October 13, 2016
High Court Upholds Public Policies Against Restrictive Covenants
The issue of restrictive covenants often comes up in news or social media stories where a HOA or condominium demands that an owner take down an addition, a shed, a statue or some other architectural feature on the grounds that it offends the rules. The board claims that the rule is found in (or derived from) a document recorded in the land records encumbering all of the properties in the community. The board’s assertion of the restriction may come as a surprise to the owner. In a recent blog post, Does an HOA Disclosure Packet Effectively Protect a Home Buyer?, I wrote about how the existing legal framework fails to adequately disclose to the purchaser what it means to live in a HOA. That post started some great conversations with attorneys, realtors and activists about how consumers could be better protected during the sale process. Today’s post focuses on what the legal requirements are for a contractual relationship to arise between the community association and a resale purchaser who did not sign off on the restrictive covenants originally.
Restrictive covenants that bind future owners are a legal device that predate HOAs and condominiums by hundreds of years. Community associations derive their power to collect $$$ from and enforce rules against their owners through restrictive covenants. However, many owners are not aware that enforcement of restrictive covenants are disfavored by Virginia courts on public policy grounds.
Restrictive covenants are contract terms which, if enforceable, follow the property or the person around even after the contract between the original parties is over. They aren’t limited to real estate. For example, a pest control company may ask an employee to sign an agreement not to compete against the employer even after leaving the company. Courts are skeptical of contracts that restrict the ability of a worker to make a living in the future. For public policy reasons, workers should be able to reasonably put their skills to use in the marketplace regardless of what a written agreement might say. The courts enforce only very narrowly tailored covenants-not-to-complete in the employment context. Judicial precedent and the uncertainties of litigation make many businesses reluctant to sue former employees now working as rivals.
Courts disfavor restrictive covenants on real estate for similar policy reasons. Covenants that bind future owners narrow the usefulness of the property. Labor and property should be freely marketable without short-sighted, unreasonable restrictions. Such a policy protects property values and market liquidity.
The Supreme Court of Virginia still shares this viewpoint. On February 12, 2016, the Court decided Tvardek v. Powhatan Village HOA. That case was about the validity of an amendment to the HOA declaration, including its restrictive covenants. In ruling in favor of the homeowners, the Court reaffirmed the strict construction of covenants that run with the land, even in contemporary HOAs. Justice D. Arthur Kelsey’s opinion explains:
“The common law of England was brought to Virginia by our ancestors” in large part “to settle the rights of property.” Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554, 557 (1886). At that time, English common law had developed a highly skeptical view of restrictions running with the land that limited the free use of property. “Historically, the strict-construction doctrine was part of the arsenal of restrictive doctrines courts developed to guard against the dangers imposed by servitudes.” Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.1 cmt. a (2000).
Virginia real estate law generally views restrictive covenants as a threat to liberty. University of Virginia law professor Raleigh Minor prophetically wrote in his 1908 treatise, “perpetual restrictions upon the use of land might be imposed at the caprice of individuals, and the land thus come to future generations hampered and trammeled.” If only Professor Minor could see how property rights have eroded in many communities today.
The viewpoint of many people in today’s real estate industry and local governments is the opposite of what courts have traditionally held. Buyers are told that covenants protect their investments from barbarian neighbors who might do something to make the surrounding properties look undesirable. But as Professor Minor pointed out 100 years ago, these rules give an opportunity for capricious enforcement. Is the message of our contemporary industry an insight misunderstood by previous generations, an appeal to the preferences of certain buyers who dislike non-HOA neighborhoods or merely a sales pitch?
English common law recognized very few restrictive covenants running with the land. Those receiving judicial approval appeared to be limited to easements appurtenant “created to protect the flow of air, light, and artificial streams of water.” United States v. Blackman, 270 Va. 68, 77, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446 (2005); see also Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 557 (1886). Over a century ago, we noted that “attempts have been made to establish other easements, which the [historic common] law does not recognize, and to annex them to land; but the law will not permit a land-owner to create easements of every novel character and attach them to the soil.” Tardy, 81 Va. at 557. Since then, in keeping with our common-law traditions, Virginia courts have consistently applied the principle of strict construction to restrictive covenants.
The court applied this principle in the Tvardek case where the association sought to enforce an amendment to the declaration against certain owners who didn’t vote for it. As the court reaffirmed in this 2016 decision, restrictive covenants are not always enforceable. The Tvardeks opposed being deprived of their right to rent out their property. The covenant has to fall within a recognized category. The principle of “strict construction” works against the restrictor and to the benefit and protection of the owner.
A restrictive covenant running with the land that is imposed on a landowner solely by virtue of an agreement entered into by other landowners who are outside the chain of privity would have been unheard of under English common law. See generally 7 William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 287 (1925) (“Whether or not the burden of other covenants would run with the land, and whether or not the assignee of the land could be sued by writ of covenant, seem to have been matters upon which there is little or no mediaeval authority.”). Privity has long been considered an essential feature of any enforceable restrictive covenant. Bally v. Wells (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 913, 915; 3 Wils. 26, 29 (“There must always be a privity between the plaintiff and defendant to make the defendant liable to an action of covenant.”). Many of our cases have recognized this common law requirement. See, e.g., Beeren & Barry Invs., LLC v. AHC, Inc., 277 Va. 32, 37-38, 671 S.E.2d 147, 150 (2009); Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC Props., 255 Va. 75, 81, 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1998); Sloan v. Johnson, 254 Va. 271, 276, 491 S.E.2d 725, 728 (1997). We thus approach the statutory issue in this case with this historic tradition as our jurisprudential guide.
Someone is “in privity” with another if they have legal standing to sue them because he (or his predecessor-in-interest) was party to the contract that creates the rights at issue. The court affirmed the common law privity requirement, rejecting any suggestion that it should be discarded as outdated. For this reason, the legal requirements that the association disclose certain documents and the seller honor a right of cancellation of the purchase contract have the effect of establishing privity between the HOA and the subsequent purchaser. Do these statutes fairly balance the respective rights of resale purchasers and community associations?
The Tvarkeks did not contest that they were not bound to the HOA covenants that existed when they bought their home. Instead, they sought to have an amendment to the covenants declared invalid because the statutory procedures were not properly followed. If you are curious about the technical reasons why the court found this particular amendment invalid, there are other bloggers, such as Jeremy Moss, following community associations law developments in Virginia have written about Tvardek from this angle. An HOA may have hundreds of members. The membership changes every year. Most owners have never personally made any transactions with the developer or the owners who voted to amend the declaration of covenants. How can privity exist if the declaration can be amended without a signature from every owner? That’s where the legislature comes into play:
The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act, Code §§ 55-508 to 55-516.2, expanded the concept of privity considerably beyond common-law limits. In general terms, the Act permits the creation of a restrictive covenant running with the land and enforceable against subsequent owners of the parcels covered by the declaration, whether or not they consent, so long as the association follows the statutorily prescribed procedures governing the association’s declaration and amendments to it.
The enactment of the HOA statutes do not wipe out the rule of strict construction of covenants that run with the land. Instead, the General Assembly expands certain exceptions to the privity requirement for the enforceability of restrictive covenants. The basic rule of skepticism holds. The Property Owners Association Act must be understood within the context of the common law.
One might think that the modern age of statutes would have marginalized the role of English common law, but this is not so. “Abrogation of the common law requires that the General Assembly plainly manifest an intent to do so.” Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30, 35, 540 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2001). We do not casually presume this intent. “Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms.” Giordano v. McBar Indus., 284 Va. 259, 267 n.8, 729 S.E.2d 130, 134 n.8 (2012) (citation omitted). A statute touching on matters of common law must “be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law.” Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215 Va. 274, 276, 208 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1974).
Case law is very important to make sense of any HOA. Otherwise the statutes just seem to be an enablement of legal powers for the boards that are not found in the governing documents.
The Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act authorizes the creation and enforcement of restrictive covenants against nonconsenting landowners in a manner unknown to the common law. The General Assembly, however, policed the imposition of these covenants with a host of strict procedural requirements — not the least of which is the plainly worded command that no recorded amendment shall be “effective” unless it is accompanied by a certification verifying that the requisite majority signed the amendment or a ratification of it. See Code § 55-515.1(F). In effect, the General Assembly created something entirely new to the law (the right to form private associations having power over land use) while adding precautions to honor the common law’s ancient antipathy toward restrictions on the free use of private property.
The POAA is not some sort of freeway that allows boards to completely bypass the old traffic lights of the common law. As attorney John F. Faber, Jr. observes in his July 2016 Hampton Roads Realtor magazine article about Tvardek, “‘close enough’ does not count when interpreting statutes that allow broad application of restrictive covenants prohibiting the free use by owners of their properties.” In Tvardek, the court articulates three important, related legal protections for owners:
- A restrictive covenant has to be expressly stated in a public land recording (or fairly implied by very narrow exceptions).
- Restrictive covenants must fall within narrow exceptions to the general rule prohibiting them in order to be enforceable.
- If the board relies upon the POAA to enforce the covenant but can’t show that it meets the strict requirements of the statute, it is out of luck.
Does this mean that an owner should disregard notices from the HOA or condo that there is a rules violation or monthly assessments due? Certainly not. Owners should presume that courts will enforce clear and validly adopted restrictive covenants. But what the board, property manager or other representatives of the association is tell the owner may not accurately reflect what the owner’s legal obligations actually are. The owner may not even have a complete set of the governing documents in her possession. In any dispute with an HOA or condominium, owners should see a qualified attorney to help them protect their rights.
For Further Reading:
Tvardek v. Powhatan Village Homeowners Ass’n, 291 Va. 269, 784 S.E.2d 280 (2016)
Photo Credit:
Geoff Livingston The Georgetowner via photopin (license)
September 29, 2016
What is a Community Development Authority?
Every community is supposed to have a downtown as a destination for people to live, shop and play. The town center ideally keeps retail dollars and tax income from leaving the community. When these developments pop up, you hear discussions about whether “gentrification” helps or harms blue-collar people who live or work there. How does a developer decide where to place a new town center? In many places in Virginia, the local government offers to help finance the project with a special assessment district called a Community Development Authority (“CDA”). A CDA is where millions of dollars are financed through issuance of bonds paid off over many years by owners of real estate in the CDA district. The locality collects the assessments for the Community Development Authority. I take a personal interest in these CDAs because there is one in Fairfax County near me called the Mosaic District. Like many CDAs, Mosaic mixes residential homes and retail development.
