attending in person at our Bobzien-Gaither Education Center in Richmond/Innsbrook.
  • Option to attend virtually via live-interactive webcast or telephone: attend this can’t-miss program from the convenience of your home or office and still be able to ask questions of the speakers in real time.

Faculty
Gregory S. Bean, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP / Williamsburg
Kristen Buck, Rees Broome, PC / Tysons
Brendan P. Bunn*, Chadwick, Washington, Moriarty, Elmore & Bunn, PC / Fairfax 
Deborah M. Casey*, Woods Rogers Vandeventer Black, PLC / Norfolk
John C. Cowherd, Cowherd PLC / Vienna
Robert M. Diamond*, Reed Smith LLP / Tysons
Erik W. Fox, Rees Broome, PC / Tysons
David S. Mercer*, MercerTrigiani LLP / Alexandria
Chad Rinard, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston LLP / Falls Church
Lucia Anna Trigiani*, MercerTrigiani LLP / Alexandria
Jerry M. Wright, Jr.*, Chadwick, Washington, Moriarty, Elmore & Bunn, PC / Richmond

* College of Community Association Lawyers

Moderator
Chad Rinard
, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston LLP / Falls Church

June 2025 Update:

This seminar is now available as an on-demand CLE program. For more information check this link.