“The Residences at the Lofts at SodoSopa”
A few days ago the Supreme Court of Virginia issued a new case opinion that provides an example of CDAs’ particular vulnerability to changes in the economy. Before I describe the case, I must first share something from pop culture with insight into recent trends in town center developments. A year ago, the television show South Park aired an episode called “The City Part of Town.” This episode lampooned these kinds of developments. I don’t often watch South Park because of some toilet bowl type humor they employ in other episodes. As a denizen of Northern Virginia, I love this particular episode. In this show, the “socially conscious” leaders of South Park wanted something that would, “Instantly validate us as a town that cares about stuff.” They created a new town center designed to lure Whole Foods Market to South Park. They named the district SodoSopa, shorthand for “South of Downtown South Park”. The episode focuses on a boy named Kenny whose family struggles financially but manage to keep their heads above water. SodoSopa develops around their “historic” home. Hipsters at trendy SodoSopa bars cause nighttime disturbances. The episode also features Mr. Kim and his asian restaurant, City Wok. The residents of South Park lose interest in City Wok when swank new restaurants open in SodoSopa. Mr. Kim takes desperate measures to try to keep City Wok from going out of business. City Wok hires a “child labor force.” Mr. Kim broadcasts commercials for his own restaurant district in an effort to compete with SodoSopa. In classic South Park fashion, the moronic adults engage in foolish behavior in vain attempts to achieve vainglorious objectives. According to Wikipedia.com, Whole Foods Market does open a store in fictional South Park, but not in SodoSopa. South Park’s gentrified district becomes abandoned because it failed to land the desired anchor tenant.
[embedyt] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=miXMWJyOdgw[/embedyt]
CDAs & “Overlapping Debt”
Unfortunately, the cartoon’s satire is not too far from reality. On September 22, 2016, the Supreme Court of Virginia published a new opinion in Cygnus Newport-Phase 1B, LLC v. City of Portsmouth. The case confronted the issue of “overlapping debt” in CDAs. Both bank loans and the CDA bonds finance these developments. If the local government records the CDA ordinance in land records after the bank files their deed of trust, which takes priority in foreclosure? Does the Community Development Authority have “super-priority” over “ordinary” liens? This case is of interest to anyone who conducts real estate settlements, foreclosures or wants to understand what it means to own real estate in a CDA.
New Port CDA
In 2004, Portsmouth Venture One, LLC (“PVO”) acquired a 176-acre developable tract of land in Portsmouth, Virginia. PVO used a Bank of America (“BOA”) mortgage to finance the purchase. In 2005, PVO successfully petitioned the city to set up New Port Community Development Authority. New Port CDA entered into a “Special Assessment Agreement” with PVO for finance of almost $17 million in infrastructure, including roads, utilities and lighting. PVO agreed that the City of Portsmouth could collect the special assessments to pay off the bonds financing the infrastructure improvements. The agreement provided that the special assessments, “does not exceed the peculiar benefit to the Assessed Property … resulting from the improvements,” and that PVO’s successors would be bound by the agreement. In 2006, the CDA’s resolution authorizing the bonds, the city’s ordinance establishing special assessments on the CDA properties and a declaration of notice of special assessment were recorded in the land records. The declaration provided that its provisions would “run with the land” and bind future owners of the subject property. The CDA handed approximately 75% of the bonds proceeds over to PVO to make the infrastructure improvements. PVO then began selling individual lots.
This is a particularly powerful type of financing. CDAs allow a developer to obtain millions of dollars up-front to pay for public infrastructure required in large projects. The Community Development Authority, as a local government entity, issues the bonds. The millions are supposed to be paid back by special assessments owed by the present (and successor) owners of the properties in the CDA. In addition to federal income tax, county property tax, state and local sales taxes, mortgage payments and community association dues, owners in a CDA must pay the special assessments collected by the city or county. Some of New Port CDA’s bonds would not be retired for 30 years.
Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis
2006 was a particularly unfortunate time to undertake an ambitious real estate project. A few years after the mortgage crisis began, PVO defaulted on its debt obligations, eventually losing its investment. In 2011, BOA sold its real estate loans to a company called Cygnus VA, LLC (“Cygnus”). Cygnus instructed the foreclosure trustee to conduct a sale. Cygnus itself purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, thus becoming the succcessor. Cygnus conveyed the property to other holding companies, but for the sake of brevity I will refer to all of them collectively as “Cygnus.”
Once Cygnus acquired these vast tracts, New Port CDA demanded the outstanding special assessments. Cygnus refused, insisting that the foreclosure stripped off the latter-recorded CDA lien that PVO allowed to encumber the property. Not wanting to pay the money or lose the property in a subsequent foreclosure, Cygnus filed a lawsuit. Cygnus argued that the foreclosure sale extinguished the special assessment lien. BOA was never party to the agreements with the CDA and city. Cygnus alleged that, physically speaking, there was very little to show for the millions provided to PVO by the CDA. The property purchased at the foreclosure was largely unimproved by infrastructure. How could New Port CDA claim a lien when there was little or no improvements to the foreclosed property that the new owner would be benefitting from? The circuit court found that this didn’t matter. Circuit Court Judge William S. Moore dismissed the lawsuit on the CDA’s motion. The Supreme Court of Virginia granted Cygnus’ petition for appeal.
Race-Notice Land Recordation & Super-Priority Liens
This New Port CDA case was a closely decided case by a 4 justice majority over 3 dissenters. Virginia appellate law blogger Steve Emmert describes this opinion as a “bar fight” among the members of the Supreme Court. I like his bar fight analogy because it makes me think of South Park’s fictional restaurant districts. The court majority decided that the bank foreclosure did not extinguish what was found to be a “super-priority” CDA lien. Virginia is a “race-notice” jurisdiction as far as real estate law is concerned. This means that between two parties who both recorded liens against real estate, the first one to record has priority. Cygnus appealed the case confidently – its title derived from BOA’s earlier-recorded deed of trust. However, the majority found that a special assessment lien is paramount over other encumbrances including a prior-recorded lien. They explained that a tax lien is superior in dignity because it is made by local governments for purposes of public improvements. The court found that it is not proper for a prior mortgage to defeat the process by which municipalities make property tax liens.
In response to this argument, the dissent points to the sections of the Virginia Code that specifically authorize the attachment of these CDA special assessment liens to real estate. The statutes mirror the “race-notice” rules that apply generally to land recordings. How can these special assessment liens enjoy “super-priority” status if the statute specifically provides otherwise? The Court ruled that because the city filed the ordinance before the foreclosure trustee’s sale, when Cygnus purchased the property, it was on notice of the special assessment liens.
The Shelter Doctrine:
Cygnus’ litigation strategy relied upon what is called the “shelter doctrine,” which has nothing to do with the habitability of any physical construction. Cygnus took title through BOA as a party without notice of any special assessment liens at the time the deed of trust was recorded. Under the “shelter doctrine,” if the mortgage lender’s interest in the real estate had priority over a later-recorded lien, then any party which takes title through the bank foreclosure enjoys the same lien priority. Under the shelter doctrine, the successor in interest of one who purchases the real property in good faith stands in the same position as the good faith purchaser even when the successor had notice of the lien through title examination. The shelter doctrine underlies the nonjudicial foreclosure system in Virginia. The purchaser at the trustee’s sale takes title from the trustee whose authority comes from the deed of trust made to benefit the lender.
The majority remarked that, “To permit such belated challenges would not only be contrary to the [Virginia] Code, it would completely unravel the entire legislative system of local improvements funded by special assessments.” The dissent argued that the majority rewrites the super-priority feature into the special assessment legislation which says otherwise.
“The Villas at Kenny’s House”
Remarkably, a CDA only requires the approval of the locality and 51% of the landowners’ interests in order to set it up. The 51% might be calculated by relative acreage or tax assessment appraised values. If non-consenting landowners oppose formation of the CDA, they have a very short deadline in which to petition the court to block it. In the South Park episode, Kenny’s family owned a small home included within the encompassing SodoSopa district. Of all the townspeople, only Kenny’s family attended a hearing where South Park heard public input on the creation of SodoSopa. If an owner has a larger developable tract as a neighbor, potential imposition of a CDA by the 51% and the county upon other landowners is a legitimate concern. The local government, not the owners, appoint the members of the CDA’s board.
What Might All of this Mean to Buyers and Owners?
I expect lenders to re-write their commercial loan underwriting and documentation processes in the wake of the Cygnus case. I can’t imagine Bank of America now agreeing to finance a project like this without forcing the developer to agree to obtain lender consent before petitioning for a Community Development Authority, or otherwise protecting their interests in writing. Why would a bank knowingly permit overlapping debt to obtain priority over their mortgage? Look for underwriting standards and loan documentation to tighten. Industry and governmental leaders want town center developments to continue and will want the players to get along.
The term “Community Development Authority” seems like a euphemism, like calling serfs “agricultural interns.” Someone who runs across the term might think that it is in charge of parks, libraries or children’s sport programs. CDAs are more accurately called a Higher Tax Area.
What does this new Cygnus case mean to owners of condos or townhouses in CDAs? An owner in one of these districts must pay the special assessments in order to avoid a sale to satisfy the liens. Like everything else in real estate, the owner must understand what the ordinances, abstracts, agreements and memoranda of liens mean. Owners should not assume that every CDA has the same governing provisions as one elsewhere. Likewise, anyone shopping for real estate should check whether it is located in a CDA and what those assessment obligations might be.
Independent Professionals Can Help with Understanding CDA Documents
Between HOAs, CDAs, mortgages and taxes, property owners have many potentially overlapping obligations and rules. HOAs & CDAs provide developers and local governments with means of shifting burdens to build and maintain common areas and infrastructure off of the county budget. While these strategies may work fine for creating these communities, they don’t always work well for owners, as shown by the South Park episode and the Supreme Court of Virginia opinion.
CDAs are a relatively new and potentially confusing phenomenon. Owners or prospective buyers should seek a qualified attorney to help them understand the obligations that come with the benefit of living in one of these districts. Investors should protect themselves against the potential risks that come with unanticipated responsibilities and town center developments that might fail.
For Further Reading:
Cygnus Newport v. City of Portsmouth, Supreme Court of Virginia, Sept. 22, 2016
Photo Credit:
m01229 The new Target store, coming to Merrifield via photopin (license)
September 14, 2016
Does an HOA Disclosure Packet Effectively Protect a Home Buyer?
There is an interesting September 14, 2016 article in the Washington Post by Ilyce Glink and Samuel Tamkin entitled, “Why you should look carefully at an HOA’s plans for that community before buying a home there.” The article responds to Virginia home buyers who have great questions that aren’t answered in an HOA disclosure packet. The purchasers know that the roads the HOA owns need major repairs. It is overall a great article. The HOA disclosure packet doesn’t say how this will be paid for. They are concerned that their dues might increase from $1,000 to $3,500. This is a make or break question. Virginia law entitles the buyer to disclosure of HOA governing documents, corporate records and financial reports before going to closing on purchase of property. These disclosures are supposed to educate buyers about their rights and responsibilities to the HOA for as long as they own the property. In reality, buyers have many things on their minds during this exciting and stressful time. Their busy lives are consumed with urgent matters. They attend the home inspection and negotiation of any repairs. They come up with the down payment and approval from their mortgage lender. An excited family member may be dismissive of any questions or red flags about the property. The purchase will require the buyers to move and have their lives disrupted. Many home buyers feel worn down by demands of the process. They want to avoid cancelling and starting all over. All the buyers know about the HOA may be from seeing neighboring houses, maybe some common areas like a pool or playground. What’s in the HOA disclosure packet or condominium resale certificate give the association great influence over the financial affairs and home life of the buyers. Virginia law requires that HOA disclosure packet to include the following statements and documents:
Statements:
1. Name and registered agent of the association.
2. Approved expenditures that will require a special assessment.
3. Ordinary assessments or mandatory dues or charges.
4. Whether there are any other parties to which the lot owner may be liable for fees or charges.
5. Reserve study report or summary.
6. Current budget and financial balance sheet.
7. Any pending lawsuit or unpaid judgment that could have a material impact.
8. Insurance coverage provided and not provided by the association.
9. Whether any improvement to the property being sold is in violation of the governing documents.
10. Flag display restrictions.
11. Solar panel use restrictions.
Documents:
1. Declaration & any amendments.
2. Articles of incorporation, bylaws & any amendments
3. Rules, regulations or architectural guidelines
4. Approved minutes of the board and owner meetings for previous six months
5. Notices of any pending architectural violations
6. Disclosure Packet Notice Form prepared by the Virginia Common Interest Community Board
7. Annual Report form filed with the state with officers and directors and other information
8. Federal Housing Administration lending approval statement
While many people aren’t familiar with these kinds of documents, they reflect the family’s future financial obligations to the HOA and restrictions on the use of the property. The 2008 subprime mortgage crisis was caused in part by mortgage lenders giving borrowers loan documents that they didn’t understand. The HOA covenants are also a source of confusion. Many buyers would never buy a home without using a home inspector, but they try to tackle the HOA disclosure packet themselves. Unfortunately, it is easier for an unaided consumer to eyeball things in the home that need repairs than make sense out of the HOA documents. The federal government requires mortgage lenders to provide borrowers with simplified statements of the loan terms to make them transparent. For HOAs, consumer protections are weaker. Virginia law gives the buyer only three days to cancel the purchase contract after receipt of the HOA disclosure packet. That might give a professional working in the real estate industry enough time to digest them. However, many ordinary consumers struggle to make this three-day review period a meaningful part of their decision-making. A buyer could negotiate with the seller for this three-day period to be lengthened in the language of the sales contract. Few ask for this because the disclosures in the sales contract do not suggest to the buyer that additional time might be necessary.
As more HOA horror stories appear in news articles and social media posts, consumers are more likely to read the HOA disclosure packet and ask questions like in today’s Washington Post article. Even if the buyer is familiar with community associations law, the governing documents may be vague, ambiguous or unclear about issues critical to the buyer’s use and enjoyment of the home. This is what the home buyers in the article discovered. Glink and Tamkin recommend that the buyers knock on the door of the HOA president and ask her point-blank about how the road repairs will be paid for. An officer who understands their leadership responsibilities well might provide a sufficient answer upon a direct request. However, in most situations this probably won’t achieve a satisfactory result. Educated officers and directors know that the HOA or condo board is only required to provide the information and documents referenced in the statutes. If the buyer is unsatisfied, they have to either exercise the contingency within the deadline or negotiate for an extension of the cancellation period and a follow-up request to the board. The HOA could employ dilatory tactics, inducing the buyer to inadvertently waive the right of cancellation while pursuing an answer to the question. The road expense issue is probably already a hot-button issue for this board with lots of HOA politics in play.
There is a disturbing issue about the facts described in this newspaper column that isn’t addressed by the article. The HOA is managed by its board and not by a property management company. The monthly dues for the property are $1,000. This means that the officers and directors are handling a huge budget themselves, making day-to-day property management decisions. Maybe the board consists of retired real estate professionals who do this as a hobby to benefit the community at no added benefit to themselves. Given the commitment required to manage such a large budget, this is probably not the case. This would be my number one question.
If the purchasers have questions about what the documents mean, they might ask their real estate agent. Realtors provide a lot of value to their clients because they negotiate sales transactions all the time. The agent may not be the best person to ask because she won’t receive a commission on the sale if the buyer gets cold feet and backs out. The disclosure packets contain legal documents that are designed to enforce restrictions in court should disputes arise. If an attorney or real estate agent might struggle to make sense out of the disclosure packet, a buyer who is not familiar with HOAs may only read a few pages before setting them aside and focusing their attention elsewhere. If consumers understood the HOA disclosure packet and made an intentional decision to go to closing or back out based on what they read, consumer trends and demands might force home builders to make HOAs more owner-friendly.
In theory, a buyer can retain independent attorneys and CPAs to review the HOA disclosure packet and answer questions. This would allow an educated decision whether to cancel within the short deadline. In reality, if the buyer doesn’t already have an attorney and/or CPA lined up at the beginning of the three-day period, it may already be too late. Let’s say the buyer spends a day trying to make sense of the HOA disclosure packet on his own. If the family cannot figure things out themselves, on the second day he might start calling around for an attorney. Unfortunately, almost all community association lawyers represent the associations themselves, big investors or developers. They do not normally represent homeowners. My firm is an exception – in my solo practice I never represent HOA boards. General practice attorneys often represent individual persons. However, to effectively advise the purchaser on short notice, the attorney must be familiar with the appellate court decisions concerning the HOA statutes and governing documents. Much of the law pertaining to community associations matters is found in court opinions, not just acts of the general assembly. Many general practice lawyers are very good but may not be familiar with these things. Assuming that the buyer does find an attorney who is a good fit, there still are time constraints. The buyer has to talk to the lawyer, hire him, and provide the documents. It may take the attorney more than an hour or two to review the documents to prepare to provide an overview and answer questions. All of this must be completed within 3 days (or whatever extended period agreed with the seller) so that the buyer can make a meaningful decision to exercise or waive the HOA contingency. Otherwise the buyer might lose their deposit and some other fees if they want to get out of the contract. The three-day period might work if the buyer hired the attorney beforehand. However, the terms and disclosures in the sales contract do not alert the buyer that such might be desired.
Don’t get me wrong. The HOA disclosure packet provides critical information and documents to consumers and does contain a right of cancellation. Doing away with it entirely would be a huge setback to property owners. Unfortunately, the deadlines and procedural features of the disclosure laws don’t do enough to protect consumers. My professional experience working with owners leads me to believe that many of them go to closing unaware of what they are getting into. This is not really their fault. Sometimes they don’t understand the extent of some restriction or obligation that the property is subject to. Also, owners have rights that they are often unaware of and could improve their situation if they knew about them.
One of the key statements in the packet is the Virginia Common Interest Community Board Disclosure Notice Form. This is a kind of “Miranda” warning to consumers about what it means to live in an HOA or condo. The current version is useful but could be improved. It doesn’t mention fines for rule violations. It states that the buyer is subject to all of the decisions of the Board. Yet an adverse decision of the board might be legally void or voidable if the owner acts promptly. The notice does not reference the statutes or common law principles that may dramatically affect the rights and obligations of owners. The packet notice does not point out to the buyer that they have a right to have their own attorney review the documents and answer their questions. If the buyer received a useful disclosure notice form at the time they signed the contract, then they might more carefully consider whether to hire an attorney, CPA or other professional to help them with the HOA disclosure packet. Also, if the statute allowed for a longer period of time for the contingency than three days, the buyer would not need to negotiate that in advance. These additional protections are necessary because the system that exists has a practical effect of limiting home buyers’ right to counsel.
Based on my own personal experiences with real estate, the stories I have read about other people’s experiences and homeowners I have spoken to, I believe that on a practical level, the HOA disclosure packet is an ineffective system of consumer protection. This is shown by the surprise that owners experience when they are victim of an abusive debt collection practice, an arbitrary architectural review decision or any other infringement of their property rights by an association. Fundamentally, the HOA disclosure packet procedure doesn’t work because consumers don’t understand how its contents help them find answers to any questions they might have.
What does a buyer need to know that isn’t found in the HOA disclosure packet? The courts are the branch of government that oversee HOA boards. The Supreme Court of Virginia has repeatedly held that the declaration is a written contract or agreement between the owners and the HOA. If you go to the Virginia Code looking for guidance on something not explained in the packet you might not find the answer there because of the nature of the legal system. The declaration, along with other real estate contracts are interpreted by court precedents for many issues. For example, if a party breaches a contract, they are entitled to remedies which might include money damages, attorney’s fees or an order for the other side to do something. An owner has an interest in knowing whether the declaration even makes the association qualify as an HOA. The system of remedies for breach of covenants is very important in the HOA context because that’s where the owner finds means of enforcing his rights. A wide variety of rules that pertain to HOAs are found in court opinions that aren’t neatly summarized in the disclosure packet or even in legislation.
Because the governing documents are written in legalese interpreted by court opinions and legislative enactments, the disclosure packet is not effective as a summary of the rights the HOA has over the property. The Washington Post column illustrates this. A buyer does not have the time to take a law class on community associations or enforcement of real estate covenants in the three days in which the disclosure laws give them to review it.
I hope that the General Assembly amends the statutes to provide stronger protections for buyers. If buyers knew what they were getting themselves into beforehand, they would be better educated to be owners or even board members. In the meantime, home buyers should prepare to retain advisors to help them understand the documents. If necessary, the buyer and seller can agree to expand the three-day waiting period. Ultimately, families must work with their own team to stick up for themselves and protect their rights. Owners owe it to themselves to adequately understand all of the rights and burdens that may come with the sacrifices made to purchase the property to begin with. Buyers should retain a qualified attorney to help them understand the documents before they even receive the HOA disclosure packet or condominium resale certificate.
For Further Reading:
Common Interest Community Board – Virginia Property Owners’ Association Disclosure Packet Notice
Va. Code Section 55-509.5 (Contents of association disclosure packet; delivery of packet)
Va. Code Section 55-79.97 (Va. Condominium Act – Resale by Purchaser)
Photo Credit:
160404-neighborhood-sidewalk-morning-clouds.jpg via photopin (license)(does not depict property referenced in blog post)
August 17, 2016
Court Determines that an HOA is Not Legally Valid
HOAs and Condominiums derive from the covenants and state statutes’ powerful tools to use against homeowners. However, if the association does not meet the legal definition of a HOA or condo, then it cannot use the statuary toolbox. Instead of issuing fines, it must file a lawsuit each time it wants to obtain a lien against an owner’s property. The Virginia Condominium Act and Property Owners Association Act contain many protections for owners. However, they also provide associations with powerful debt-collection tools if they fit within the statutory definition. If a court determines that an HOA is not legally valid, this is a big win for owners being bullied by the board. Every once in a while, owners will take a stand and challenge whether their “HOA” exists. Recently, George Evans, Karen Evans, Gilbert Kesser & Yvonne Kesser brought such a case against their “HOA” in Culpeper, Virginia. On July 13, 2016 they won an important motion, setting the stage for big changes in Seven Springs Farm Subdivision (SSF). I am originally from Culpeper County, but I have never been to Seven Springs. We lived in a quiet residential development of modest wooded lots a few blocks from a lake. No one ever complained that their quality of life or property values suffered for lack of an HOA. When I left to go to college in 1995, there were few HOAs. Since then, development transformed Culpeper County from a farming community into a suburb of Northern Virginia. HOAs played a key role in that transformation.
This case arose over a dispute about assessments for road improvements. The covenants required the HOA to take a member vote before apportioning an assessment against the unit owners. On March 29, 2014, the Board made a $12,000 “blanket” assessment against homeowners without taking their votes. When the Kessers and Evans refused to pay, the HOA placed liens against their properties. Many owners of HOA properties believe that their Boards have the power to “tax & spend” for the “general welfare” of the community and that there is little way to challenge this. However, the Seven Springs Farm HOA case shows that everything a Board does must be authorized according to proper interpretation of the governing documents.
My friend, Mark Sharp, brought a suit on behalf of the Evans & Kesser families. They sought a judgment declaring that SSF is not a HOA for purposes of the Virginia Property Owners Association Act (“POAA”). Usually, the developers’ lawyers who set up HOAs take care that the Association qualifies as an HOA under the POAA. However, just because it calls itself an HOA and acts as though it has those powers doesn’t mean that it is an HOA. In Virginia, the declaration of covenants must provide, among other things, that the Board has the power to make assessments and also an affirmative duty to maintain common areas. This makes sense, because a contract is only meaningful if obligations go both ways. Contracts that fail to exchange something by both sides are invalid because of lack of “consideration.” In the HOA context, fundamental unfairness would arise if the board had the power to assess and lien but no obligation to spend the money on the common areas. Without this mutuality of obligation, an association is not entitled to the toolbox of remedies provided in the POAA.
In the Seven Springs case, the declaration gave the “HOA” the power to assess. The board had the power to do common area maintenance but were not specifically obligated to perform it. Under Virginia law, “valid covenants restricting the free use of land, altogether widely used, are not favored and must be strictly construed.” Accordingly, “substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved against the restrictions, and in favor of the free use of property.”
Culpeper Circuit Court Judge Susan Whitlock’s opinion applied this strict construction principle to the question of whether the association qualifies as an “HOA” under the Property Owners Association Act. Anything in a declaration of covenants can be strictly construed. HOA lawyers typically make the governing documents many pages long in order to avoid having a judge find any “substantial doubt or ambiguity.” Judge Whitlock observed that an HOA is subject to such a challenge even if there was an ongoing pattern of owners paying dues and the Board spending the money on the common areas.
When the owners brought this challenge, SSF filed a demurrer, asking the judge to dismiss the case for legal deficiencies and not allow it to proceed to trial. Judge Whitlock overruled this demurrer, finding that “The Defendant’s Declaration fails to expressly require SSF to maintain the common areas, and therefore the Defendant is not a “Property Owners’ Association” under the POAA. Merely stating that those fees shall be used for maintenance of Lots and upkeep of roads fails to bridge the gap of ambiguity to be considered an affirmative duty to maintain.”
While the board, its managers and lawyers may interpret ambiguous governing documents to empower them to do what they want, in the end it is the counts that oversee HOAs, which a judge may very well reject. Judge Whitlock permitted the owners challenge to the road improvement assessment to proceed in Court.
This Seven Springs Farm HOA reminds us of several things: First, an owner must understand what the governing documents mean under state law to know what their rights and responsibilities are. In a dispute, this will require attorney assistance. The president, manager or HOA lawyer approaches the issue from a different perspective and cannot be expected to disclose to the owner all of her rights. The governing documents may or may not be consistent with what someone might think to be a common-sense approach to solving a problem.
Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia views a HOA as a contractual relationship. Ambiguous or uncertain provisions of these “contracts” can be strictly construed in the owners’ favor. A Virginia HOA board is not a “mini-government” empowered to exercise general legal authority within the boundaries of the development.
Third, Judge Whitlock’s decision is a pleasant reminder that not only do HOAs sometimes lose in Court, sometimes they are found to be less than a card-carrying member of the HOA club. Owners considering litigating against their community association should take this opinion as a reminder that a good case is winnable.
Fourth, just because a judge rules that an association is not an HOA under Virginia law doesn’t mean that the declaration of covenants is completely invalid. Such a ruling just means that its board cannot benefit from all of the intensive lobbying that the industry has done to empower HOAs and condominiums. A non-HOA association may still be able to exercise dominion over common areas and take owners to court to resolve disputes.
Property owners considering court action involving their boards of directors should begin the process with careful consideration of the recorded governing documents with the assistance of a qualified attorney. In many cases, they have more rights than what others explained to them.
Case Citation: Evans v. Seven Springs Farm HOA, No. CL15001273 (Culpeper Co. Va. Cir. Ct. Jul. 13, 2016)(Whitlock, J.)
Photo Credit: Culpeper County Courthouse via photopin (license)
August 15, 2016
Escaping an Unlivable Rental Property
Americans continue to feel the effects of the recession that began in 2008. In April 2016, the Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. home ownership rates dropped to 63.5%, near the 48 year low of 63.4% experienced in 2015. Meanwhile more families are renting homes. Washington, D.C.’s local economy is more resistant to recession because of the federal government. In past years, the rental real estate market in Northern Virginia exploded. Many workers with decent wages found themselves renting because of challenges in saving up for a security deposit. Many single family homes available for rent are owned by landlords who live out-of-town. Frequently, tenants find themselves committed to written lease contracts for properties that are practically uninhabitable. Sometimes this happens because the tenants signed leases after viewing photos on the internet without an in-person inspection. In other situations, the tenants discover serious problems with the condition of the property only after living there a while. Not all habitability problems are immediately apparent upon an in-person visual inspection. Such problems can include insect or rodent infestation, contaminated water, broken furnaces, asbestos exposure, serious water intrusion, toxic mold, lead exposure or any other condition that threatens the health or safety of any occupant. Escaping an unlivable rental property has its own challenges. Tenants find themselves financially responsible for use of property that is not habitable. Adding to this, tenants must make a new financial commitment to another property if they want to move. The current landlord keeps additional leverage by holding the security deposit.
Typically, the landlord, her agent or attorney prepare the residential lease agreement. By design, that lease seeks to manage the risks of a damaging or non-paying tenant. Landlords look at their ownership responsibilities in terms of mortgages, taxes, insurance, agent’s commissions, association dues, you name it. Leases have more provisions about the tenants’ obligations than those owed by the landlord. When dealing with unlivable conditions, a tenant must consider legal protections outside the four corners of the lease agreement.
In Virginia, the chief consumer protections for tenants are found in the Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act. This statute applies to many landlord-tenant relationships in the Commonwealth. Also, the Virginia General Assembly enshrines the landlord’s obligations in a statute entitled “Landlord to maintain dwelling unit,” Va. Code § 55-225.3(A) requires the landlord to:
- Comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety;
- Make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
- Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him;
- Supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all times and reasonable air conditioning if provided and heat in season except where the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat, air conditioning or hot water is generated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant or supplied by a direct public utility connection; and
- Maintain the premises in such a condition as to prevent the accumulation of moisture and the growth of mold and to promptly respond to any notices as provided in subdivision A 8 of § 55-225.4.
Tenants intuitively know that they are entitled to these basic protections. How are they to get out of bad situations without bearing an unfair burden for problems which are someone else’s responsibility. Litigation should only be pursued if unavoidable. Many problems with the condition of property might require proof by testimony of an expert witness. The parties might have to wait several weeks for their first court date, and then weeks or months more for trial.
If a condition with the property is currently unbearable, the landlord can expect a prospective buyer or new tenant to have the same visceral reaction. If repairs or remediation are required, the landlord will have to pay for that while paying other obligations. The property could go for weeks or even months where the tenant rightfully doesn’t want to pay, but the landlord doesn’t want to release the tenants from their obligations. In a residential case, the parties should expect a judge to oppose giving damages for rents where the landlord could mitigate his damages by making the property livable and renting it out to a new tenant.
Under most lease agreements, timing issues are critical to tenants preserving their rights to get their deposits back. Landlords can try to enforce provisions requiring for advance notice harshly.
If the landlord refuses to let them go amicably, the tenants should prepare to go to Court if necessary to protect their rights. At the same time, where at all possible a reasonable settlement should be pursued. Depending upon how severe the problems are with the condition of the property and how the statutes and lease provisions speak to the problem, the tenants can usually negotiate an exit strategy that doesn’t require them to finance the landlord’s efforts to market or refurbish the premises. Landlords, their property managers, and attorneys will look to see if the tenants are serious in their desire to get out of an unacceptable situation while protecting their rights. Tenants have rights not to unfairly bear the financial and lifestyle burdens of landlords’ problems. Contract qualified legal counsel to protect your interests.
UPDATE:
I would like to share an emailed comment on this article from Deborah Goonan, property rights blogger & activist:
It certainly seems to me that a tenant has more legal protection than an owner of a condo or HOA. There is no specific obligation for an Association to provide maintenance up to a habitable standard — at least not spelled out to the degree that landlord/tenant law spells out in Virginia law.
And at least the tenant can leave (theoretically — depends on the tenant’s financial situation and if there’s anywhere else for the tenant to go), and loses, at most, the security deposit.
A condo owner has a LOT more financial risk and cannot easily walk away from obligation to pay assessments and mortgage payment for a place that is not livable. (Such as Michelle Germano with the toxic drywall).
Deborah
Photo Credit: 20-22 Surry Rd: Our 2 family house via photopin (license)
July 28, 2016
Walking on Sunshine
Americans are increasingly frustrated by federal, state, local and HOA officials making decisions in secret. On the floor of the nominating convention, supporters of Senator Bernie Sanders protested Hillary Clinton’s undisclosed collusion with the Democratic Party leadership during the presidential primary. On the Republican side, Donald Trump continues to refuse to disclose his tax returns. Democracy doesn’t work unless voters, boards and legislators can make informed decisions. Virginia already has “sunshine” laws on the books to safeguard “open government” on the state, local and HOA levels. These laws mandate freedom of information and often have a beneficially deterrent effect. As Katrina and the Waves sang in their 1980’s hit, “I’m walking on sunshine, and don’t it feel good!” Property owners feel good when they can observe, understand and react to decisions that affect them. Many decry the “partly cloudy” forecast for “open government.” Property owners often struggle to resolve impasses with HOAs, land use officials and construction contractors. In many cases owners can use “open government” laws as a tool to seek favorable outcomes. As an attorney, I seek documents and information from whatever sources are available to help clients. Owners “walking on sunshine” make better decisions.
Developments at a July 15, 2016 Loudoun County Board of Supervisors meeting illustrate how confusing and frustrating “open government” rules can be. Harris Teeter Properties, LLC obtained permission to open a grocery store in Aldie, Virginia. Harris Teeter wanted the Board of Supervisors to deny requests for three neighboring restaurants. This would allow them to plant their largest store in one of Loudoun County’s Transition Policy Areas. “Transition Policy Area” is a land use designation “incorporating an innovative blend of rural and suburban development features.” Under the Board’s official policy, Aldie is a border-town of sorts between Northern Virginia and rural areas. These competing retail proposals are for development along this fault-line. If a mega-grocery store comes to Aldie, shoppers will drive there from all over. Aldie folks were mostly fine with getting a regular Harris Teeter. They have to eat. The Board of Supervisor’s Transportation & Land Development Committee considered these controversies. Although he was not on this Committee, Republican Supervisor Tony Buffington took a keen interest because he represents the Aldie district. Many of his constituents fear that an expanded Harris Teeter proposal would create traffic congestion, destroying the hamlet’s rural identity. Some questioned the Board of Supervisor’s commitment to its overall plan for land development. The Loudoun Times quotes Gem Bingol of the Piedmont Environmental Council as saying, “The question I see facing you is, ‘Are you going to support your Transition Policy Area policies?’” Supervisor Buffington’s day job with the U.S. Capitol Police took him on the day of the committee meeting away to the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio. From the GOP convention, Buffington texted Supervisors at this committee meeting. He was “against everything they [Harris Teeter] are currently proposing.” He shared that the “residents are adamantly opposed to the proposals.” He and a group of other Supervisors carried on a lengthy discussion text message on what to do about the Harris Teeter proposals.
Randall Minchew, the lawyer for Harris Teeter, noticed that the Supervisors were all very active on their cell phones during the Committee hearing. Mr. Minchew asked if Buffington was texting them. The other Supervisors read their texts with Buffington into the official meeting record. Minchew accused the Supervisors of a “blatant” Virginia Freedom of Information Act violation. Mr. Minchew’s appeal to the open government laws at least gave him and the grocery an opportunity to respond to criticisms submitted off the record. However, VFOIA can’t really be used make the Board to give the grocery the decision they want.
Loudoun County Attorney Leo Rogers reviewed these text messages. Rogers, in consultation with the Virginia Coalition for Open Government, reached an opinion that the Buffington-instigated texts did not violate the FVOIA:
First, given that the text messages were exchanged between only two Board members, there was no participation in the meeting itself. A public meeting of the county’s elected body is defined under FOIA as a meeting of three or more Board members.
Second, in order to be an electronic communication under FOIA, there needs to be an audio or visual component, which the text messages did not include. In any event, in order for a FOIA violation to be actionable, it must be done “willfully and knowingly,” and there is no evidence that is the case.
Of course, Mr. Rogers only speaks in his role as an advocate and advisor for the County. Harris Teeter could try to bring a legal action in court to obtain a ruling. However, what Harris Teeter wants is to gain an edge on its competitors in the mega-grocery field. They are more interested in the ultimate decision that the Board will make than a mere FOIA issue. After the incident, Buffington publically expressed regret that his actions may have caused a perception of wrongdoing by the public.
County supervisors and other elected officials reading the opinions of the county attorney and FOIA council are probably breathing a sigh of relief. Undoubtedly, board members everywhere make all sorts of communications with one another that it would be unduly burdensome and unnecessary to put on the record. The Harris Teeter hearing illustrates why it pays to make inquiries to find out what off-the-record communications shape governmental decisions that affect how many people a grocery store will give jobs, serve goods or delay commutes. The same can be said for HOA and condominium board and committee deliberations.
The Transportation & Land Use Committee hearing was broadcasted. Mr. Buffington or any other interested party could stream it on their computer or mobile device. Lawyers represented the interests of Harris Teeter and Loudoun County. Local newspapers quickly covered the scoop for the interest of county voters. At stake is the identity of one of the fastest growing counties in the nation. In this instance, the recording and inquiries allowed the threats to transparency to be quickly addressed.
In many condominiums and homeowners’ associations, these safeguards do not practically exist. HOA board and committee meetings aren’t broadcast on television. Meetings are recorded in brief minutes, if at all. The news media are unlikely to commit personnel and resources to covering HOA controversies unless something juicy erupts. Owners rarely bring legal counsel to HOA hearings. Owners frequently complain that their Board’s ruling clique keeps them in the dark. The Virginia Property Owners Association Act and the Condominium Act contain statutory protections of the integrity of HOA meetings and owners’ rights to review records. Although most Associations would rather simply disclose the requested meeting records than defend an owner’s lawsuit, few owners take advantage of their rights. On a practical level, the association president, board majority, Association lawyer and property manager make many decisions without the “open government” sunshine that many owners want. HOAs present themselves to state and local policymakers as mini-governments that relieve county budgets from service obligations in entire communities. For many people, their neighborhood community is the least transparent “government” making decisions that affect their lives. It should be the other way around.
VFOIA is a useful tool for property owners in construction cases as well. Contractors must obtain county approvals and inspections throughout the construction process. The local government maintains records of all of these applications, permits, inspections, correspondence and other documents. Owners can use VFOIA requests to find useful information for construction disputes with the builder.
Property owners don’t have to be big grocery store chains to protect their rights and get their voices heard before their local elected government officials and HOAs. HOA and local government boards and committees have legal counsel and managers on their team. Owners need to have a “team,” which could consist of like-minded neighbors, sympathetic board members, attorneys, CPAs and others. With help, owners can understand the laws and governing documents. “Walking on sunshine” can help owners protect their rights and make smart decisions.
News Articles:
Selected Virginia Statutes:
Virginia Freedom of Information Act
Va. Code § 13.1-933. Inspection of records by members (Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act)
Va. Code § 55-79.74:1. Books, minutes and records; inspection (Virginia Condominium Act)
Va. Code § 55-79.71:1. Use of Technology (Virginia Condominium Act)
Va. Code § 55-510.1. Meetings of the board of directors (Virginia Property Owners Association Act)
Va. Code § 55-515.3. Use of Technology (Virginia Property Owners Association Act)
Photo Credit:
Harris Teeter Quail Corners Charlotte, NC via photopin (license)
July 15, 2016
Dealing with Memorandum for Mechanics Lien
A disgruntled contractor or supplier may attempt to collect a payment from owners by filing a Memorandum for Mechanics Lien against the real estate. Under Virginia law, claimants (contractors or material suppliers) can interfere with owners’ ability to sell or refinance property by filing a lien in land records without first filing a lawsuit and obtaining a judgment.
A March 2016 opinion by federal Judge Leonie Brinkema shows why purchasers at Virginia foreclosure sales must give care to mechanics liens. In April 2013 and October 2015 Jan-Michael Weinberg filed a Memorandum of Mechanics Lien against a Fairfax County property, then owned by Ann & James High. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank later foreclosed on the High property. In early 2016, Mr. Weinberg brought a lawsuit to enforce the mechanics lien against J.P. Morgan Chase and the property.
If a claimant pursues a Memorandum for Mechanics Lien correctly, the property may be sold to satisfy the secured debt. A Memorandum for Mechanics Lien is a two-page form that anyone can download online for general contractors or subcontractors. The filing fee is a few dollars. By contrast, removal of the lien may require significant time and attention by the owner. Overall, it is best for owners to work with their advisory team to avoid having contractors file mechanics liens in the first place. Sometimes, disputes cannot be easily avoided and owners must deal with recorded liens. A Memorandum for Mechanics Lien differs from a mortgage or a money judgment. Fortunately for the owner, Virginia courts apply strict requirements on contractors pursuing mechanic’s liens. Just because a contractor fills out all the blanks in the form that doesn’t meant it necessarily is valid. This blog post is a brief overview of key owner considerations. The Weinberg case provides a good example because the court found so many problems with that lien.
- Who? The land records system in Virginia index by party names. For this reason, the claimant must correctly list its own name and the name of the true owner of record. The owner’s team will need a title report and the construction contract. Whether the claimant is a general contractor, subcontractor or supplier will determine which form must be used. Mr. Weinberg’s Memorandum for Mechanics Lien claimed a lien of $195,000. Virginia law requires a contractor to have a “Class A” license for projects of $120,000 or more. Judge Brinkema found this Memorandum defective because Weinberg’s claim was not supported by a reference to a Class A license number. In some residential construction jobs, the Virginia Code requires appointment of a “Mechanic’s Lien Agent” to receive certain advance notices of performance of work from claimants that might later become the object of a mechanics lien. This creates an additional hurdle for the contractor, suppliers and subcontractors. In many construction projects, the builder works with the owner’s bank to obtain draws on construction loans. If mechanics lien disputes arise, owners can work with the bank to obtain documents.
- What? The Memorandum for Mechanics Lien must describe the dollar amount claimed and the type of materials or services furnished. The written agreement determines the scope of work, payment obligations and other terms. Generally speaking, only construction, removal, repair or improvement of a permanent structure will support a mechanics lien. Mr. Weinberg claimed that he conducted “grass, shrub, flower care,” “week killer,” “tree removal/cutting,” general property cleanup,” “infrastructure work,” “planting grass,” “site work,” “general household work” and “handy man jobs.” The Court found that this description of work was invalid. The work described was either landscaping or too vaguely connected to actual structures. Where the agreement was for work that could actually be the basis of a mechanics lien, the owner should consider how much of the work the contractor actually performed? Is the work free of defects? Does the Memorandum state the date the claim is due or the date from which interest is claimed?
- When? The contractor or supplier must meet strict timing deadlines for the mechanics lien. Generally speaking, the Memorandum for Mechanics Lien must be filed within 90 days from the last day of the month in which the claimant performed work. Judge Brinkema observed that Mr. Weinberg failed to indicate on the Memoranda the dates he allegedly performed the work. Also, no Memorandum may include sums for labor or materials furnished more than 150 days prior to the last day of work or delivery. Furthermore, the claimant must bring suit to enforce the lien no more than 6 months after recording the Memorandum or 60 days after the project was completed or otherwise terminated. Weinberg’s 2013 Memorandum was untimely because he did not sue to enforce it until 2016. Because Weinberg’s 2015 Memorandum was the same as the 2013 version, they both probably describe the same work on the property.
- Where? The Memorandum for Mechanics Lien must correctly describe the location of the real estate that it seeks to encumber. If it lists the wrong property, the lien may be invalid. Property description problems frequently arise in condominium construction cases because the same builder is doing work in the same building for multiple housing units. The Memorandum must be filed in the land records for the circuit court for the city or county in Virginia where the property is located.
- Why? There is usually a reason why a contractor decides to file a Memorandum for Mechanics Lien instead of pursuing some other means of payment collection. The Highs allegedly didn’t pay Weinberg for his landscaping and handyman services. The Highs’ weren’t able to pay their mortgage either. Weinberg filed for bankruptcy. In order to resolve a mechanics lien dispute with a contractor, an owner should consider how the dispute arose in the first place. Is someone acting out of desperation, confusion, or is the lien a predatory tactic? Could investigation need some other explanation?
- How? The owner must understand how the mechanics lien dispute with the contractor relates to the overall plan for the property. Mr. Weinberg tried to use mechanics liens to collect on debts. At the same time, he went through bankruptcy and the property went through foreclosure. Context cannot be ignored. Few owners can afford to remain completely passive in the face of a dispute with a contractor. The owner may have a construction loan or other debt financing to consider. An unfinished project is difficult to sell at a favorable price. Potential tenants won’t lease unfinished property.
On March 15, 2016, Judge Brinkema denied Mr. Weinberg’s motion to amend his lawsuit and dismissed the case. When a contractor or supplier files a Memorandum of Mechanics Lien against property, the owner must carefully consider whether to pay the contractor directly, deposit a bond into the court in order to release the lien and resolve the dispute with the contractor later, bring suit to invalidate the lien on legal grounds or simply wait 6 months to see if any suit is brought in a timely fashion to enforce the lien. Fortunately for owners, there are strict requirements on contractors for them to take advantage of mechanics lien procedures. A Virginia property owner should consult with qualified legal counsel immediately upon receipt of a Memorandum of Mechanics Lien to protect her legal rights.
Case Citation: Weinberg v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2015)
Photo Credit: Views from a parking garage via photopin (license)
July 7, 2016
What is a Summons for Unlawful Detainer?
This blog post discusses the role of the Summons for Unlawful Detainer in Virginia foreclosures. “Unlawful Detainer” is a legal term for the grounds for eviction from real estate. The foreclosure trustee and new buyer go to a real estate closing a few days after the foreclosure sale. Upon settlement, the title company records the Trustee’s Deed of Foreclosure in the local land records. In most land transfers, the giver and recipient of the ownership of the real estate participate voluntarily. In a foreclosure, the borrower may contest the validity of the foreclosure transaction and the Trustee’s Deed. The Trustee’s Deed is necessary to the new buyer to pursue eviction proceedings against the occupants of the property. The Trustee’s Deed is the buyer’s legal basis for filing the Summons for Unlawful Detainer form. A copy of what this form looks like is available on the website for the Virginia court system.
Post-foreclosure evictions are not the only reason anyone files a Summons for Unlawful Detainer. Unlawful Detainer suits get into court in different situations. The most common is where a tenant fails to pay rent or defaults on the lease. However, it can be used for a variety of situations where an occupant entered onto the property with lawful authorization (such as a deed or lease) but has continued to occupy the premises after his right to do so ended. Every landlord knows that each month that the tenant holds over without paying is rental income that will likely never be collected. The General Assembly enacted legislation to streamline property owner’s rights to evict tenants and other persons unlawfully detaining possession of the real estate. This prevents an unfair result that might occur if a tenant could use lengthy court proceedings to live in the premises rent free when he may not have money to pay a judgment at the end. The buyer of the foreclosure property has made a financial commitment to own the property. Foreclosure investors want to evict the borrower, make any necessary repairs as soon as possible so that the property can be rented out or re-sold. So the summons for unlawful detainer form is a powerful, attractive tool for the new buyer in a foreclosure.
The investor or their attorney typically files the Summons for Unlawful Detainer in the local Virginia General District Court (“GDC”) after receiving the Trustee’s Deed. The GDC is the local court in Virginia most people are familiar with. This is where Virginians go for traffic ticket cases and suits for money under $25,000.00. The GDC has a “Small Claims Division” where parties litigate without lawyers. The Sheriff’s Office serves the Summons for Unlawful Detainer on the borrower and any other occupants. Upon receipt of the Summons for Unlawful Detainer, the borrower faces a “fight or flight” decision. Experienced lenders, trustees and purchasers know that the Trustee’s Deed of Foreclosure can be used as a weapon to try to crush the borrower’s opposition to the foreclosure. The Bank, trustee, and new buyer are can pursue these legal matters without the threat of having being evicted out of their base of operations. The borrower would not be in a foreclosure matter if there wasn’t a difficulty making payments. Once the Deed is in land records and the Summons is filed with the GDC, the borrower also has to mount a legal defense to keep possession of the home. A borrower is well advised to seek qualified legal counsel in his jurisdiction to help deal with these matters.
The Summons for Unlawful Detainer Summons must contain the name, address and point of contact for the new owner seeking to evict him. This will tell the borrower whether the property is now owned by the bank that requested the foreclosure or an unrelated investor. The Summons sets out when and where the borrower or his attorney must appear to contest the eviction proceeding. Every form states, “If you fail to appear and a default judgment is entered against you, a writ of possession may be issued immediately for possession of the premises.” A writ of possession is a document signed by the judge that authorizes the Sheriff’s Office to go out to the house and remove the people and belongings found there and turn it over to the new buyer and their locksmith.
What can a borrower do who has been wrongfully foreclosed upon and received a Summons for Unlawful Detainer? The earlier the borrower engages with legal counsel, the more there is that the attorney can do to help. On June 16, 2016, the Supreme Court of Virginia initiated legal reforms which dramatically shift the balance of power in these post-foreclosure evictions. If properly defended, the borrower may have an opportunity to get the dispute over the validity of the foreclosure decided before ordering eviction. This is good news. Prior legal precedent required many borrowers to defend against a Summons for Unlawful Detainer at the same time he pursued his own wrongful foreclosure claims against the bank and trustee. I discussed this new case in greater detail in my blog post, “The Day the Universe Changed” and in a radio show interview available in the “On the Commons” podcast library. While borrowers will continue to receive these “Summons for Unlawful Detainer” forms, they now have better options.
Unless the borrower does not intend to contest the eviction and foreclosure, borrowers receiving a Summons for Unlawful Retainer from the buyer of the foreclosure property should immediately seek qualified legal counsel in order to explore available options. The Virginia General Assembly is anticipated to enact new legislation in its next session to clarify the jurisdiction of the GDC and the appropriate court procedures when a borrower contests the validity of a foreclosure related to the eviction proceeding. With assistance, borrowers may be able to take advantage of these legal reforms.
photo credit: GEDC1290 s via photopin (license)
July 6, 2016
What is a Notice of Trustees Sale?
Bankers and lawyers send many notices, letters and statements to borrowers struggling with their mortgage. The purpose of such paperwork is to collect on the mortgage debt. In Virginia, the Notice of Trustees Sale is very significant. In Virginia, the bank does not have to go to court first in order to obtain a foreclosure sale. The law permits the property to be sold by a trustee in a transaction outside of the direct supervision of a judge. The Foreclosure Trustee cannot conduct a valid foreclosure in Virginia without sending a proper Notice of Trustees Sale. The Trustees Sale is a public auction of the property to the highest bidder, usually on the courthouse steps. In order to protect her rights against abusive foreclosure tactics (examples discussed elsewhere on this blog), the borrower must understand the role this Notice of Trustees Sale plays. Borrowers exploring the possibility of contesting the foreclosure should retain qualified legal counsel when they receive the Notice of Trustees Sale.
When borrowers go to closing on the purchase or refinance of Virginia property, they review and sign a loan document called a Deed of Trust. Virginia judges treat Deeds of Trust as the “contract” between the borrower, lender and trustee regarding any foreclosure. The Deed of Trust imposes specific requirements on the lender if they want to foreclose. The bank is required to follow these requirements regardless as to whether the borrower is in default on the loan or not. Deeds of Trust describe what the Notice of Trustees Sale must include, who it must be sent to, requirements for it to be published in the newspaper, etc. The Virginia Code also has specific requirements about the Notice of Trustees Sale and its newspaper publication. The Notice of Trustees sale is more than a tool to intimidate the borrower or provide a courtesy to someone about to lose their home. The Notice is an essential building block. Absent this, the foreclosure is not valid.
Upon receiving the Notice of Trustees Sale, Borrowers must take seriously the trustee’s stated intention to foreclose on the property at the date written. For various reasons, lenders and trustees will cancel or postpone trustee’s sale, but they won’t do this simply upon request by the borrower. If the lender or trustee indicates that the sale has been temporarily cancelled or postponed, the borrower may request for written confirmation.
The Notice of Trustee’s Sale is an invitation to make an offer to enter into a contract for the property with the purchaser at the sale. The two main documents in a Trustees Sale are the Memorandum of Sale and the Trustee’s Deed of Foreclosure. The Memorandum of Sale is a written contract between the trustee and the new buyer. Some Deeds of Trust require that the trustee and the buyer make their contract on the terms set forth on the Notice of Trustee’s Sale. Sometimes trustees put additional terms into these Memoranda which create other contractual rights which may be of interest to the borrower. The Trustee’s Deed is the document conveying ownership of the property to the new buyer. A borrower investigating the validity of the foreclosure should carefully review the Deed of Trust, Notice of Trustees sale, Memorandum of Sale and Trustee’s Deed to determine whether any of the latter documents breach of the Deed of Trust. If the trustee refuses to provide a copy of the Memorandum of Sale, the borrower should seek the assistance of qualified legal counsel. Both the borrower and any potential purchasers are generally entitled to rely upon the terms of the Notice of Trustees Sale in making informed decisions about it. If the lender and trustee sell the property on terms and methods contrary to the Notice of Trustees Sale, then the Trustee’s Deed may be invalid. The validity of the Foreclosure Trustee’s Deed is an issue of great interest to any victim of wrongful foreclosure.
Many homeowners fighting foreclosure observe many contradictions between their loan documents, mailings received from the bankers and their lawyers, and the things they are told on the phone by the bankers and the banker’s lawyers. The banks have experienced foreclosure attorneys whom they may have instructed to aggressively pursue the foreclosure and eviction. The Notice of Trustees Sale is one of the essential “gears” in the “foreclosure factory” borrowers contend with. Receipt of this document may be the best time to contact qualified legal counsel to discuss your rights and options available for keeping your home.
Relevant Statute: Va. Code § 55-59.1. Notices required before sale by trustee to owners, lienors, etc.; if note lost.
July 1, 2016
False Promises of Loan Modifications in Fraudulent Foreclosure Cases
In the classic comedy, Ferris Bueller’s Day Off, Ferris’s mother meets with the assistant principal to discuss his absenteeism. She had no idea he took 9 sick days. The school official bluntly explains: “That’s probably because he wasn’t sick. He was skipping school. Wake up and smell the coffee, Mrs. Bueller. It’s a fool’s paradise. He is just leading you down the primrose path.” Mothers of truant teenage sons aren’t the only ones succumbing to the temptation of wanting to believe that everything is fine when it isn’t. Owners busy with their jobs and families would like for their home to be worry-free. Unfortunately, the Ferris Bueller’s of the world sometimes grow up to service mortgages, manage HOA’s and handle customer service for home builders. The real estate and construction industry has some predators who lead consumers on the “primrose path.” We are not talking here about mere “sales talk” and “puffery” (for example, someone merely says that they will “treat you like family”). Promissory Fraud is when someone makes promises with no intent to follow-through but with every desire for the listener to rely upon it. In the past few years, borrowers have sued mortgage servicers for false promises of loan modifications in fraudulent foreclosure cases. Loan servicers stand in the shoes of the original mortgage lender as far as the borrower is concerned. Servicers send out the loan account statements, collect the payments and make disbursements. These cases allege that the servicers used “primrose path” tactics to conduct foreclosure fraud.
Leading along the primrose path is a powerful ploy because of the psychological roller-coaster the consumer experiences. Financial struggles, default notices and foreclosure letters causes stress and troubles that impact owners’ resources, time and relationships. Promises of time extensions, foreclosure avoidance and loan modifications are spellbinding. They invite the consumer to the much-missed happy place of living their life without threat of catastrophic financial loss. If the servicer says just the right thing, the borrower will very naturally want to let down their guard and forego more arduous tasks of forging a legal and financial solution to the problems. The false sense of security is intoxicating. When the borrower later experiences foreclosure instead of the promised modification, they are left trying to pick up the pieces.
Randolph Morrison vs. Wells Fargo Bank:
Mortgage servicers often get away with this because borrowers don’t always pay close attention to what they are actually being told. When borrower listen and take notes, they protect themselves. In 2014, a federal judge in Norfolk considered a claim for fraud based on telephone misrepresentations that Wells Fargo Bank allegedly made in the foreclosure context. When Virginia Breach homeowner Veola Morrison died in 2009. Her family received a notice that the property would be foreclosed on January 19, 2011. Veola’s son Randolph offered to assume the mortgage and requested an interest rate reduction. On January 12, 2011, a Wells Fargo employee told Randolph that he was approved for a loan modification and that the January 19, 2011 foreclosure would not take place. Wells Fargo sent Randolph a letter dated January 14, 2011 offering him a special forbearance agreement, requiring him to make his first payment on February 1, 2011. A “forbearance” is when the lender agrees to hold off on foreclosure and collection activities for a period of time in anticipation that the borrower will resolve short-term cash flow difficulties. They said that the foreclosure would be suspended so long as Randolph kept to the terms of the agreement. In spite of these representations, Wells Fargo Bank’s substitute trustee conducted the foreclosure sale anyway on January 19, 2011. In his suit, Randolph alleged that he reasonably relied upon a telephone statement by Wells Fargo that the January 19, 2011 foreclosure would not occur. He relied upon the subsequent letter saying when he had to make his next monthly payment. Relying on these representations, Randolph did not take other actions to prevent foreclosure such as hiring an attorney. After he discovered what happened, Randolph sued Wells Fargo. The Court denied Wells Fargo’s initial motion to dismiss the case and allowed Randolph’s claim for promissory fraud to proceed in Court. The case settled before trial.
Alan & Jackie Cook vs. CitiFinancial, Inc.:
Just because a false reassurance is not in writing doesn’t mean that the borrower can’t sue for fraud. Virginia Federal Judge Glen Conrad considered this question in 2014. Jackie & Alan Cook owned a property in Lovington, Virginia. In September 2011, Mr. Cook explained to his lender CitiFinancial, Inc. that he was current on his loan but struggling to make payments. The branch manager suggested that he pursue a loan modification through the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”). The manager told Mr. Cook that if he stopped paying, the lender would “have to modify the loan” and it would probably be able to cut the interest rate and principal owed. Mr. Cook became leery and asked questions. The manager reiterated that he should just stop making payments and ignore the bank’s letters until he received a notice with a date for the foreclosure sale. The customer services rep told Mr. Cook that once he got the foreclosure notice he could call the number on it and get started. Per the manager’s instructions, Mr. Cook stopped making payments and ignored the servicer’s default letters.
On June 17, 2013, Cook received a notice that on July 17, 2013, foreclosure trustee Atlantic Law Group would sell his Nelson County property in foreclosure. Remembering what CitiFinancial originally said, Cook tried to call the loan servicer 20 times, receiving no answer or he was hung up on. Finally, on July 11, 2013, Mr. Cook got ahold of CitiFinancial who told him what information they needed for a loan modification. When Mr. Cook talked to another employee of the servicer, he was told that his case would remain on “pending/hold status” for 30 days in order for him to obtain the necessary documents, and that the scheduled foreclosure would be postponed during that time. On July 17, 2013, the noticed day of foreclosure, one employee of the servicer told him on the telephone the “great news” that he was awarded a loan modification. Later that day, he talked to another employee of the servicer who told him that the foreclosure would indeed proceed as originally scheduled, because he failed to provide them with necessary documents. When Mr. Cook asked her about the 30-day hold period that he was previously given, she replied that “she had never heard of such a thing” and that there was nothing to be done to stop the foreclosure sale. Notice how the servicer used a new misrepresentation about the 30-day period to keep Mr. Cook on the “primrose path” even after he struggled to communicate with him after defaulting per their instruction. Mr. Cook rushed to an attorney’s office but by the time the trustee received the attorney’s letter the sale had already occurred. Use of the primrose path strategy is particularly damaging because the new buyer can use the foreclosure trustee’s deed to initiate eviction proceedings. Citi bought this property at the trustee’s sale and brought eviction proceedings against Mr. Cook. Cook filed suit, basing fraud claims on the servicer’s false promises. CitiFinancial initially moved for the court to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Cook could not have reasonably relied upon the false oral representations because the promissory note and deed of trust provided unambiguous terms for foreclosure in the event of default. Citi seemed to be saying that only things that are in writing are official in the mortgage context. Judge Glen Conrad rejected this argument because the question of whether Cook was justified to rely upon Citi’s oral statements was an evaluation of the credibility of witnesses at trial.
Jackie & Alan Cook’s case settled before trial. An agreed order reversed the foreclosure sale. While a servicer misrepresentation doesn’t have to be in writing to constitute fraud, the dispute may come down to a “he-said she-said” at trial. Few borrowers will take careful notes at the time these discussions take place. While defendants may be required to make document disclosures, homeowners can’t count on getting copies of servicer notes and internal messages during the litigation. Search warrants are not available in civil cases.
The experiences of the Morrisons and Cooks are common amongst different lenders all across the country. It’s best for homeowners struggling with their mortgages avoid the “primrose path” promises made by some servicers, foreclosure trustees and foreclosure rescue scams. If it sounds too good to be true, then it deserves thorough review and consideration. However, there are many situations where relying upon the representations of a lender or trustee is the only reasonable option. Once the foreclosure trustee’s deed is recorded, the borrower may face eviction proceedings. If a trustee or servicer breaches the mortgage documents or makes misrepresentations in conducting a foreclosure, the borrower should contact qualified legal counsel immediately.
Case Citations:
Morrison v. Wells Fargo Bank, 30 F. Supp. 3d 449 (E.D. Va. 2014)
Cook v. CitiFinancial, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 67816 (W.D. Va. May 16, 2014)
Photo Credit:
June 21, 2016
The Day the Universe Changed
My parents are retired schoolteachers. Growing up, we watched our share of public television. I remember watching a British documentary by James Burke called, “The Day the Universe Changed.” This program focused on the history of science in western civilization. Scientific developments affect public perceptions of man’s place in the world. Each episode dramatically built up to a momentous change in scientific perception. For example, when scientists determined that the earth circles the sun (and not the opposite), it felt as though the “universe changed.” The title of the final episode was, “Worlds Without End: Changing Knowledge, Changing Reality.” Provocative stuff for 1985. I went on to study the history of science for four years in liberal arts college.
Property: Ownership & Possession:
In the law there is a difference between the reality of how people think and act in real life, on the one hand, and the reality of courthouse activities on the other. For example, people frequently lie when under the stress of questioning. Courts developed a comprehensive set of evidence rules to determine what documents and testimony are acceptable. The rules of evidence are not a formalization of the way people ordinarily evaluate truth-claims. As another example, outside of Court, non-lawyers understand the difference between the right of ownership and the right to possess or occupy any property. The right of ownership is superior to, and often includes the right to possess. These rights are distinct but unseverably connected. Attorneys and nonlawyers understand the difference between being an owner, a tenant, or an invited guest. By contrast, since before the Civil War, Courts in Virginia enforced the conceptual separation between the right to claim ownership and the right to evict an occupant and gain exclusive possession. The courts did this by not allowing an occupant to raise a competing claim of ownership as a defense in an eviction suit. In many cases, attorneys would have to “lawsplain” why a borrower could not effectively assert the invalidity of the foreclosure in the eviction case brought by the new buyer. Practically speaking, the borrower had to defend the eviction case while also filing another, separate lawsuit of her own to raise her claims to rightful title to protect her property rights. The rules required a financially struggling borrower to litigate overlapping issues in two separate cases at the same time against overlapping parties. If you are reading about this and think that it makes no sense, you are right, it doesn’t. But this was the way that the Virginia eviction world worked for a very long time.
Instant Legal Reform:
And then June 16, 2016 was the day the entrenched worldview of foreclosure contests and evictions in Virginia changed forever, or at least until the General Assembly holds its next session. The Supreme Court of Virginia published a new opinion overturning 150-200 years of precedent in this area. This opinion is important to anyone who lives or works in any real estate with a mortgage on it. Virginia appellate law blogger Steve Emmert observed that this decision represents a “nuclear explosion” and that “. . . dirt lawyers are going to erupt when they read . . .” This case is a game-changer that unsettles much of real estate litigation in Virginia.
My Professional Interest:
Since the foreclosure crisis exploded in 2008, I have litigated foreclosure cases in Virginia on behalf of borrowers, lenders and purchasers. Before June 16, 2016, few expected the rules of the road to change dramatically. The Supreme Court of Virginia has hundreds of years of precedent underlying the existing state of affairs. The banking industry maintains an effective lobbying presence with the General Assembly. Victims of foreclosure abuses play the game of survival; few become activists. Yet, common-sense would dictate that having two separate lawsuits (the eviction case and ownership dispute) proceeding through the court system at the same time wastes resources for everyone. This impacts borrowers the most because they are in the least favorable position to pursue multiple lawsuits at the same time.
Parrish Foreclosure Case:
Teresa and Brian Parrish took out a $206,100 deed of trust (mortgage) on a parcel of real estate in Hanover County, Virginia. This deed of trust’s provisions incorporated certain federal regulations into its terms. These regulations prohibited foreclosure if the borrower submitted a complete loss mitigation application (a.k.a., loan modification application packet) more than 37 days before the trustee’s sale. Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) had an interest in the home loan. The Parrishes timely submitted their application packet. Regardless, in May 2014, ALG Trustee, LLC sold the Parris property to Fannie Mae at the foreclosure sale. Fannie Mae then filed an unlawful detainer (eviction) lawsuit against the Parrishes in the General District Court (“GDC”). The GDC is the level of the court system that most Virginians are familiar with. People go to the GDC for traffic tickets, collection cases $25,000.00 or less, evictions and “small claims” cases. In the GDC, the Parrishes did not formally seek to invalidate the foreclosure sale. Instead, they argued that they were entitled to continue to possess the property because ALG conducted the foreclosure sale while the loan modification application was pending. The GDC judge took a look at the Trustee’s Deed that ALG made to Fannie Mae and ordered the sheriff to evict the Parrish family. The Parrishes appealed the case to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court granted a motion affirming the lower decision in Fannie Mae’s favor. The Parrishes sought review of the case by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s June 16th opinion is a mini-treatise for the new landscape of foreclosure legal challenges.
Questions of Ownership and Occupancy Are Inextricably Intertwined:
The Justices directly addressed the question of the GDC’s jurisdiction. Unlike the Circuit Court, the GDC does not have the statutory legal authority to decide competing claims to title to real estate. That said, in each post-foreclosure unlawful detainer case the GDC must base its decision on whether the presentation of the Trustee’s Deed of Foreclosure is sufficient evidence of title to grant the eviction. Under longstanding legal precedent, the Parrishes’ contention about their loan modification application would not be heard in the unlawful detainer case because the borrowers can’t invalidate the foreclosure deed in the GDC. But on June 16, 2016 that all changed. The majority found that the validity of the foreclosure purchaser’s claimed right to possess the premises cannot be severed from the validity of that buyer’s claimed title because that title is the only thing from which any right to occupy flows. “The question of which of the two parties is entitled to possession is inextricably intertwined with the validity of the foreclosure purchaser’s title.”
From this insight, one must call to question the practical requirement for the borrower to bring his own separate lawsuit against the buyer, trustee and lender to reverse the foreclosure, confirm the right to possess and other relief. Why not have a procedure where all of the related claims can be combined?
What Are Lawyers to Do Now?
Okay, now the “universe has changed.” How do borrowers raise this issue in defense of post-foreclosure evictions? Is there anything that the foreclosure buyer can do about this? The Supreme Court recognizes many reasons why a borrower might have a legitimate claim that the foreclosure sale was legally defective, including but not limited to:
- Fraud (by the lender and/or foreclosure trustee)
- Collusion (between the trustee and the purchaser)
- Gross Inadequacy of Sale Price (so low as to shock the conscience of the judge)
- Breach of the Deed of Trust (for example the regulations about the loan modification application)
The Supreme Court’s new opinion states that the homeowner could allege facts to put the validity of the foreclosure deed in doubt. By the court’s new standard, if the borrower sufficiently alleged such a claim, the GDC becomes “divested” of jurisdiction. When the judge determines that he has no jurisdiction because there is a bona-fide title dispute, he must dismiss the entire case. From there, the new buyer would have to re-file the case in the Circuit Court where the parties would then litigate everything.
I expect that the General Assembly will enact new legislation in its next session that will clarify the jurisdiction of the GDC and the procedures for post-foreclosure unlawful detainers. At least until then, purchasers and lenders will not have the same ability to use the unlawful detainer suit as a weapon in their struggles with borrowers in foreclosure contests. Homeowners’ abilities to fight foreclosures will be streamlined. Justice McClanahan wrote a dissent where she explained the meaning of this in remarking that the majority of justices,
practically eliminated the availability of the summary [i.e. expedited] proceeding of unlawful detainer to purchasers of property at foreclosure sales. The majority’s new procedure for obtaining possession operates to deprive record owners of possession until disputes over “title” are adjudicated after the record owner has sought the “appropriate” remedy in circuit court.
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the decision of the Circuit Court and dismissed the unlawful detainer proceeding brought against the Parrishes.
Conclusion:
I welcome the Court’s recognition that the rights of title and possession are “inextricably intertwined”. In post-foreclosure disputes between the borrower, purchaser, lender and trustee, bona fide ownership claims should certainly be decided in court before the sheriff kicks anyone out of their house. Eviction procedures should not be used as a weapon to railroad homeowners out of their houses. It makes no sense for there to be more than one legal case about the same thing. Hopefully the General Assembly will adopt new legislation accepting these revelatory developments while clarifying and streamlining court jurisdiction and procedures so that the parties need not litigate any more than is necessary to properly decide who has the right to own and possess the foreclosure property. The universe has changed, and we are closer to a future where the court procedures do not unfairly burden one side over the other and it is easier for each case to be decided on its merits and not who runs out of money first.
UPDATE: I was interviewed by Shu Bartholomew on her radio show/podcast, “On the Commons” about this Parrish v. Fannie Mae case. The podcast is now available.
Case Citation: Parrish v. Federal National Mortgage Association (Supr. Ct. Va. Jun. 16, 2016)
Photo Credit: 2012/11/12 OOFDG Defending Jodie’s Home via photopin (license)(does not depict the property discussed in this article)
May 31, 2016
Liberty University Suing Neighbors Over Unwanted Lake
Lynchburg got in the news lately on account of Liberty University suing neighbors over unwanted lake. People know about Liberty University (“LU”) from the political-incorrectness of its leaders, especially Jerry Falwell, Sr. Long before Donald Trump captured the headlines with controversial statements, Mr. Falwell had a comparable relationship with the news media. Liberty brands itself as a conservative Christian University. Until recently, I had no idea how intermeshed Liberty is in Lynchburg, Virginia. For example, in March 2016, Liberty purchased a 75% interest in the River Ridge Mall for $33.5 million dollars. This mall is across the street from LU. According to ABC13 WSET, Liberty will allow the property managers to operate the mall without much regard for the political or religious viewpoints of the University. R-rated movies will be shown. Victoria’s Secret will remain open. President Falwell, Jr. explained that the University purchased the controlling interest in the mall to diversify its investment portfolio.
River Ridge Mall is not the only local off-campus real estate owned by LU. Many years ago, a Real Estate Investment Trust donated Ivy Lake to Liberty University. Ivy Lake is the centerpiece of a residential development 10 miles from the LU campus. Ivy Hill Recreation, LLC (“IHR”), a LU subsidiary holding company and the homeowners around the lake are in an intractable dispute over maintenance of the lake’s dam and the road that runs over it. In April, 2016, IHR brought a lawsuit against more than 400 landowners, seeking contribution towards necessary repairs to the dam and the roadway. This case tests the institutional values of LU regarding respect for property rights and neighborly obligations. The case also illustrates risks to landowners when the duties to maintain and repair roads and bridges in a community are not very well-defined. Most suburban properties without direct access to public right of ways have recorded HOA covenants that refer to roads as commons areas. When considering purchase of properties in a HOA, potential buyers certainly should carefully review and consider the HOA disclosure documents. As this lawsuit shows, sometimes home buyers should be equally skeptical about the absence of restrictive covenants when there are “common areas” that require maintenance.
This case captured my attention because I grew up a mile from a man-made lake in rural Virginia. While the lake and adjoining park are owned by the local government, some of our neighbors had lakefront properties. My brothers and I used to walk to the lake during the winter and sled down the side of the dam. One winter, someone built a sledding ramp near the bottom of the dam for cheap, risky thrills. In the summer, I would run up the side of the dam for an intense workout. Perhaps IHR could offer rights to use a beach area on the lake as an incentive to maintain the dam?
According to the lawsuit, the developer constructed a dam across ivy creek in order to create Lake Ivy. The lake adds scenic and recreational value to adjoining owners. The developer built a road across the dam. Some of the homes around the lake are only accessible by the road across the dam. The lakefront owners have easements to use the lake for recreational purposes. What is unusual here is that the lake, dam and road are not owned by the county or by an HOA. The developer donated the Lake to Liberty University, subject to the easements of the homeowners. Liberty faculty, students and staff rarely use the lake. A few years ago the Commonwealth of Virginia determined that per statute, the dam required extensive repairs, particularly the spillway and the road over the dam. If the spillway and road are not repaired, they must be closed to mitigate risks of failure. The repairs will cost approximately $1 million dollars. The state ordered IHR to comply with the safety requirements. Because of all of this, Liberty is no longer interested in owning the lake property. If they can’t get the owners to assume ownership of the property, they at least want them to contribute to the repairs.
This dispute is complicated by the fact that some defendant owners have lakefront acreage and don’t use the dam road, some rely upon the road over the dam (with no lakefront), and some are on the water and rely upon the dam road for access.
The neighborhoods surrounding the lake are not without any restrictive covenants. While they don’t all appear to be an HOA, most of them are subject to a declaration of agreements that restricts development to residential use, sets up an architectural committee, prohibits commercial uses, limits unsightly outbuildings, and other restrictions.
The gravamen of LU’s demands to the homeowners is not unreasonable. If the owners want to continue to enjoy access to their properties, someone needs to maintain the dam road. If the waterfront owners want to continue to enjoy the lake, someone needs to support the repairs to the spillway. Many landowners willingly signed documentation that would require them to make pro-rata contributions to the repairs. LU would prefer to have the owners form a HOA with the lake property as a common area. The lawsuit doesn’t request that the owners be forced into a formal HOA. Judges have discretion to craft solutions to easement disputes. However, they cannot decree creation of an HOA. HOAs must be set up by the developer beforehand, because rarely will owners unanimously consent to one. Enough oppose the efforts to require filing of the lawsuit. LU’s decision to file the lawsuit is more reasonable than unilaterally draining the lake and eliminating the dam without an effort to resolve the dispute. Without the lake, the owners will lose a perk. Without the roadway, their properties become useless because of lack of access.
The lawsuit suggests that the legal and practical aspects of all of this has been apparent for many years. Any potential buyer could research land records and determine that if the dam road required repairs, someone would have to pay for it. Also, the developer who built the lake apparently did it on the cheap. The lawsuit alleges that, “The work necessary to armor or harden the spillway was contemplated when the dam was originally conducted, however it apparently was not completed, and it must be done now as a condition of maintaining the dam.”
What is LU asking the Court to do for them? The lawsuit contains five claims:
Count 1: Duty to Maintain Easement (both the lake and the required repairs)
Count 2: Contribution (to IHR towards Required Repairs and other related issues)
Count 3: Right to Assess a Fee (for use of the lake, consistent with the right to makes rules & regulations)
Count 4: Negative Reciprocal Easement (lake development parcels have similar restrictions, most have express easements for recreational use of lake subject to rules and regulations, because they have easements for use, they should be bound by the rules and regulations, and also should be bound to contribute to the required repairs)
Count 5: Otherwise, owners must (1) personally make the repairs or (2) suffer the consequences of an abandoned easement.
In my opinion, IHR is overreaching somewhat in this lawsuit. I doubt that the judge would enter an order that would create a quasi-HOA relationship between the parties absent a unanimous agreement. The lawsuit burdens the owners with having to defend the case. It forces them to take a position, either participate in the maintenance and repairs or abandone their interest in the road, dam and lake. I would be very surprised if the judge would do more than deciding that the LU subsidiary is entitled to financial contribution for the minimum amount of repairs to maintain the easements.
Regardless of its outcome, this case has lessons learned for prospective property owners. Buyers should not assume that the developer will record covenants that will adequately address common area maintenance. If a developer wants to give away a property like a man-made lake that is unfinished and requires maintenance, then an institution like a University should consider the implications before accepting the gift. Hopefully these parties can resolve this dispute and avoid endless litigation and/or removal of the dam. Ivy Lake could remain a blessing, and not become a curse.
photo credit: The James River from the Old N & W Railroad Bridge via photopin (license)(does not depict creek or lake in article)
